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In the following pages, I start by telling the strange story of a
painter and of his picture. The story, I argue, invites questions about
artistic space that could be productively asked of legal space too-the
space, that is, that every legal theory and practice, each time and in
different ways, institutes and rules. What, the story seems to ask, is to
"think" pictures? Where do the origins of artistic space lie? Indeed,
where is the heartland of artistic space? And so too-where is the
heartland of legal space? Where for example is the heartland of con-
tract, murder, citizenship or war? Such questions-as it will be ap-
parent to anyone interested in today's most troubling debates over the
future of the nation states and of the rule of law-are of considerable
2
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importance and should not be ignored by a genuinely imaginative le-
gal scholarship. In what follows I first suggest that many questions
about say contract, murder, citizenship or war are better understood as
"how" questions rather than "what" or "where" questions-then I
work out some insights for a post-Heideggerian understanding of legal
space. So the point here is not to look specifically into one or another,
legal or political practice. Nor am I thinking here of a new theory, or
even meta-theory, thereof. Instead, and much mo're limitedly, I hope
merely if resolutely to do just that-to tell a story and ask what I think
is a very central question: the question, that is, of legal space. To the
extent that it is by asking a question that we can best visualize and
then tackle its contours, the following considerations offer a fresh out-
look on assumptions dominant in legal theory and practice-though to
suspend judgment and invite reflection, rather than spell out the spe-
cific agenda of any change, is the immediate task of these first nota-
tions on the matter of legal space.
INTIMATIONS
1. The Devil's Elixirs. At one point in the book entitled The
Devil's Elixirs,' Hoffmann tells us the strange story of a young, gifted
painter whose world and craft go suddenly into pieces. Here is the
story.2
Once upon a time, the mighty Republic of Genoa decided to ask
Camillo, prince of P., whether he would be prepared to give a good
lesson to some fearsome Algerian corsairs who were raiding the Re-
public's coasts. Camillo was an ambitious person-so, without too
1. E.T.A. HOFFMANN, THE DEVIL'S ELIXIRS (Ronald Taylor trans., John Calder Publish-
ers, Ltd. 1963). The history of the publication and of the translation of this book is unusual.
Here, suffice to say that there are two German editions of the book, one of 1816, the other of
1827. Where possible, I have followed the first 1816 edition, published in Berlin under the
title Die Elixiere des Teufels-Nachgelassene Papiere des Bruders Medardus eines
Capuziners. The choice seemed justified by the fact that the 1816 edition was the only one
authorized by Hoffmann himself, who died in 1822, five years before the second German edi-
tion came to light (1827). Furthermore, on the initial 1816 German edition is based the par-
ticular English translation (by R. Taylor, Calders and Boyars Limited, 1963), which I have
referred to in my text. Though an earlier English translation of 1824 seemed at times prefer-
able for its overall warmth and evocative atmosphere, that earlier translation represents only
an abridged version of the German original-hence the decision to keep to the later 1963
English translation for the purposes of this essay.
2. Id.
2004]
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much thinking about it, he decided to write to his eldest son Fran-
cesco, instructing him to return home and govern in his place while he
was away on his punitive expeditions. At that time, Francesco was
studying painting at the academy of Leonardo da Vinci and was so
taken by his occupation that, we are told, he had no intention of re-
turning home-for, he replied to his father, he "knew how to wield the
brush but not the scepter."'3 After a further failed attempt to bring his
son home, without more the old prince decided to disown Francesco in
favour of his brother Zenobio. Relieved rather than upset by such a
harsh decision, Francesco "signed a document solemnly revoking his
succession to the Prince's throne in favour of his younger brother[]"
and "renouncing his name and rank, became a painter, and eked out a
scanty existence on the small yearly allowance which his brother
granted him."4 At the side of the old master, and learning from him,
Francesco soon became a renowned painter securing commissions for
many an altar-piece in churches and monasteries. Leonardo, on his
part, continued to provide the young Francesco with his advice and as-
sistance-until his death, at a great age.5
At this point, the story takes a first, unexpected turn. "Then like a
fire that has been smouldering for a long time, pride and wantonness
broke out again in the young Francesco. He considered himself the
greatest painter of his time, and coupling his artistic perfection with
his rank, he called himself 'the noble painter."' 6 It was thus that, we
are told, Francesco began to speak with increasing condescendence of
his old master while, on the other hand, taking to paint in a wholly
new manner.7 His figures were now richer and his colours brighter-a
style that, while gaining Francesco much praise, also made him more
and more vain, and more arrogant than ever.8 Needless to say, Fran-
cesco was soon attracted by all sorts of dubious youth and practices.
9
Such reproachable company seemed to be mainly one of painters and
sculptors "who were completely absorbed in the art of Antiquity and
scorned all that modern artists, inspired by Christianity, had conceived
and executed in its glory."' 0 Francesco, in particular, excelled in the
art of portraying very realistically "the sensuous beauty of the female
3. Id. at 252.
4. Id. at 253.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 254.
150 [Vol. 41
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form, for he drew the erotic quality from living models and his formal
values from the marble busts of Antiquity."'" Among such ancient
statues, Francesco, we are told, had long had a real liking, indeed a
true obsession, for one well-known portrait of Venus, of which Hoff-
mann here tells us no more.
12
Now, it so happened that Francesco's libertine life soon caused
him to run into trouble. Short of money, Francesco recalls that a
Capuchin monastery had some time before commissioned him a pic-
ture of Saint Rosalia-for which he had been promised a considerable
recompense.' 3 Despite his repulsion for the sacred art, Francesco now
imagines "to portray Saint Rosalia in the nude, with features like those
of that Venus."' 4 It is at this point that the story takes a second, unex-
pected turn. As the young painter starts on his new work, he is pro-
gressively overwhelmed by a truly inexplicable power, by force of
which Francesco is pushed "to drape round the naked body," as ini-
tially conceived, "demure and graceful robes-a crimson gown and an
azure cloak."15 An angelic face, too, now appears on the canvas,
though Francesco is unable to take himself to complete it.' 6 At first
the only figure on the canvas about which the Capuchins had earlier
given no particular instructions, Francesco now draws Saint Rosalia
surrounded by a number of other figures in a scene suggesting her
holy martyrdom.17 What is more, Hoffmann tells us, Francesco
was completely absorbed in his picture: it was as though it had become a
powerful spirit which was holding him in his arms, high above the wicked
life which he had hitherto been living. Yet he was still unable to complete
her face, and this tormented him day and night.
18
It is then that Francesco's party arrives-finding him lying in bed,
looking rather unwell. 19 Francesco's protestations that by some evil
demon he was being prevented from completing his picture meet with
skepticism and laughter.20 By contrast, some Syracusan wine is now
passed around and drunk before the incomplete picture, and toasts are
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 254-55.
16. Id.
.17. Id. at 255.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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made to pagan divinities.2 1 This time, however, Francesco is reluctant
to join-in, and all the more derided by the others for that reason.22 Fi-
nally, one of the party, pretending to be a doctor, takes out a bottle
from under his cloak. 23 That is an odd moment. "A strange scent
filled the room, overcoming the men so that they sank into their chairs
and closed their eyes as if in sleep.' ' 24 Francesco, annoyed for the con-
tinuing derision to which he had been subjected, suddenly takes the
bottle and drinks a mouthful. 25 The scene now changes rapidly. All
others, wakening from their stupor, leave.26 As to Francesco, Hoff-
mann tells us:
As Mount Vesuvius roars and sends forth its destructive flames, so
streams of fire shot through Francesco's soul. All the pagan subjects he
had ever painted appeared as living forms before his eyes, and cried out
fiercely: "You too must come, my beloved goddess. You too must live
and be mine, or I shall deliver myself up to the gods of the underworld."
Then he saw Venus standing close to the picture, beckoning gently to
him. 27
At the sudden view of his beloved Venus, Francesco quickly
stands up and rushes to paint the head of Saint Rosalia-yet, inexpli-
cably,
[i]t was as though his will could no longer command his hand, for the
brush continually slipped away from the clouds enveloping the saint's
head, and painted involuntarily the heads of the barbaric figures which
surrounded her. But her celestial countenance emerged more and more
plainly, and suddenly she looked at him with such dazzling eyes that he
fell to the ground as if struck by lightning. 28
Fainting and then waking up again, Francesco drinks more of theFainti g 29 u
bottle's contents. But, turning once more to his picture, he now real-
izes that, meanwhile, his work has been mysteriously completed-
though the picture now shows a lustful Venus, not a pious St
Rosalia. 30 The picture, in fact, seems alive and moving-yet frantic
21. Id.
22. Id. at 255-56.
23. Id. at 256.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 257.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
[Vol. 41
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attempts by Francesco to take this devilish Venus in his arms show
that, out there, there is only inert matter.3 And yet,
[o]n the third day, while he was standing before the picture motionless as a
statue, the door of his room opened and he heard a rustling sound behind
him as of a woman's dress. Turnin* round, he saw alive before him, in all
her loveliness, the woman of his picture. Speechless, he fell at her feet,
raising his hands to her in worship. The woman lifted him up, a gentle
smile on her lips, and told him that, when she had been a little girl and he
a student at Leonardo's academy, she had often seen him and cherished
even then an all-consuming love for him; she had left her parents and rela-
tives and come to Rome to look for him, for an inner voice had told her
that he loved her too, and that he had painted her portrait out of desire and
longing for her. Francesco realized that he was under the spell of a myste-
rious spiritual relationship to this woman, and that this relationship had
caused his passionate love and the wonderful picture to merge into one.
32
THE ORIGINALITY OF LEGAL SPACE
"Ars est perceptionum exercitatarum constructio ad unum exitum utilem
vitae. 33
2. Thinking. Hoffmann's generally unorthodox, personal story
is known. Trained as a lawyer, Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann
(1776-1822) was an unusual personality of many talents (he was,
amongst other things, a judge, a musician and a writer), and he exer-
cised a great deal of influence over the likes of Baudelaire, Balzac,
Poe, Dostoevskij, Schumann and Offenbach. The Devil's Elixirs-one
of his most famous works-has been widely read, as widely analyzed
has been its psychological inventiveness, gothic narrative and roman-
tic angst. The aim of the book, Hoffmann once wrote to a friend, was
to reveal, through the strange, perverted life of a man who from his
birth had been tossed to and fro by the forces of Heaven and Hell,
those mysterious relationships between the human mind and the
higher values enshrined in Nature, values whose meaning we glimpse
31. Id.
32. Id. at 257-58.
33. DIOMEDES, DE ARTE GRAMMATICA, 2 (GL. 1.421.5-7K.).
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in those rare moments of insight which we choose to call the products
of Chance.
34
Thus, Hoffmann seems to ask, what is it that we normally summon
when we speak of "Nature"-when we speak of the visible world un-
folding, or so we think, "out-there"? Is meaningful insight into "Na-
ture" the result of "Chance"? How is "Nature," the visible world,
grasped-how is it thought-by human being?
The Devil's Elixirs is a complex book with many themes. Yet one
of the central questions that Hoffmann seems to be asking throughout
his book is, quite simply, what is each time at stake in thinking-here,
in thinking pictures? Is thinking a representing or imitating of the
visible world (a re-presenting of it)-in the sense of the scholastic
adaequatio rei et intellectus?35 Or is there something else that is eve-
rywhere at stake in thinking? If thinking is only a representing or imi-
tating of the world outside-what, then, of Francesco's failed attempts
to paint saint Rosalia "in the nude, with features like those of that Ve-
nus,"36 his model, that he liked so much? The cynical might be
tempted to treat the story of Francesco and his devilish Venus as just
another instance of a mad painter given to drink, and heaven only
knows what other similar practices-and so give those attempts no
special notice. That in my view would be a rather rushed move-
doing a bad service to someone who is still today regarded by many as
one of the most interesting and complex writers of modernity. By
contrast, one set of questions raised by Francesco's failed attempts to
paint a somewhat iconoclastic image of the saint after a Venus he
knew so well seems to be: is representation really ever possible? And
if it is, how is it possible? To start with, Francesco seems to be over-
taken by a 'powerful spirit' forcing him to paint a holy image of the
saint, not an iconoclastic one.37 Secondly, however, he seems to be
strangely unable to paint the face of the saint, in whatever fashion.
Until, that is, Francesco suddenly gains a glimpse of his beloved Ve-
nus "standing close to the picture, beckoning gently to him."38 It is
only at that point that Francesco feels he has the energy to try again-
only though to find out that all he can in fact draw are the heads of the
34. Ronald Taylor, Introduction to HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at ix.
35. See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, On the Essence of Truth, in BASIC WRITINGS 111, 113
(David Farrell Krell ed., HarperCollins Publishers 1993) (1977).
36. HOFFMANN, supra note 1, at 254.
37. Id. at 255.
38. Id. at 257.
[Vol. 41
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"barbaric figures" near Saint Rosalia, rather than the saint herself.39
Yet it is as if, somewhat paradoxically, the reluctant painting of those
unlikely figures makes the saint look all the more resplendent. In the
end, the picture is in fact completed-and it does show a lustful Venus
rather than a pious Saint Rosalia. How though could it all happen the
way it did? Who or what is really the devilish Venus that suddenly
appears next to the picture and, then, comes alive "in all her loveli-
ness"? 4° What place does that Venus really have in Francesco's think-
ing the thought-and so painting the picture-of St Rosalia? Surely, I
would suggest, there is here a figure of "excess"-an excess in respect
of the picture that Francesco had initially set out to paint. But if Fran-
cesco's devilish Venus is, as it were, the excess of the painter's in-
tended representation-what, then, might be at stake in thinking?
3. Contract, Murder, Citizenship and War. Surely, to ask what
is thinking-what is each time at stake in thinking-asks us to begin
with thinking thought afresh. That is, it asks us to begin with what
Martin Heidegger called "meditating thinking," a thinking that medi-
tates thought-as opposed to "calculating thinking," a thinking that
measures, calculates thought. 1 But what in particular might lawyers
need to think afresh? One obvious answer is that lawyers might need
to think afresh the many theories and practices they put in place-
those, for example, that tell us what counts as contract, murder, citi-
zenship or war. In other words, lawyers might need to interrogate
what I would like here to call the characteristic "space" that each time
such theories and practices institute and rule. Indeed on inspection it
is precisely the status of such space-the status of the space that is
each time traced out by what legal theory or practice is each time in
39. Id.
40. Id. at 257-59.
41. The difference between "meditating thinking" and "calculating" thinking (this latter
being the "metaphysical," instrumental thinking characteristic of Western thinking, including
legal thinking, from Plato onwards) is a recurrent theme in Heidegger's work. See, e.g.,
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, What is Metaphysics?, in PATHMARKS 82 (David Krell trans., 1998);
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Gelassenheit, in DISCOURSE ON THINKING (1966); 13 MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, Zur Erorterung Der Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggesprach uber das
Danken, in GESAMTAUSGABE 37-75 (Vittorio Klostermann 1983) (1944); MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
UBERLIEFERTE SPRACHE UND TECHNISCHE SPRACHE (1989) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER,
UBERLIEFERTE]. Importantly, calculating thinking is en-closed or self-referential thinking.
UMBERTO GALIMBERTI, IDEE: IL CATALOGO E QUESTO (1992) ("C' un pensiero che calcola e
c' un pensiero che pensa. 11 primo 6 un pensiero chiuso che nasce quando l'uomo non si
coglie pii nel mondo, ma pone il mondo innanzi a s e, oggettivandolo, ne dispone in vista
del suo impiego, della sua manipolazione, del suo dominio."). Id. at 25-26. See also infra
118.
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place-that is in my view so dramatically at stake today in so many
current debates over the future of Western democracy and the rule of
law 42
Initially, however, to interrogate legal space as a way of thinking
thought afresh must mean, I suggest, to question the origins of legal
space rather than to examine the form or contents of a particular the-
ory or practice-thereby positing those origins as given.43 As we will
see, to posit the origins of legal space as given would be to imply the
universality and neutrality of legal space and so to deny, in particular,
what I would describe as the evidence of its politics.' By contrast, I
42. The debates which I refer to here are those concerning such controversial issues as,
for example, economic globalization, the globalization of communication technologies, the
globalization of transportation, the advent of "Risk Society," the ecological impact of reflex-
ive modernization, and U.S. exceptionalism and the "new world order." Diverse as such is-
sues of course are, one thing they have in common is that they raise questions of exceptional
importance for the legal jurisdictions implicated in those processes. See generally ANTHONY
GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY (1990); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS
A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., 1992); JEAN-MARIE GUtHENNO, LA FIN DE LA
DEMOCRATIE (1993); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (Co-
lumbia Univ. Press 1998); MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000); HAROLD
JAMES, THE END OF GLOBALIZATION: LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2001). For
views of the impact of such processes on the law, see, e.g., BAUMAN, supra at ch. 5; WILLIAM
TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL THEORY (William Twining & Christopher McCrudden
eds., 2000) [hereinafter TWINING, GLOBALIZATION]; the numerous contributions to Diritti e
Globalizzazione IX, RAGION PRATICA 16 (Piero Barboni ed., 2001); and TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESSES (Michael Likosky ed., 2002). According to one increasingly popular view,
"[i]t is in the legal realm that we find many of the deepest weaknesses and greatest hopes of
our age. It is in the process of law, perhaps more than in economic institutions, that the great-
est puzzles facing our societies lie." Jeffrey Sachs, Globalization and the Rule of Law, Ad-
dress Before Yale Law School (Oct. 16, 1998), in YALE LAW SCHOOL OCCASIONAL PAPERS
(2d ser., No. 4), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/2.
43. One excellent but ultimately insufficient instance of this, combining Kelsenian and
Saussurian insights and distributing the legal system along the axes of an "ordre normatif'
and of an "espace normatif," is generally GtRARD TIMSIT, THtMES ET SYSTtMES DE DROIT
(1986). For this author, "ordre normatif' is a "systZme d'archinormes" or "d'engendrement
des normes," that is, "un syst~me des r~gles assignant un certain type de rapports, de com-
patibilit6, de conditionnement, aux normes considdrdes dans leurs relations r6ciproques et
dans les relations qu'elles entretiennent avec les organes, avec les institutions ... qui les en-
gendrent." Id. at 29. By contrast, "[alvec la notion d'En [espace normatif], il n'est plus ques-
tion de s'interroger sur le syst~me d'engendrement des normes, sur le mode de generation des
r~gles, mais sur le contenu des normes elles-mimes, et la signification qu'elles rev~tent pour
ceux auxquels elles s'adressent." Id. at 69.
44. The work of the Critical Legal Studies movement has been of course pivotal in at-
tracting (unwanted) attention to the politics of law, but in many cases the evidence of those
politics has been discovered within the legal theories or practices examined, thus paradoxi-
cally reaffirming the very theory and practices that were being criticized. See generally Dun-
can Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom & Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology,
36 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 518 (1986) (1 am grateful to Duncan Kennedy for pointing out this paper
to me); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE To CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). For a parallel ap-
proach in comparative law, see David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Corn-
10
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suggest that the question initially must be: what is each time at the be-
ginning of legal space? How may a certain legal theory or practice
have originated? Did it really stem from, as the prevailing legal-
philosophical tradition of the West would normally hold, one or an-
other of the innumerable, usually written texts of yet another legal
theory or practice? Or is it perhaps the institutional context of any
such theory or practice that-in a socio-legal tradition closer to our
own-we should be looking at, instead? What is that which is at the
beginning of legal space-text, institutional context or-and this
would be a third possibility-some other sort of "space"? Is my con-
tractual space, for example, truly that which my written or oral con-
tract says it is or even that which, say, my specific economic position
allows or induces me to negotiate? Or is it perhaps the case that, by
contrast, such space is in fact some other sort of space-neither tex-
tual nor properly institutional-contextual? Is it my being a murderer
really, principally linked to my evil deeds, or even to the institutional
context that calls me a murderer? Perhaps not, as shown for example
by Raskol'nikov's odd fortunes in Crime and Punishment.45 Am I a
citizen of this country only so long as my papers say so, or so long as I
live and work here, or can it be the case that I am a citizen because of
something else that, quite literally, makes me a citizen? And is war
simply what international treatises say that it is,46 or even that which a
particular institutional context, for example, a supposed "clash of civi-
lizations"47 may or may not be said to trigger-or is it perhaps some-
thing else that makes the war? And, finally, if contract, murder, citi-
zenship or war are not only what they appear to be, but something
else-what then is every time at stake in legal space? These are by
and large the sort of questions that interest me here-the questions
that I here begin to ask as a way into what I propose to call the heart-
land of legal space, as well as a contribution towards the debate over
the future of Western democracy and the rule of law. In particular, to
interrogate legal space-to walk back toward what must be the ever
mobile heartland of legal space-is, I suggest, to ask how is each time
parativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 545 (1997).
45. FEODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (George Gibian ed., Jessie Coulson
trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1964) (1953).
46. Both the attack on the Twin Towers and, in a perfect parallel, the second war in Iraq
show how, unfortunately, war is not simply that which an international treatise may or may
not say that it is.
47. This is the notoriously disputable thesis of Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civi-
lizations, in THE FUTURE OF PEACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 454 (Nicholas N. Kittrie et
al. eds., 2003).
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the legal space that is each time at stake. Or, to put it somewhat dif-
ferently, to start on the way back towards the heartland of legal space
is to think about the originality of that space-so that it is really on
that originality and the inauguration thereof (rather than the "origins"
as one might think at first) that I wish to offer here some preliminary
considerations.
4. The Matter of Legal Space. But first, how might Hoffmann's
story have anything to suggest to a lawyer? Is Francesco not an art-
ist-and only that, at that?
Francesco is indeed an artist and his picture is a work of art. So,
how might the making of a work of art be at all regarded to be in any
way similar to, for example, the ruling of a court or the drafting of leg-
islation-and, in fact, how might a work of art, of all things, be in any
way associated to, say, a legal decision or a statutory provision? Sim-
ply put, a parallel would lie in that both painters and lawyers are said
to be the holders of particular techniques that allow them to represent
the visible world "out-there" within the confined boundaries of, for
example, a canvas or a legal theory or practice. In a way, therefore,
both pictures and legal texts such as, for example, judicial decisions or
statutory provisions can be said to be representations resulting from
experience-artistic representations the former, legal representations
the latter. Both Plato and Aristotle argued how, in fact, representa-
tions can only amount to interpretations by a particular individual try-
ing to imitate reality (representations are mimesis)-though Aristotle,
unlike Plato, thought such representations, however imperfect, to be
useful to knowledge.48 Cicero, on his part, apparently employed the
term "ars" (art) to translate a definition of "technique" by the Stoic
Zeno-stressing how techniques are the representation of each time a
particular individual concerned with a particular end that is thought to
be useful to life ('ars est perceptionum exercitatarum constructio ad
unum exitum utilem vitae').49 Indeed, according to Quintilian, the
48. On Plato's concept of "techne" (technique), see generally MARGHERITA ISNARDI
PARENTE, TECHNE: MOMENTI DEL PENSIERO GRECO DA PLATONE AD EPICURO (La Nuova Italia
1966); 2 A.A. LONG & D.N. SEDLEY, THE HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHERS (1987); DAVID
ROOCHNIK, OF ART AND WISDOM: PLATO'S UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNE (1996).
49. See DIOMEDES, supra note 33. Diomedes' attribution of this definition to Cicero is
supported by PARENTE, supra note 48, at 290. Sceptical, by contrast, is Joanna Garbarino, in
M. TVLLI CICERONIS, FRAGMENTA 109 (loanna Garbarino ed., 1984). Isnardi Parente argues
that the transformation of the Roman "jus civile" from "scientia iuris" to a more structured
concept of "ars" (the Roman equivalent of the Greek techne-) had already began in the period
between the first century B.C. and the first century A.D.-though the first ever mention of the
term "ars" in this respect is in the later, well known definition of "ius" by Celsus as "ars boni
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most common definition of art amongst the Romans highlighted pre-
cisely the same points ("artem constare ex perceptionibus consentien-
tibus et coexercitatis adfinem utilem vitae")5 0 a point confirming how
generally Romans agreed with Aristotle, not with Plato, as to the cog-
nitively useful if no doubt imperfect character of any such representa-
tion."
The parallel between an artist and a lawyer is not far-fetched, and
has been made or implied before, for example, in the case of adoption.
In holding that adoption must imitate nature, Dig. 1, 7, 16 and Inst. 1,
11, 4 refer to an old Aristotelian maxim both to explain the limits of
adoption and to highlight the artistic power of the lawyer. Bartolus
and then Baldus reiterate the point, while in the 17 th century Joannes
Oinotomus goes as far as freely recognizing how adoption, like art,
imitates nature." Nor has the association between artists and lawyers
become any less popular since. Pringsheim, for example-on com-
paring the Roman system of actions with the English forms of action
and noting the reliance of both on an individual, personified action-
observed how
in entering the domain of art, both nations show a similar inclination and
endowments. Eminently Roman and eminently English is the ability to
portray, and especially the ability to depict the characteristic head; both
Roman sculptor and English painter exhibit a grasp of personal character-
istics, a sense of reality and of the significant, which is related to the ju-
ridical talent just described.53
Lawyers are being painted as painters to this very day. So, for ex-
ample, one critic has recently argued how "[a] healthy global general
et aequi." DIG.1.I.lpr. (Ulpianus, I inst.), http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2004). The debate is examined in VINCENZO SCARANO USSANI, L'ARs DEI
GIURsTI: CONSIDERAZIONI SULLO STATUTO EPISTEMOLOGICo DELLA GiURISPRUDENZA
ROMANA ch. I (G. Giappichelli ed., Torino 1997).
50. MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA liber 2, cap. 17, § 41
(T.E. Page et al. eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1921), http://www.intratext.com/
1XT/LAT0332/_index.htm#fonte.
51. See also MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ACADEMICA PRIORA liber 2, cap. 7, § 22 (n.d.),
available at http://phil.flet.mita.keio.ac.jp/person/nakagawa/texts/cicero/acadprio.html ("ars
uero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animis perceptionibus
constat"); MARcus TULLIUS CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUM liber 2, § 59, at 148 (T.E. Page et
al. eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1961) ("ex quibus conlatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque
efficimus partim ad usum vitae... necessarias"); PARENTE, supra note 48.
52. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Sovereignty of the Artist: A Note on Legal Maxims and
Renaissance Theories of Art, in DE ARTIBUS OPUSCULA XL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERWIN
PANOFSKY 267, 269-71 (Millard Meiss ed., New York Univ. Press 1961) (1960). "Adoptio
enim seu ars imitatur naturam." Id. at 269 n. 11 (quoting J. INST. 1.11.4. (Venetiis, 1643)).
53. Fritz Pringsheim, The Inner Relationship Between English and Roman Law,
5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 347, 358-59 (1935).
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jurisprudence should be able to give a total picture (descrip-
tive/explanatory/normative/analytical) of the phenomena of law in the
modern world."54 For, it is maintained, the question for jurisprudence
is "what is involved in depicting (i.e. interpreting, describing and ex-
plaining) a single legal system or order[J" 55 and it is to questions such
as that one that "a substantial part of our vast heritage of jurispruden-
tial writing is ostensibly addressed."56 In an alternative view, lawyers
are painters whose portraits are self-portraits that need to be subjected
to a comparative semiological analysis,57 or else painters whose paint-
ings offer competing views of the visible world that need not be at-
tacked or reconciled, but simply accepted on their own terms.58
Many more examples of this old-standing parallel between the art
of painting and the art of law could of course be mentioned. But the
point here is simply to highlight how Hoffmann's story (the strange
story of a picture that was meant to show an "illicit" St Rosalia but, as
it turns out, does not do just that) might indeed help us think legal
theories and legal practices-the legal space they institute and rule-
afresh. For there is some obvious similarity between a picture and a
legal text or even the institutional context which may have led to it-
at least to the extent that both legal texts and their institutional con-
texts are traditionally thought to be reflecting, however imperfectly or
creatively, the worldly experience of those who set them up or lived
them through. In particular, it is experience that, in such a view, lies
at the origins of both the art of painting and the art of law-of both le-
gal and artistic space.
So on inspection our initial question asking what is at the begin-
ning of legal space could be aptly reformulated as asking, in particu-
lar, what is at the beginning of legal experience. Take for example the
history of judicial decisions, statutes, legal procedures, substantive
54. TWINING, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 42, at 88 (emphasis added). See also William
Twining Reviving General Jurisprudence, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES (Michael
Likosky ed., 2002).
55. TWINING, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 42, at 165 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Mitchel Lasser, Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A Project in Pro-
gress, 1997 UTAH L.R. 471 passim (1997). According to Lasser, American lawyers John
Dawson and John Merryman "paint.. . portraits of the French civil judicial system" that "are
rather difficult to believe." Id. at 472-73. This critic's proposed strategy is thus to resort to a
comparative semiological analysis treating judicial texts in France and the U.S. as "portraits"
and, "[i]nsofar as judicial texts offer representations of their judicial authors and of these au-
thors' practices, . . . as self-portraits." Id. at 481. See generally Mitchel Lasser, Judicial
(Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, (1995).
58. Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Informa-
tion, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 221, 226 (1999).
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laws, the architecture of courts or prisons, etc. Indeed, that history
shows well how-just as painters, sculptors, etc. must develop a mix
of practical skills and personal sensibility to produce what piece of
work they may have had initially in mind-so, too, lawyers must be-
come the skillful holders of complex techniques, both personal and
useful, if they are to do properly their job. Accordingly, lawyers like
painters work out their ideas-they build each time their different sto-
ries-on the basis of what relevant experience they might or might not
have of the outside world. For, indeed, "[t]he life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience."5 9 As Roscoe Pound generally put
it in regard of what he called "legal precepts,"
(t]here is in any legal system a traditional technique of developing and ap-
plying legal precepts by which those precepts are eked out, extended, re-
stricted, and adapted to the administration of justice. This technique of
developing and applying the precepts is quite as authoritative as and no
less important than the precepts themselves. 60
However, if at the beginning of legal space is-as the parallel
with artistic space suggests-experience, the more difficult question,
it seems to me, is: what is each time the how of that experience? Is
the how of that experience subjective, objective or, by contrast, nei-
ther properly subjective nor properly objective? Is it imitation or is it
creation? And if the how of that experience is neither simply subjec-
tive nor simply objective-neither sheer imitation nor outright crea-
tion-how then is that experience? Once again-on asking such ques-
tions I wish in what follows to interrogate the origins of that
experience rather than immersing myself in it by analyzing its many
forms and contents as they can be found in everyday life. In particular,
I wish to ask: how original is the experience that is each time at the
origins of legal space? Ultimately, as I have earlier indicated, to in-
terrogate legal space is precisely to interrogate that originality.
It is important at this point to consider that, in fact, the question
seems to be twofold. First, that question asks: how is each time, pre-
cisely, the space of legal representations? Second, that question asks:
which is, each time, the heartland of legal space? No doubt, legal
procedures, judicial decisions, legal rules, regulations, courts, prisons
etc., but also, for example, legal histories-are each time the specific
place of given judicial, legislative or administrative instructions that
59. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
60. Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 70, 74 (1955)
[hereinafter Pound, Comparative].
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may or may not be a reflection of one's own experience of everyday
life. Collectively, such places make what might be called the "legal
archive." But, then, how is each time the legal archive? Where might
its originality lie? Or, which is the same, where do those legal places
really come from?6 Do they come from what other predominantly
written texts the legal archive is typically seen to arrange orderly to-
gether? Alternatively, do they come from the institutional context of
which the legal archive is said to be each time the product? To be
sure, for the setting up of that strange archive the individual and col-
lective experience of those involved matters. It sets the rhythm of
ideas.62 It provides, each time, the building site of a different world.
So, lawyers like painters might well be "artists"-but, clearly, their art
is of a worldly nature. It is experience-namely, a means to an end.
It is, quite literally, archival, rhythmic interpretation of texts and insti-
tutional contexts. But then, again, how is precisely that experience-
how is precisely the art of legal space? How, in particular, is the
space of that interpretation and, also, which is each time the heartland
thereof?
Together, the how of legal space and the heartland of legal space
would be nothing less than what I will here call, for short, the matter
of legal experience-and so the matter of legal space. That matter is,
I think, intriguing-and, again, as I understand it that matter would be
something other than the mere form or content of any particular legal
theory or practice. Nor, on the other hand, would there be here always
the same matter, or else the simple, crude matter of the supposed in-
strumental function of any such theory or practice. And yet-neither
just form or contents, essence, structure or function-the matter of le-
gal experience is, it seems to me, central in the precise sense that it
lies at the core of so many of today's more challenging legal and po-
litical debates.
So then, what is the matter of legal experience-what is the matter
of legal space?
5. Comparing As Such, or the How of Legal Space. As noted, a
first response to the core question of the matter of legal space requires
us to take a first step back toward the inauguration of legal space.63
61. Again, by asking where does a certain legal place come from I mean to ask questions
about the originality of those places-not just the textual or contextual origins of them.
62. For an elegant essay on law's rhythm, see Jan Patrick Oppermann, Anaximander's
Rhythm and the Question of Justice, 14 L. & CRITIQUE 45 (2003).
63. See supra 3.
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What then is it that inaugurates legal space-or, better still, how is it
that legal space is inaugurated? I will return to that question through-
out the remainder of this paper. 64 Before we can proceed, however,
we must briefly consider how comparisons seem to be needed of both
artistic and legal measure-however apparent that may or may not
happen to be in any particular instance. So to interrogate legal as well
as artistic space-to ask which is the matter of a lawyer's experience
and so, then, which is the matter of legal space-must involve some
consideration of the art of comparison. In particular, we must ask: is
comparing central or peripheral to those arts?
(i) Here, it will be sufficient to note how comparing has been gen-
erally explained to be, quite simply, a drawing of comparisons. But
then, the question is, what would those comparisons be like?
Etymologically to compare means to bring jointly into presence-
from the Latin cum-parere, to present together. Thus, according to a
first traditional view, comparing draws comparisons as co-presences.
That is, in particular, what for example comparative lawyers would
typically do--draw comparisons as co-presences. Co-presences of
what? Co-presences of present-presences-legal texts or institutional
contexts-for, surely, one can only compare what is always already
there, available for comparison.
But then, if comparing is a drawing of comparisons as co-
presences of present-presences, each comparing and its comparisons
must, on this first account, come after the present-presences that, on
comparing, are to be presented together (or so, at least, it would ap-
pear). That is to say, there must be here, once again, a representa-
tion-in the very sense of there being, each time, a re-presentation or
imitation of certain present-presences that only thus would come into
their co-presence. Comparisons, in this first, commonly-held view,
would therefore be but a particular type of legal representation-in
fact, a second-order representation, or a representation of representa-
tions-one whereby the re-presentation of the visible world occurs, as
it were, through a copy of a copy rather than through the "original
copy" itself. But then, a pale image of themselves, comparisons, in
this first view, end up fading away in their unbridgeable distance with
the Same.
(ii) That could well be so--comparisons could indeed be the result
of a very imperfect attempt to represent (imitate) the world "out-
there"-and no doubt many believed and others continue to believe
64. See infra 6.
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that that is what comparisons ultimately amount to (some very imper-
fect representation of reality). But then the question becomes-or so a
second view would immediately point out-where do present-
presences come from? Clearly, according to this second view, those
present-presences come from a separating of sort-the separating of a
picture or of a written legal text or of a certain institutional context
from the world at large. Indeed, the holders of this view would argue,'
it is precisely that separating that, above else, lets picture, legal tbxt or
institutional context come each time into their presence, or else into
their co-presence-and, in particular, it is the painter or the lawyer
(whether individually or collectively considered) who draws the part-
ing line at one point rather than another of the visible world. To put it
otherwise, representations in this second view would be creations of
sort and so legal representations, far from being merely a matter of
imitating something already present that lies in the surrounding world,
must be, they too, creations-the result of a separating as creating-
by those who, each time, set out to draw them.
So, on this second account, present-presences would come into
presence as a result of what separating-creating each time allows them
to be present or, else, to be co-present-like, for example, in the case
of legal representations and of legal comparisons. But if that is so,
then, one would think, comparisons including legal comparisons must
be much more (or, depending on one's outlook, much less) than sec-
ond order representations, or copies of other copies. Instead, they
must be a painter's or a lawyer's or a comparative lawyer's very own
artifact. That is why legal comparisons could not, in this second view,
be treated like second-order legal representations (a species to a ge-
nus)-more than any other legal representation could legitimately be
treated as just a second-order legal comparison. Legal comparisons
and other legal representations, by contrast, should be now let loose of
one another and then treated on an equal footing. For in this view
there would be each time the result of an individual or collective sepa-
rating-creating-so neither a copy as such, nor a copy of another
copy.
Comparisons, in particular, would make themselves heard indi-
vidually just enough to disappear, back again, into the mare magnum
of legal difference where no comparison is any longer possible-that
is, into the infinite variety of the Other (which is nothing Other than
the Same).65
65. Sarfatti noticed how the development of comparative law was at the beginning ac-
tively opposed by both the natural law school, for which comparisons were hopelessly imper-
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(iii) It is only now that we can ask the key question of the matter
of legal space: how, we must now ask, might be the heartland of any
such separating-creating-whether the result be a comparison or any
other representation? How, in particular, might the heartland be of a
lawyer's separating-creating of legal representations or of a compara-
tive lawyer's separating-creating of legal comparisons? And might
this heartland affect or infect, each time, such separating-creating in a
way that might have to be carefully considered?
One last point, though, needs to be clarified first-before we go to
the core of the question of legal space. On careful analysis, the sepa-
rating-creating that is here in question seems to be a presenting-
together of a presence thus being made present together with what
presence that presence is being separated from and so, too, made pre-
sent. In that sense, separating-creating seems to be a parting that is
indeed a creating of two or more parts-rather than a parting-
disappearing of one particular part from the whole. But then what that
must mean is that legal comparisons and other legal representations
may well be creations-yet one's own creating must first and fore-
most be a "comparing" in the specific sense of being a producing of
two or more presences that only thus can come properly into their co-
presence. Comparing, in this third sense, must thus be at the begin-
ning of comparisons as well as of other legal representations-not af-
ter the Same (first view), nor at the end of it (second view). Or, which
is the same, comparing would be something other than, merely, a
passing appearing of present presences or of co-present co-presences
(first view). And it would also be something other than a final disap-
pearing thereof (second view). All to the contrary, comparing would
be now much more accurately understood as a withdrawing from what
is present, so as to let comparisons or other legal representations
come properly or finally (depending on one's views) into sight. As
such, comparing would in this third view "precede" comparisons and
other legal representations (that is the sense of its being "at the begin-
fect, and the historical school, for which comparisons were outright irrelevant.
Au XVIe et au XVIW sicles, le ddveloppement du droit compare fut contrarid par
l'opposition des dcoles. D'une part, en effet, I'dcole du Droit naturel, d~daigneuse
de toute observation fondde sur des faits sociaux et dfsireuse d'dtablir les Eldments
d'un droit ideal et immuable, se refusait 6tudier des legislations qui selon elle ne
pouvajent 8tre que plus ou moins d~fectueuses; 1'6cole historique, d'autre part,
s'opposait A la legislation: selon elle, l'6volution juridique avait lieu fatalment
d'une mani&e ind~pendante de ]a volont6 humaine et par une orientation spon-
tande des exigences collectives populaires ....
M. Sarfatti, Les Premiers Pas du Droit Comparg, in II MLANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES
MAURY 237 (1960) (internal citation omitted).
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ning")-it would neither follow them behind nor pass away with
them, as the first two views by contrast would suggest. In particular,
there would be here, I suggest, a clearing of what is each time present
at hand so that each time a different legal difference can properly or
finally come into sight.
(iv) So, we can preliminarily conclude, experts as they are in the
art of representing the visible world through, respectively, a blank
canvas or a legal text or an institutional context-both painters and
lawyers including comparative lawyers have a "comparing," rather
than an imitating or a creating, as the true matter of their doing-and
that is what remains generally concealed in legal representations and
legal comparisons alike. Their comparing, in particular, would be at
the beginning of their doing, not after it or at the end of it. And it
would be each time an original comparing, not a comparing of the
Same or a comparing of the Other. Such comparing, however, would
be "original" in the rather overlooked sense of being productive-
poietic, poetic, imaginative, immanent, that is, eminently human. It
would be, in particular, a comparing that is the clearing that lets dif-
ference come properly or finally into sight. In short, there would be
what I would call a confined creating of difference. As a creating, it
could not be merely an imitating. As a confined creating, such com-
paring could not be a creating out of nothing (ex-nihilo). That is why
such a comparing-a "comparing as such," shall we now say (as op-
posed to comparing in the common sense of that word) -would seem
to be central to the art of law and, indeed, central to the art of thinking,
not peripheral. That is, it would seem to be what lies at the beginning
of legal space always, already inaugurating the originality of that
space-the originality, that is, of every legal theory and practice that
such space each time institutes and rules.
Take, for example, premodern law. Skilled as they had to be in
the representation of law's many domains, did not lawyers always
have to be lawyers-comparatists? Indeed what, for example, might
Celsus's famous definition of law-"ius est ars boni et aequi"- 6 be,
66. DIG.11.lpr. (Ulpianus I inst.), http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2004). "luri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat.
est autem a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi." Id.
This is the oldest known and probably most famous definition by a Roman lawyer of law it-
self (ius). The definition is contained in a text by the Roman jurist Ulpian that was probably
compiled in A.D. 213 or 214, TONY HONORt, ULPIAN (Clarendon Press 1982), but Ulpian at-
tributes the definition to Publius luventius Celsus, a praetor in A.D. 106 or 107 and consul for
the second time in 128 (Celsus also served as governor of Asia and on Hadrian's council).
The definition refers comprehensively to the "ius civile," DiG.1.1.6pr. (Ulpianus 1 inst.),
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/justinian.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004), the "ius naturale,"
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if not a first important trace of an ancient, sustained, repeated attempt
to separate posited, man-made law from total, god-like justice?67 And
then what might that attempt be if not an on-going, never-ending and
never-ended process of cautious comparing of what counts as law and
what doesn't, as well as a continuing effort to shape law's many do-
mains into a range of balanced, skillful, even imaginative, though al-
ways imperfect, no longer "infinite" objects of, now, human control?
And, -finally, what would that process of comparing be if not, each
time and crucially, a clearing through which only what counts as law
and what doesn't-what difference the law makes-can thus come
properly or finally into sight?
(v) So, comparing as such-this confined creating of difference-
is central to the art of law as it is central to the art of painting. And so
too, I suggest, it will be central to modem comparative law when later
on that curious discipline is invented, along with a host of other social
sciences and other (somewhat more self-assured) legal disciplines:
land law, contract law, family law, etc.68 At that later time, when the
lawyer-comparatist becomes a comparative lawyer (a lawyer special-
ized in legal comparisons), the attempt will be to represent from with-
out what processes of punctilious separation had, in fact, already been
going on from within-and to do so via an ever increasing, ever more
probing, ever more detailed co-present-presenting of what differences
and similarities could be found to exist within the wholly new world
of the nation state and the rule of law.69 Somewhat paradoxically,
though, the comparing as such required of those legal comparisons
seems to have been generally forgotten or else actively ignored. Yet,
it seems to me, that comparing is always there and is in one first im-
portant sense a confined creating of difference. It is, moreover, a
comparing from within-a comparing from a heartland-and not, as
conventional comparative law would have it, a representing from
id. at DIG.1.1.1.3, and the "iusgentiun," id. at DIG.1.1.1.4.
67. Whether or not it was Cicero who, as it has been suggested, had first referred to "ius"
as an "ars," the definition in Upian's Institutiones seems to indicate that by the second cen-
tury A.D. "ius" had finally come to be generally understood as being much more than a "sci-
entia iuris." See generally SCARANO USSANI, supra note 49 and text accompanying note 49.
Arguably, however, an opposite conclusion could be drawn. See, e.g., DIG.1.1.10.2 (Ulpianus
1 inst.), http://www.thelatinlibrary.comjustinian.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) ("luris pru-
dentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scienti").
68. I say a "curious" discipline in that, according to the prevailing view and unlike the
other social sciences, comparative law, as such, "does not exist" for, it is pointed out,
"[c]omparative law ... is not a topic, but a method." 0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as
an Academic Subject, 82 L.Q. REV. 40, 41 (1966).
69. See infra 6.
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without, either of the Same or of the Other. The heartland of compari-
sons, in that sense, seems to be each time nothing less than, quite liter-
ally, a comparing of the heart. And it is to that heartland that we must
now turn.
TAKING PLACE
Navy: Please divert your course 15 degrees to the North to avoid a colli-
sion.
Civilian: Recommend you divert your course 15 degrees to South to avoid
collision.
Navy: This is the Captain of a US Navy ship. I say again, divert your
course.
Civilian: No, I say again, divert your course.
Navy: This is the aircraft carrier Enterprise. We are a large warship of the
US Navy. Divert your course now!!
Civilian: This is a lighthouse. Your call.7 °
6. Space. So, in one first important sense, the matter of legal
space-the how of legal as well as of artistic experience-is a com-
paring from a heartland, or "comparing as such." But then, which
might be each time the heartland of that comparing-the heartland of
legal space? And, first of all, which is the space that normally counts
as space in law including comparative law?7
Before a response to those questions can begin to emerge, we
must consider what counts as space in Francesco's own story-in the
story of the painter and of his art. For, it can be safely suggested,
what counts as space in that story is, by and large, what generally
counts as space in law including comparative law. And just as in
Francesco's story what counts as space is then reflected into his pic-
ture, as well as in his broader relationship with that picture-so too
what counts as space for a lawyer is likely to be reflected in the repre-
sentations she makes.
And yet, the next interesting point is that, as we look again at the
story of Francesco and his devilish Venus-at the story of the picture
and its excess-it soon becomes obvious how what counts as space in
70. Canadian Naval Radio Conversation, quoted in J.D. BARROW, THE BOOK OF NOTHING
138-39 (2000).
71. As it will become apparent, I distinguish in what follows that which counts as space
from what space is at stake in law, legal comparisons and comparative law.
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that intriguing story is hardly the space that is there at stake. How
then might that other space be?
7. Physical Space (Linear, Measurable, Calculable). As it will
be readily recognized, space is generally understood to be a "given" in
everyday experience and, in particular, something geometrical defined
by what material bodies or structures we physically encounter or do
not encounter in our daily affairs-the physical world which, as it
were, meets us, hosts us and buries us. Space, for example, is the
physical place occupied by or surrounding a particular person-for
example, a fellow traveler sat next to me on my train ride home.
Space is also the physical place occupied by or surrounding a certain
building (for instance, the Piazza San Pietro in Rome, or the Blue
Mosque in Istanbul, or the Red Square in Moscow, or the Tate Mod-
em in London), or else the physical place occupied by a well-defined
natural site (an island, a mountain, a lake or the desert, for example, or
the sea). So, then, we normally speak of a fellow traveler taking up
"too much space" in the carriage, or of the Tate Modem as a "great
space" for the showing of modern and contemporary art, or of the Fu-
jiyama as a most beautiful "natural space" lying outside busy, metro-
politan Tokyo. In such a popular view, all sorts of bodies can be and
will be in space (this ant, rose, or stone, or that table, book or grain of
dust-and so on)-and that, in turn, will each time help us give space
its particular height, width and depth. Material bodies and other struc-
tures are, in this view, seen to be coinciding.
In this first commonsense understanding, then, space could be de-
scribed as some sort of linear, material mark (or lack thereof) that, if
need be, can be properly measured and properly calculated by meas-
uring and calculating its different contents-once more, the material
bodies or structures that space encounters or a-voids. Depending,
moreover, on one's more specific understanding of things, that linear,
material mark would then be seen to be, for example, rather like an a
priori realm of consciousness-the linear, material mark of a subject
(Kant) 7 -- or, by contrast, like a true res extensa-the linear, material
72. In this view, subjective space is just as linear, measurable and calculable a space as
objective or, for that matter, institutional space--to the extent, at least, that space is an a pri-
ori form of understanding. Kant's physicism is indeed well known. Greatly influenced by
Newton's physics, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is, according to one author, "a masterly
description of what the structure of the human mind should be, in order to account for the ex-
istence of a Newtonian conception of nature, and assuming that conception to be true to real-
ity." ETIENNE GILsON, THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE 229 (1952).
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object of a mark (as initially suggested by Descartes).73 Either way,
space remains, in this first sense, a physical place-the place of a par-
ticular subject or else the place of a particular object.
As to modem mathematics, they allow that linear, material mark
to open up into a wide, imaginative range of different, somewhat in-
dependent, even "cell-like" instances of space (Spinoza, Bergson),74 to
which, however, we will have to return.
8. Institutional Space (Linear, Measurable, Calculable). In a
rich set of alternative views that cannot be here adequately repre-
sented, space is each time the place resulting from a given "institu-
tional" context (broadly understood)-namely, a particular socio-
political or linear-historical environment-rather than, as noted ear-
lier, a mute physical object that can be found "out-there" or even the
particular subjectivity that each time would go to express it.75 In a
way, there is now a mere shift of focus-from the institution of space
(space as a thing or else space as the thing of a subject) to space as in-
stitution, individual or collective, historical or socio-political-yet
such a shift is, in its different and progressively more and more ab-
stract versions of it, rather momentous. That is to say, space is now
increasingly analyzed in its direct causal link with a particular institu-
tional context that is said to have generated it and on the existence of
which that particular space is therefore thought to be dependent in a
fundamental, structural way,76 or else in a functional-instrumental
one.7 In the many different views of the more recent social theories,
73. See generally RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the
Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, in FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS 13
(Charles W. Elliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son Co. 1910) (1889).
74. See generally THE COLLECTED WORKS OF SPINOZA (Edwin Curley ed. and trans.,
1985); HENRI BERGSON, THE CREATIVE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS (2002).
75. See supra 7.
76. The list here would be very long; see, e.g., the pioneering work of F. DE SAUSSUE,
COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye, eds., Roy Harris trans.,
Duckworth 1983) (1972); Louis ALTHUSSER, POUR MARX (1967); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS,
THE SAVAGE MIND (Julian Pitt-Rivers & Ernest Gellner eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1966)
(1962); FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY
SYMBOLIC ACT (1981). For a critique of some of such analyses as "foundationalist," see gen-
erally Stanley Fish, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of Composition, in
THE CURRENT IN CRITICISM: ESSAYS ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF LITERARY THEORY 65
(Clayton Koelb & Virgil Lokke eds., 1987). See also infra T 11.
77. A bibliography of the functionalist approach in the social sciences would be beyond
the scope of the present argument, but among the initiators the names of B. Malinowski and
A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (in anthropology) and D. Armstrong and H. Putnam (in philosophy)
come to mind first. In sociology, see the work of ROBERT K. MERTON, Manifest and Latent
Functions, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 73 (enlarged ed., 1963); and of
TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES (1971).
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the space resulting from any given institutional context would be seen
to be constructed in a seamless sort of way in consequence of histori-
cal processes engendered by individual or collective actors who con-
tinually institutionalize it,78 or else continually perceive it, represent it
and typify it as such.79 According for example to one critic, commodi-
ties occupy a "space" lay out by "politics":
Economic exchange creates value. Value is embodied in commodities that
are exchanged. Focusing on the things that are exchanged, rather than
simply on the forms or functions of exchange, makes it possible to argue
that what creates the link between exchange and value is politics, con-
strued broadly. This argument... justifies the conceit that commodities,
like persons, have social lives.
80
9. An-Other Space (neither Linear, nor Measurable, nor Calcu-
lable). We will return on the implications of such commonly held
concepts of space in relation to law.8' But here let us just ask: is it
only that sort of space-physical or institutional-that is at stake in
Francesco's story? Are we, for example, talking of something like
Genoa (the residence of prince Camillo, but also the glorious seat of a
mighty Republic), or Genoa's coasts (raided as we are told by some
Algerian pirates, but also the focus of the projected intervention by the
prince)? Are we talking of something like the Capuchin monastery-
understood as either the final destination of Francesco's work or, else,
the worthy patron of Francesco's art? Is it really the particular loca-
78. For some of the most interesting recent approaches in sociological theory see, on the
one hand, those who give place of pride to social structures and the macro-aspects of society.
See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIALE SYSTEME: GRUNDRIB EINER ALLGEMEINEN THEORIE
(1984); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1990); PIERRE BOURDIEU ET AL.,
LA MIStRE DU MONDE (Olivier B6tourn6 ed., 1993). On the other hand, for theories that re-
main principally if not exclusively centered on individual actors and their interactions, see
generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
(Anchor Books 1989) (1966); ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974). In the specific field of the sociology of science, see
BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC
FACTS (Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (1979).
79. See e.g., E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (Penguin
Books, Ltd. 1968) (1963); GARETH STEADMAN JONES, LANGUAGES OF CLASS: STUDIES IN
ENGLISH WORKING CLASS HISTORY, 1832-1982 (1983); Luc BOLTANSKI, LES CADRES: LA
FORMATION D'UN GROUPE SOCIAL (1982); ALESSANDRO PIZZORNO, I SOGGETTI DEL
PLURALISMO: CLASSI PARTITI SINDACATI (1980); Alessandro Pizzorno, Political Exchange
and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict, in 2 THE RESURGENCE OF CLASS CONFLICT IN
WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1968, at 277 (Colin Crouch & Alessandro Pizzorno eds., 1978);
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (rev. ed. 1999).
80. Arjun Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE
SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
1986).
8 1. See infra 11.
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tions where Leonardo famously exercised his art and led his school
that interest us most--or, maybe, the specific quarters where follow-
ing to Leonardo's death Francesco lived and worked, and began to
lead his dissolute life? And so, finally, is it really the physical setting
of Francesco's picture, or its subject (St Rosalia)-that is at stake in
Francesco's story?
Genoa, the Capuchin monastery or Francesco's quarters-each of
those res extensae, subjectivities or institutional places could of course
be validly treated as each time the particular space where, in a given
chronological sequence, Francesco's story specifically unfolds. Fur-
thermore, whether the physical or institutional space in question hap-
pened to be a real space lying "out-there" or, like in The Devil's Elix-
irs, only a space described by a literary work-that would be here
relatively unimportant. Real or fictional, the sort of space that we
would normally be representing to ourselves or to others would be, we
can safely assume, either a true Cartesian res extensa or a Kantian a-
priori realm of consciousness or the place of a particular institutional
struggle--each of which would be seen to be varying or fixed, empty
or taken-up by certain structures and, in any case, to be signaled by
some measurable, calculable boundaries including something while at
the same time excluding something else.82 In short, there would be
what I would generally call some instrumental space-both the pe-
rimeter and the threshold of a "solid," worldly theatre, a space where
to represent the objects of our cogito or the linear, material experi-
ences of our consciousness or the linear, material effects of a particu-
lar institutional struggle that we happen to master, endure or simply
witness.83
82. Take, for example, Genoa's coasts. In the world "out-there" (as in THE DEVIL'S
ELIXIRS) Genoa's coasts would be typically understood and represented as having a certain
physical or social substance to them. There would be a space occupied by, say, a combina-
tion of natural vegetation, of human, animal and mineral life, of odd buildings, villages and
towns, etc. There would be, in addition, a space marked, for example, by the coasts of
neighboring provinces, as well as by the Mediterranean Sea and its many recurrent tides. All
that (and, of course, much more) would be Genoa's coasts-as the reader would be likely to
see them in her daily life, as well as to be reminded of when reading something like THE
DEVIL'S ELIXIRS. For an interesting example of institutional struggle concerning the proposal
to install an "eruv" in northwest London, see Davina Cooper, Talmudic Territory? Space,
Law and Modernist Discourse, 23 J.L. & Soc'Y 529 (1996). According to Cooper, the intense
opposition that the proposal met by a certain part of the local population occurred because, in
the view of the objectors, "space was a finite container" and so "[t]he eruv proposal appeared
to alienate space in three ways: by privileging minorities, religion, and inappropriate civil
governance." Id. at 43.
83. It should therefore be clear that I here propose to use "instrumental" in a broad
sense-meaning for example both foundational and functional-instrumental.
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Yet, on reflection, the sort of space primarily at stake in Fran-
cesco's own story might well be another one-one, I would suggest,
made obvious by the sudden appearance of Venus alive, next to Fran-
cesco, toward the end of the story. (Nor am I presently thinking of
what outer space there might or might not be lying beyond the atmos-
phere-a space where stars and other heavenly bodies are said to re-
side and move).' In other words, what in Francesco's story could be
at stake could be a space radically different, radically "other" from the
instrumental space that the reader, if prompted, would normally con-
sider as space. One, of course, must be careful. Here, as elsewhere,
one must start from some linear, measurable, calculable space-so
that, for example, we will here start from the space where Francesco
the painter is busy painting St Rosalia. However, as we begin, in what
follows, with that sort of space, with what Western rationality would
normally understand to count as space in Francesco's own story-we
must also attempt to move on, or perhaps sideways, and slowly re-
focus our attention on a somewhat different, non-linear, non-
measurable, non-calculable, indeed incalculable sort of space-a dif-
ferent "space," an-other space, a space-other, a space that, however, is
not other than space,85 whilst at the same time being radically other
than the instrumental space with which we are normally familiar. But
where might that other "space" actually be? Better still, how might
that "space" be?
Initially, it might be difficult to see any such radically other-space,
so we must proceed with circumspection.
10. The Place of Francesco's Space. The story of Francesco and
his devilish Venus is as a whole quite interesting but, also, quite com-
plex. Let us therefore in the following pages narrow our focus on
what space might be defined by Francesco as the subject of his story
(Francesco the painter)-and Francesco's picture as the object of his
art and troubles.86 So which and how is the space of Francesco and his
canvas, taken together?
84. But cf Barton Beebe, Law's Empire and the Final Frontier: Legalizing the Future in
the Earlyorpus Juris Spatialia, 108 YALE L.J. 1737 (1999); Kieran Tranter, Terror in the
Texts: Technology--Law-Future, 13 L. & CRITIQUE 75 (2002).
85. It is not, for example, "mental" space-to the extent, at least, that by that one under-
stands a space with no outside.
86. The matrix of (Western) modernity remains, in my view, Cartesian-it remains im-
plicated in a separation between the cogito and his object that, it would seem, not even Kant
was ever able fully to overcome.
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Together, Francesco and his canvas-the subject and his object-
occupy and embody an out-and-out, seemingly pre-existing physical
space that is linear and, if need be, could be easily measured and eas-
ily calculated. A certain objective or subjective space would result,
for example, of the physical distance between painter, picture and the
surrounding physical world; or between painter and picture; or be-
tween painter, picture and that which the picture reproduces from
within-the perspective employed by the painter in his picture.8 7 On
the other hand, we could alternatively treat Francesco and his picture
as the "effect" of, again, some sort of institutional plight. In that
sense, there would be here a space where, for example, Francesco the
pupil of Leonardo can show his friends how so much better his own
craft has become in comparison to that of his master, thus demonstrat-
ing at the same time that as an artist he is worthier than his master, and
as a man he is just as worthy as anybody else of his friends' compan-
ionship. In such case, the painter and his picture might be seen as the
site of a particular power struggle highlighting either the social dis-
tance characterizing the relationship between Francesco and Leo-
nardo, or else the social closeness that Francesco now feels to exist in
respect of his friends.
But-the question was-how is the space that Francesco and his
picture specifically take up? That is what here interests me most-so
that the real or fictional, physical or social distance between Francesco
and his canvas, master and friends would not be yet the immediate fo-
cus of analysis. Instead, what of this example I wish now to note is
just how the separation of a subject from his object, the separation of
a painter from his work, the separation of Francesco from his picture,
that separation (which becomes all the more apparent once we look at
that story from Hoffmann's point of view88) points out each time to a
non-linear, non-measurable, non-calculable place which is all-
pervasive yet remains normally unthought-of by those concerned-
Francesco, his friends, his readers etc. That particular place has no
author.89 And it emerges, even "insurges," into view-it has not, in
that sense, an origin in the common sense of that concept. Further-
more, it is each time a genuinely novel place-if only because it is a
place wholly other from the objective, subjective or institutional
87. See generally Jurij M. Lotman, The Stage and Painting as Code Mechanisms for Cul-
tural Behavior in the Early Nineteenth Century, in THE SEMIOTICS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE 165
(Ann Shukman ed., Judity Armstrong trans., 1984).
88. See supra $ 3.
89. Although we are here dealing with a fictional story that, therefore, has its author-
that is to say, Hoffmann himself.
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spaces (real or fictional) that, as it were, are already surrounding as
well as occupied by Francesco, his party and his picture even before
the story begins. How, then, is each time that other place? And how
is each time the relationship between the physical or institutional
space in which somebody like Francesco and his picture are normally
said to be (and that we typically think of as space) and that "other-
space," that other place that is here at stake? How is each time the re-
lationship between those two sorts of places, which only on surface
could be said to be at all coinciding? That other-space, I suggest, is a
non-chronological, yet timely sort of place through which Francesco 's
story is then allowed to happen-or, quite literally, to "take place."
Clearly, it would be easier to understand Francesco's story as a
highly complex yet linear, measurable, calculable space-a linear,
measurable, calculable territory whereby characters (Camillo, Fran-
cesco, Leonardo, his party, etc.) and things (the original Venus, the
portrait of St Rosalia, the devil's elixir, etc.) are then deployed and
move. But the more difficult question would be, how does that space,
how does that complex territory take place? We must ask that ques-
tion for something odd happens in the story-in that, as we know,
Francesco and his canvas suddenly find themselves elsewhere (so to
speak) while, at the same time, being there, in the physical or institu-
tional space that, so far, the painter, his friends and even his readers
could see so clearly. No doubt, moreover, each res extensa, subjectiv-
ity or institutional struggle in the story will only take its bit of place-
the place it needs to make that story. Or (which is the same) the story
as a whole only takes its bit of place-vis-A-vis the larger environment
within which it will be inscribed. Even so, how is each res extensa,
subjectivity or institutional struggle that we can think of, how is that
story, how is that complex space-if not, each time and at the same
time, an-other-space that in a timely sort of way already belongs there
even before it all begins, and some physical or institutional space can
accordingly be duly deployed and duly represented to count as space?
Again, always already there as it all begins (though not there before it
all begins), space is each time, it seems to me, a timely sort of place
before it becomes the space that it is-before becoming something
else, something real or fictional, something physical or institutional,
something powerful or powerless, etc.-before becoming, for exam-
ple, a specific construction, a sudden void, a particular practice or a
well-tested theory.
Such a critical discovery-to the extent that it does ring true-
immediately suggests what our everyday concept of space might well
presuppose and determine-in fact, how very limited, how excep-
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tional might that concept be. On the other hand, that discovery still
leaves wholly concealed the very characteristics of that "other-space"
through which each time each story, its characters and objects, can be
represented and deployed as taking place. So, how is each time that
"other-space"? How, for example, is each time the place through
which legal comparisons can be normally represented as spaces of
comparison? Let us here begin by suggesting that the sort of place
that I want here to visualize may well be such in the radical, original
sense of being each time not just linear, measurable, calculable space
but that which occurs, an event that be-comes each time a "space," an
event that each time comes-to-be-a-particular-space, an event upon
which only everything else can eventually take place-that is to say,
its bit of place. As such, that place does not properly pre-exist while,
on the other hand, it is always already there as and when it all begins.
So neither metaphysical nor uniform, neither eternal nor immobile-
that place is each time an original event, in the specific sense of being
an always co-existing, always immanent, always imaginative (though
by no means imaginary), mobile sort of place. It is each time an
original gesture-each time, originally, a place of separation, emer-
gence or insurgence. It is, quite literally, the heartland of legal space.
SCHISMS
11. Law's Innumerable Spaces. What counts as physical or insti-
tutional space in Francesco's story reflects a widely held if, we now
begin to realize, somewhat nafve view-according to which space
simply is the linear, measurable, calculable bodies or other structures
that Space itself encounters or avoids (say, the rooms where Francesco
is busy painting his St Rosalia, or else the libertine friends who exert
on Francesco their unorthodox influence). In other words, the trans-
parency of our normal concept of space allows for an apparent
equivalence to come into sight-the equivalence between an imagi-
nary (though by no means imaginative), pre-existing "Space" and the
bodies and other structures that are now seen to lie within (painter,
canvas, window, friends, etc.).90 But does that equivalence reveal any-
90. Lefebvre takes issue, on the one hand, against what he calls the "illusion of transpar-
ency" and, on the other hand, the "realistic illusion." HENRI LEFEBvRE, THE PRODUCTION OF
SPACE 27 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans., 1991). The illusion of transparency, Lefebvre ar-
gues, betrays a concept of space
176 [Vol. 41
30
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss1/4
2004] NOTATIONS ON THE MATTER OF LEGAL SPACE
thing of the Space that that equivalence is supposed to re-present-to
present again, whether after or at the end of it-particularly, when it
characterizes as being equal to it what bodies and other structures
might be associated to it? No. Instead, to the extent that the replace-
ment of an imaginary Space for its particular spaces remains always
unseen, such an equivalence strongly if subtly invites the belief of it
being merely a descriptive, neutral representation of what Space must
be all about (a claim on the neutrality of Space), as well as inviting the
further belief that the same equivalence must be true of every other
space everywhere else at any other time (a claim on the universality of
Space). In short, that equivalence suggests claims over the assumed
essence of each particular space that we encounter, dwell in or leave.
For if space is each time that which is now in my presence (and only
that), then whatever else will ever be in my presence (and only that)
must be, that too, all that Space must be essentially all about.
12. Space and Law. One consequence of the equivalence that ap-
pears to order our normal concept of space is that it will then be seen
to operate not only in our daily affairs (for example, in Francesco's
story), but also in law's many domains-for the simple reason that
such domains would, they too, be normally seen to be everywhere in
space (some fraction of linear Space that can thus be properly meas-
ured, carefully calculated and, if need be, attentively compared). 9'
as luminous, as intelligible, as giving action free rein. What happens in space
lends a miraculous quality to thought, which becomes incarnate by means of a de-
sign. ... The design serves as a mediator ... between mental activity (invention)
and social activity (realization); and it is deployed in space. The illusion of trans-
parency goes hand in hand with a view of space as innocent, as free of traps or se-
cret places. Anything hidden or dissimulated-and hence dangerous-is antago-
nistic to transparency.... Hence a rough coincidence is assumed to exist between
social space on the one hand and mental space--the (topological) space of
thoughts and utterances--on the other.
Id. at 27-28. But, asks Lefebvre, "[bly what path, and by means of what magic, is this thought
to come about? The presumption is that an encrypted reality becomes readily decipherable
thanks to the intervention first of speech and then of writing .... to the detriment of a social
practice." Id. In my view, space is everything but "luminous" or "intelligible"-as the story
of Francesco and his painting clearly indicates-nor, for that matter, is space characterized by
"naturalness" or "substantiality"-the attributes that, Lefebvre argues, have long lead to what
he calls the "realistic illusion." Id. at 29-30. The way out of this apparent stand-off, accord-
ing to Lefebvre, is to treat space as a social product. Id. at 30.
91. So, for example, one writer argues:
[L]aw is concerned with the ordering of relations between agents or persons (hu-
man, legal, unincorporated or otherwise) at a variety of levels, not just relations
within a single state or society. One way of loosely characterizing these levels of
relations is geographical. In terms of space they include the global, international,
transnational, regional, inter-communal, municipal (nation-state and subsidiary ju-
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Thus, for example, the comparative lawyer would, if asked, promptly
concede that she, the object of her comparisons and even the compari-
sons she makes simply are in physical or institutional space. This is
important-for the implication would then be not only that legal space
is normally understood as physical or institutional space (and nothing
else)-but also that that space is each time understood to be what the
Space of legal comparisons must be all about ("neutrality" claim).
And that, on the other hand, that space must too be the same sort of
space as the Space of comparative law ("universality" claim). In
short, the place of legal comparisons would be, in this view, the neu-
tral, universal space in which comparisons (quite literally) take
place.92
However, a perhaps less obvious consequence of that apparent
equivalence is precisely that, just as Francesco's apparent relationship
with his picture (the artistic space drawn by Hoffmann for his readers)
is suddenly undermined by the emergence or insurgence of some hid-
den, somewhat prior event whose existence is suggested by the ap-
pearance of the devilish woman next to the canvas-so, at a closer
look, law's innumerable theories and practices might too turn out to
hide much more than lawyers, lawyers-comparatists and comparative
lawyers alike are normally able or prepared to consider. They might
hide, in particular, certain events that will have quite literally inaugu-
rated those legal theories or practices without being, as such, at the
origins of their being. So then what for example might there be, each
time, to the mapping-out of foreign legal jurisdictions, or else of the
institutional space of one or another "legal family?" 93
risdictions), sub-state local and non-state local. These different levels are not
nested simply in a single hierarchy of larger and smaller spaces. Rather, they co-
exist, overlap and interact in complex ways.
Twining, Reviving, supra note 42, at 4 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
92. Thus, for example, the inaugural lecture delivered by Professor F. H. Lawson at Ox-
ford on February 2, 1949, could be aptly entitled "The Field of Comparative Law." See
F.H. Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law, in 61 JURID. REV. 16 (1949) (emphasis added).
In it, Professor Lawson indicated how a professor of comparative law should, "if he is wise,
try to set bounds to thefield within which he can fairly hold himself out as possessing a spe-
cial knowledge and aptitude and a willingness to assist his less omnivorous colleagues," id. at
16 (emphasis added), thus signifying clearly a link between (comparative) knowledge and a
territory that by that knowledge is both evoked and confirmed. The language was no mere
rhetorical artifice-for the lecture went on to discuss what Professor Lawson described as the
comparative lawyer's "possible geographical fields" whereby "[1luckily for him, the laws of
the world fall into four great groups." Id. at 23.
93. The concept of legal "family" is dear to comparative lawyers. See RENE DAVID,
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LAW (John E.C. Brierley trans., Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 3d ed. 1985) (1964). For an
analysis of the internal contradictions of David's project, see Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions
[Vol. 41
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In spite of the ubiquity of Space in law's many legal domains-or,
perhaps, precisely because of that ubiquity-modem Western law
seems to pay little attention to it. We know, for example, how central
legislation is deemed to be in what comparative lawyers call "Civil
law" jurisdictions. Nevertheless-and quite apart from the now
somewhat trite point whether such a characterization is accurate or
not-what is interesting is that in those countries legislation says little
if anything on space as such-while, at the same time, being firmly
built around presuppositions about space that, then, judges, practitio-
ners and legal scholars (including comparative lawyers) seldom if ever
notice or question. Treated as a given-as an objective fact that,
therefore, must be valid for everyone, everywhere, at every time-
space is rather seen as having or not having certain legal effects (de-
pending on the circumstances), on which attention is therefore redi-
rected.
So, for example, according to one eminent Italian scholar, space is
neither a cosa (a material thing), nor a bene (this being defined as any
material thing which could be of use, and therefore could be the object
of appropriation and of a legal relationship). 94 Rather, space is a
mezzo (a "means")-within which lies the object of a right, and
through which that right comes to existence and can thus be properly
exercised. 95 Yet, beneath such an apparently simple, universal prem-
ise lies of course something else-an exclusionary move which allows
the legal system to reaffirm one and the same concept of space, while
simultaneously eliminating or at least greatly reducing the impact in
legal analysis of competing notions of space that might otherwise
spring up and then, quite literally, displace it. Once that elimination
or reduction has been successfully operated, the Italian Codice Civile
but, also, the French Code Civil or even the Japanese Code Civil (to
mention but a few traditionally eminent acts of legislation in Civil law
of Latin American Law, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 425, 433-36 (1997).
94. F. SANTORO PASSARELLI, DOTrRINE GENERALI DEL DRITro CIvILE 55-57 (Napoli
1962).
95. Indeed,
[nion 6 cosa lo spazio, n6 deve trarre in inganno una disposizione del codice
che allo spazio fa riferimento (art. 840). Lo spazio non 6 oggetto, ma
semplice mezzo in cui si trova l'oggetto del diritto, mezzo necessario per
1'esistenza e l'esercizio di quest'ultimo; mezzo che, se 6 pifi appariscente per
la proprietA fondiaria, 6 in reala necessario per ogni relazione giuridica:
testualmente 6 notevole che ]a citata disposizione estende in principio la
proprietA del suolo al sottosuolo, ma non allo spazio sovrastante.
2004] 179
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jurisdictions) are only too happy to regulate, that is to juridify, what
legal effects the preferred concept of space might be seen to be deter-
mining. However, the problem remains that such an open juridifica-
tion of space is open only at one end-a centrifugal, progressive,
chronological act that, at its center, firmly holds and even more firmly
returns one and the same concept of space that, if need be, can (or so it
is hoped) be properly measured, properly calculated and then properly
controlled.96 Cose and beni, that is, are used as spatial tools before
they can be employed by law as the objects that they are (legally)
known to be.
13. Schism Within. A schism thus seems to be emerging from
within our normal concept of space (physical or institutional, but also
neutral and universal), as we look at it from close enough-and, from
there, within what concept(s) of space may be reflected in law, legal
comparisons and comparative law. A schism would seem to be
emerging between what normally counts as space (whether common
sense space, or the space of law's many domains) and what other-
space that space may or may not let us see on its trail.97 Let us attempt
96. Linear, calculable space is, of course, deemed to be just as central in other Western
legal systems, as is in countries of civil law. The English common law and, more generally,
all sorts of UK laws refer to space too-no less casually, however, than other European legis-
lations do. Historically, the separation between law and (the fact of) space was, in the com-
mon law, operated by juries.
97. It is interesting to note how Lefebvre is able to reject what he generally calls philoso-
phico-epistemological space and to criticize its supporters for being unable to "eliminate the
need for a subject of some kind," LEFEBVRE, supra note 90, at 4, and to commit what is in
fact, from the logico-mathematical point of view, the perfect paralogism: they leap over an
entire area, ignoring the need for any logical links, and justify this in the vaguest possible
manner by invoking, as the need arises, some such notion as coupure or rupture or break. Id.
at 5. According to Lefebvre, his opponents' "growing dogmatism" and "basic sophistry
whereby the philosophico-epistemological notion of space is fetishized," id., is a clear indica-
tion that theirs have become the "dominant ideas which are perforce the ideas of the dominant
class" and that such philosophical-epistemological space "is apparently, but only apparently,
extra-ideological." Id. at 6. Indeed, Lefebvre rhetorically asks, "[a]s for Knowledge thus de-
fined on the basis of epistemology, and more or less clearly distinguished from ideology or
from evolving science, is it not directly descended from the union between the Hegelian Con-
cept and that scion of the great Cartesian family known as Subjectivity?" Id. Instead of phi-
losophico-epistemological space, Lefebvre, by contrast, seeks to bring out "a truth of space,
an overall truth generated by analysis-followed-by-exposition," id. at 9, calling for a "unitary
theory," id. at 11, of the physical, the mental and the social. However, the starting point for
such a unitary theory would be neither philosophy, nor literature, nor architecture nor, for that
matter, anything as general as the notions of text, information, communication, message,
code, sets of signs, etc. Instead, Lefebvre proposes to start from certain Hegelian "concrete
universals" like "the concepts of production and of the act of producing." Id. at 15. "What is
called for ... is a thoroughgoing exposition of these concepts, and of their relations, on the
one hand with the extreme formal abstraction of logico-mathematical space, and on the other
hand with the practico-sensory realm of social space." Id. Thus, one must first of all ac-
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to capture such a looming schism by suggesting that, if it will hardly
be doubted that law is (seen to be) everywhere in space (what judicial
practice or legal principle, office, concept, rule, regulation, procedure,
standard, technique, ideal, comparison, etc. each time there is, it ap-
pears to be each time in some linear, measurable, calculable space,
thus amounting to a linear, measurable, calculable place in its own
right), it is also clearly the case that, conversely, "space" is each time
everywhere in law (what space there is, it is always present in every
bit of law's many places). But exactly how and where is the space
that is everywhere in law? And how might the container, so to speak,
be contained by its contents? Quite simply, space might turn out to
be, on inspection, something more than what Western legal thinking
has relentlessly if somewhat incautiously taken it to be. And if that is
the case, then that might be why some other-space, some "space" that
is radically other from what is normally thought to be, remains sys-
tematically unthought-of in law, legal comparisons and comparative
law-in spite of it being in law all the same.
It is here suggested that, in order to retrace that state of affairs and
let what other possibilities there might be emerge fully into view,
space should be treated as a basic, critical component of law, legal
comparisons and comparative law.
14. Everywhere in Space... First, I have suggested, law is eve-
rywhere in space (or so it is seen to be).98 What precisely do I mean
by that? Quite simply, what I mean is that in the West, law's many
places always appear to be in as well as of some sort of linear, meas-
urable, calculable Space-the same space that Brunelleschi discov-
ered, 99 Newton posited as absolute, 10° Descartes distinguished from the
knowledge how (social) space is a (social) product, how social space is both a means of pro-
duction and of domination, and how there is out-there "a diversity or multiplicity of spaces
quite distinct from the multiplicity which results from segmenting and cross-sectioning space
ad infinitum." Id. at 27. Second, one must accept that physical space is disappearing. Third,
"every society ... produces a space, its own space," and not just every society but, more ac-
curately, "each mode of production." Id. at 31. But what is social space? For Lefebvre, so-
cial space includes "spatial practice," id. at 33 (the making of space), "representations of
space," id. (the ordering imposed by space), and "representational spaces," id. (the symbolic
aspect of space).
98. "Law is everywhere in space" to the extent that there is something that we can call
"law." See generally Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law without
State, revised text of the thirty-third Chorley Lecture, given at the London School of Econom-
ics and Political Science (June 9, 2004) (on file with the author).
99. Renaissance Humanism had a great influence on concepts of space and of time as
previously understood. All aspects of the real are now seen to be organized by the human
mind in such a way that they then manifest themselves in the unitary and universal form of
space and of time. In particular, such a rational form or representation of space was called
2004]
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cogito,01 Kant re-appropriated to the subject,"°2 Hegel to the State and
Marx to historical time. Such a Space, in particular, seems to exist be-
fore we and law's many places come to be (before the arrival of the
object, the subject, the State or of material labor), and it seems to con-
tinue to be there once we and those many domains have changed,
moved on or disappeared. The same irrespective of which space it is
(the specific object that it might be), of who you are (the particular
subject that might inhabit it) or of where it comes from (the institu-
tional context of which it might be each time a different result)-such
a Space, moreover, seems to be wholly co-extensive to what legal
places (sites, instructions or people) may or may not go, each time, to
occupy or reproduce it.
Take, for example, law's many material locations-the guarded
precincts where what law there is, is everyday announced and im-
parted, reminded-of and applied, dutifully taught and dutifully
learned, keenly catalogued and attentively researched or, else, profes-
sionally illustrated and then dearly made available. Take, in other
words, our tribunals, courts, prisons, police stations, universities, law
schools, law libraries, archives, law firms, etc. These precincts are
seen to rise (as physical constructions) or develop (as institutional
places) in Space-a linear, measurable, calculable space that they are
thus seen to express or to protect. Consider, too, law's innumerable
people-the people by whom the law is said to be represented and,
each time, given a name, a face and a voice-the name, face and voice
of the thousand legal practitioners, judges, law professors, law stu-
dents, inmates, etc. who live, breathe and work in the West. They too
are usually seen to occupy or be surrounded by, each time, this or that
particular fraction of linear, measurable, calculable Space-this or that
building, this or that subjective place (the place of a subject "like
them"), or this or that office or bench (the place generated by a par-
ticular institutional context)-a space, moreover, with which we may
"prospettiva" by Filippo Brunelleschi who is generally credited to have discovered it. It was
then Leon Battista Alberti who, in his Trattato della pittura of 1436, would theorize over the
new concept for the first time. See GIULIO CARLO ARGAN, STORIA DELL'ARTE ITALIANA ch. 3,
at 79 (1968).
100. See generally SIR ISAAC NEWTON, Book 1: The Motion of Bodies, in MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AND HIS SYSTEM OF THE WORLD (Andrew Motte trans.,
1729, Florian Cajori trans. rev., U. Cal. Press 1934) (1686). "For Newton, space and time
were absolutely fixed quantities, unaffected by the presence of the bodies contained within
them. Space and time provided the arena in which motion took place; Newton's laws gave the
marching orders." BARROW, supra note 70, at 168.
101. See supra 3.
102. See supra 3.
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or may not come across one day during our own everyday activities.
Take, finally, law's almost infinite web of legal instructions (rules,
regulations, offices, judgments, procedures, principles, concepts, etc.),
which, they too, are to be found (or so it appears) in linear, measur-
able, calculable Space-in the physicality, subjectivity, powerfulness
or powerlessness of this or that act of parliament, code, judgment,
witness statement, jury's verdict, judicial procedure, consultation
process, law-book, etc. Accordingly, in space as legal places law's
many material locations, people and instructions invoke and evoke the
(legal) evidence of a neutral, universal equivalence (the equivalence
between Space and the places that they are), 103 as well as contextually
suggesting what, from now on, the essence of each (legal) place
should be dutifully taken to be.
15. . . . or, else, of Space. Now, law's many locations, people
and instructions, etc. are, we usually assume, in space (physical or in-
stitutional)-and that is where comparative lawyers, for example, tra-
ditionally look for them when setting out to compare this or that par-
ticular rule, function, degree of efficiency, history, linguistic
expression, judicial office, legal procedure, etc. So much so that, it is
often repeated, the comparative lawyer is a bit of a "traveler"-thus
someone who (presumably) travels in space in order to find, in space,
the place(s) of her future comparisons." Yet the pervasiveness of
space in legal comparisons (space is everywhere in law), and its in-
strumentality (space is a means to an end, that is, a means of repre-
senting law's many locations, people and instructions vis-A-vis one
another) is, here, not the only point. The other point is that, at the
same time as they are in space, each of those many locations, people
and instructions carefully carve-out and punctiliously define some fur-
ther legal places, as a result of being in some physical or institutional
space and having thus seized that space for their own particular ends.
Are those further legal places any different from the space from which
they seem to be originating? It is difficult to answer to this question
but, in physical or institutional space (like the locations, people and
instructions to which they belong) as well as of that space, such fur-
ther legal places seem to be but one more series of multiple reflections
of what by law space is deemed essentially to be. If that is the case,
103. Although, as we have earlier pointed out, such an equivalence seems to say nothing
of the Space that it is supposed to validate. See supra I 11.
104. Igor Stramignoni, The King's One Too Many Eyes: Language, Thought and Com-
parative Law, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 739, 740-42 (2002) [hereinafter Stramignoni, King's Eyes].
2004]
37
Stramignoni: Francesco's Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of Legal Spac
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
then the original equivalence continues to rule sovereign-multiplied,
amplified and reinforced by its own innumerable reflections. That
equivalence continues to rule sovereign-but, it would seem, its sov-
ereignty is a rather solitary affair. For amongst so many innumerable
reflections-amongst so many innumerable legal places-Space (what
space that equivalence is each time meant to represent or to reflect) is
soon forever lost.
And if Space is lost, if Space comes to an end, how could what
law there is be any longer there?0
16. Private Spaces, Extra-Spaces. Before we consider not only
how law is everywhere in space but also, and somewhat more radi-
cally, how space is everywhere in law,1°6 one more point needs to be
highlighted. As in modernity law's many domains were taking
place-as they were busy mapping-out what Space should now each
time become a new legal space of modernity-they had to figure-out
what private spaces there must be seen to be within the ever expand-
ing citadel of law. That is what (to make but the most obvious exam-
ple) property law, contract law, tort law, family law, etc., but also, for
example, public and administrative law, are there to signal-that is,
one another's private, exclusionary space of discipline and control.
And that is, likewise, what such things as "comparative contract law,"
"comparative tort law," "comparative family law," etc.-began to
mark. The former, the "inside" (as it were) of nation states and of the
rule of law-the private spaces within. The latter, their "outside"-
the private spaces visible from without.
Yet clearly the original gesture is the former-while the latter is
merely a representation from without of a gesture made long before. 107
Accordingly, one eminent sense in which private law historically (that
is, spatially and linear-temporally) can be meaningfully said to lie at
the heart of Western law-a position firmly held, among others, by
comparative lawyers' 08-is not at all sufficiently conveyed by the fa-
miliar but somewhat didactic contrast with public law, however so-
105. 1 do not mean here to make a theological-apologetic point--quite the opposite, to
caution against the normal assumption that there is such thing a thing as "space" in the New-
tonian sense.
106. See infra T 19, at 55-56.
107. See supra T 5.
108. According to Lawson, for example, "[p]rivate law is doubtless the most promising
field of comparative law." Lawson, supra note 92, at 20. Professor Lawson's remarks are
particularly interesting in light of the fact that he was the first holder of the Chair of Compara-
tive Law at the University of Oxford, and he made them on occasion of his inaugural lecture
in which he felt he should set out the boundaries of the new subject.
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phisticated the elaboration of that contrast can be." Instead, private
law can be said to be at the heart of Western law in the rather more
complex, immanent and indeed generally overlooked sense of there
being the most hidden place where Western law makes of the world as
such a private, exclusionary domain-that is, a circumscribed territory
where to rule sovereign. That is, by appearing to leave private law
outside of its immediate rule (private law is jus dispositivum, not co-
gens), Western law brings private law arrangements firmly within its
grip. Thus the privateness of private law conceals more than it re-
veals-it conceals a truly original, exclusionary act of individual or
collective sovereignty while apparently signifying the very opposite of
that act. Within that territory, private law stricto sensu and public law
(but also, for example, private international law or public international
law, whereby the individual sovereign law is only one of the con-
cerned players) are but one more expression-indeed, one more re-
flection-of that original if somehow forgotten act of sovereignty,
common to them all. 110
Secondly, on progressively charting out such a territory, law's
many domains cannot but correspondently constitute what extra-
spaces there must be left aside-so that it is really the status of these
extra-spaces, or excesses, that is today so very evidently at stake in
law's many domains. 11
Finally, the very encounter with any such legal domain quietly re-
fers to, and so recursively reaffirms, a rather specific, limited concept
of space-that of an absolute, Newtonian, instrumental space-a
physical or institutional space that will then be understood to amount
to an "evident" and not-to-be-challenged, pre-legal element of law.
17. Alternatives. That is what seems to be happening in many
cases. That is, lawyers including comparative lawyers seem to be
109. See generally DAWN OLIVER, COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW
DIVIDE (William Twining & Christopher McCrudden eds., 1999). For a sociological account,
see, e.g., RICHARD SENNET, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN (1977).
110. Again, an influential attempt to tackle the problematic nature of that act of separation
has been that of the Critical Legal Studies movement, though the stress has been often laid
upon the outcome rather the inauguration of that separation. See generally KELMAN, supra
note 44. For an alternative, compelling and all in all more imaginative attempt to analyze that
separation (focusing on the patriarchal implications of the public-private law divide), see, e.g.,
the highly diversified output of feminist jurisprudence of KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, THE
SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 1985); KATHARINE T. BARTLETT &
ROSANNE KENNEDY, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1991); REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN,
THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW (1990).
I1l. See supra 16.
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thinking of space (when they think of it at all) as either a physical or
an institutional place-and in so doing they offer representations that
end up being merely a reflection of that particular, indeed rather ex-
ceptional concept of space.
The very exceptionality of the normal concept of space indicates
just how that cannot be the only way of thinking space as such. In
particular, that exceptionality seems to suggest how space in the nor-
mal sense is unlikely to be the only place of law and legal compari-
sons that is available for thinking. One, again, could object that irre-
spective of what the alternatives might be-space in the normal sense
is the place that lawyers and comparative lawyers have explicitly or
implicitly agreed to treat as space."I2 That might be so but then, I have
argued, legal representations including comparisons are a comparing
as such-a confined creating of difference that is the how, at least at
one level, of a particular experience. "3 What that suggests is that the
space of legal representations including comparisons must therefore
come neither after nor at the end of the Same, but together with it." 4
A comparing that is a confined creating of difference upon which only
the space of legal representations including comparisons can properly
come into presence-space in the normal sense must be therefore nei-
ther a universal place nor a fixed, natural or neutral place at that. In-
stead, space must be the place-one of the places---of law's most
original imagination. So, lawyers and comparative lawyers may well
have agreed on a particular legal theory or practice but if the repre-
senting of that legal space is, as such, a comparing that is a confined
creating of difference as the how of one's own experience, the ques-
tion inevitably becomes: what is each time the heartland of that com-
paring? What in particular is the heartland of the experience of space
that is common-and is there one that is or can be common-to law-
yers and comparative lawyers alike? Here then the task is really that
of trying to open-up the normal concept of space in law and legal
comparisons alike-in order to let alternative spaces come slowly in
view. Or (which is the same), the effort is that of trying to see what
the normal sense of legal space might each time be truly about. If
nothing else, this should at least guard the possibility of that which, at
first, might seem to some to be absolutely impossible-for example,
the possibility itself of thinking space afresh and so the possibility of
recovering on its own terms each time an-other space (many other
112. See supra 16.
113. See supra T 5.
114. See supra 5.
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spaces) that under given circumstances might well be worthy of notice
or debate.
So, then, where is each time the space of legal representations?
Better still: how is each time that space? Which is the matter of legal
space? Take once again the private-public divide in any one jurisdic-
tion, as opposed to the same divide in another jurisdiction. As earlier
noted, many interesting studies on the relationship between public and
private law attempt to establish whether or not public and private law
can be usefully kept separate-yet, articulated though the result often
is, such analyses tend to loom large of the more important question
concerning the nature each time of the separation in question."5
Where could one start, instead? Coming lawyers caring for that par-
ticular opposition could start, for example, by clearing that divide
wherever they find it-say, vis-A-vis a given private or public rule, or
a legal function, or a particular legal-historical development, or a le-
gal-linguistic expression, or a legal-linguistic strategy, etc.-and then
dwelling in what will result of such clearing so as to let alternative
possibilities emerge of being (in) place "out-there."
For example: might it not be the case that, as it is here suggested,
that particular opposition between private and public law began upon
a recurrent, repeated, initial gesture of separation? If so, how would
that gesture be like? Surely, that gesture would be a comparing as
such-that much by now should be clear.1 6 But then-one would
really need to press this question-how is each time the heartland of
that gesture? How did it all come about? And what alternative if for-
gotten histories might upon such questioning come into sight instead?
115. So for example, in one recent opinion
five values pervade public and private law .... A legitimate question might
be, why select these particular values? Where do they come from? ... As
far as the question why these particular values provide the focus for discus-
sion here is concerned, the reason is that they are in practice the actual values
that can be found operating in both public and private law .... [T]he values
with which we are concerned[] are terms of art and do not have a fixed or
very concrete meaning. Indeed, they are seldom analysed explicitly by the
courts, and they seldom appear in terms in legislation. Yet... in practice re-
spect for these values, often unarticulated, influences much of public and
private law.
OLIVER, supra note 109, at 60.
116. See supra 5.
2004]
41
Stramignoni: Francesco's Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of Legal Spac
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
EVERYWHERE IN LAW
The question is in many cases no longer how deeply it is embedded, how
deep are its roots in the soil of its country, but who has planted the roots
and who cultivates the garden.
117
18. Space, Man and Language. On October 3, 1964, Martin Hei-
degger gave a short lecture in St. Gallen--on occasion of an exhibi-
tion of works by the sculptor Bernard Heiliger, entitled Raum, Mensch
und Sprache [Space, Man and Language]. I'8 Though short, the lecture
constituted a rather telling moment in the development of the existen-
tial analytics that had led Heidegger radically to criticize Western
metaphysics as reifying thinking that forgets the Being of beings and
especially of Da-sein (an intentionally vague term designating the
"being-there" of human being and so, by approximation, human being
tout-court) by reducing them to mute objects to be measured and
dominated.'19 But, Heidegger had argued, can anything ever be meas-
ured and dominated the way Western thinking hopes to measure it and
dominate it? Can Western thinking not see how the Being of Da-sein
as a language of sort-the "truth" of man as first of all language-
makes any such capture illusory as well as clearly doomed? Might
Western thinking not happen to be blind to the Being, to the "light"
that, by contrast, each time constitutes the only "truth," the only open
horizon, the only event of each thing and of Da-sein? Might Western
thinking not be blind, in other words, to the light of language?
19. Space, Spatiality, Comparing as Such. The answer, for Hei-
degger, had been "no" to the first two questions, and "yes" to the latter
two. Here, let us simply recall how the initial step that had allowed
Heidegger to ask those questions had been to argue, long before the
1964 lecture, in favour of the ultimate temporality of Da-sein
(Zeitlichkeit)-to be understood as the being past and future of Da-
sein, as well as present."2a That initial step-from traditional concepts
117. 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1, 13
(1974).
118. See infra [5.
119. For the question of Being, see generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, INTRODUCTION TO
METAPHYSICS (Gregory Fried & Richard Polt eds., Yale Univ. Press 2000) (1935) [hereinafter
HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICS]. Heidegger did not understand Being to be a transcendental be-
ing. But in what follows, I put "Being" in the capital letter whenever I wish to stress being
alone rather than, say, being-there, being-something or being-somebody.
120. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Stambaugh trans., State
188 [Vol. 41
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of the subject to time-had constituted an absolute novelty in Western
thinking allowing Heidegger to reconsider almost from scratch the
fundamental structures of that thinking. And it had indeed been on the
premise of that revolutionary proposition-that Da-sein is pre-
eminently temporal, not subject (res cogitans), mind or even con-
sciousness-that Heidegger had then tackled the matter of space. In
particular, Heidegger had argued, the temporality of Da-sein-the be-
ing past, future and present of human being-suggests that space can-
not be an absolute, fixed structure that is the same for everyone-like
for example Descartes' s res extensa or Kant's a priori space. Rather,
space is best understood as spatiality (Raumlichkeit)-something that
can only be given (can only be a given) within the temporal horizon of
Da-sein.
Heidegger's central concern throughout most of his life, and cer-
tainly in the earlier years, had been the central question of ontology,
why there is something rather than nothing. 2 1 But Heidegger's ontol-
ogy is, I suggest, a radical ontology-in that it purports to uproot tra-
ditional ontological thought as, quite literally, "metaphysical" non-
sense. To that extent, Heidegger's existential analytics if carefully
considered is immensely provocative-in that it may for example help
mobilizing the concept of space in the normal sense (physical and in-
stitutional) and so offer one truly valuable inroad into the matter of le-
gal experience and of legal space. We have seen in the previous pages
how at one first level the matter of legal experience and of legal space
is simply though crucially a comparing-a comparing as such.I22
That, I would suggest, is what Heidegger's spatiality is really about.
Francesco's story, however, also indicates that together with such
comparing there always is something else that is everywhere at stake
in legal space, as well as in artistic space. So while at one level the
how of legal space might well be a spatiality that is a comparing as
such, the heartland of legal space remains to be seen. Which then is
the heartland of legal space? Better still: how is each time the heart-
land of legal space? In the previous sections I began to characterize
that heartland as an event or series of events-but which or rather how
might that event each time be? Building on aspects of Heidegger's
analytics we should soon be able to see how the heartland of legal
space might be best analyzed as an event or series of events by and
large constituting, rather than representing, the outside world as this or
Univ. of New York Press 1996) (1953) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, BEING].
121. See generally HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICS, supra note 119.
122. See supra 5.
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that particular legal theory or practice. In today's highly complex so-
ciety, where the future of Western democracy and of the rule of law is
so dramatically in doubt, that 'is a suggestion that might well be wor-
thy of some consideration and of some discussion.1
23
20. Being-in-the-world-in-general. Heidegger's argument is
complex and his language notoriously idiosyncratic-for his own (un-
finished) task was to excavate common language out and back where
it could mean logos again-but, I would argue, that complexity and
idiosyncrasy is precisely what allows Heidegger's thinking to be gen-
erally very precise and probing. We must therefore for the remainder
of this section try to follow Heidegger's argument and language in
what no doubt will be a rather difficult exercise of synthesis and inter-
pretation. However, the benefits in temporarily joining Heidegger in
his difficult but precise and probing thinking will eventually outdo-
or so I hope-the discomfort that at first that exercise might well pro-
voke. Then in the final section of the paper we can return to more fa-
miliar grounds and examine some instances of how space understood
as a spatiality could help us think afresh the many theories and prac-
tices of law. 24
The initial step that allowed Heidegger to mobilize the normal
concept of space'25 had been to shift the analysis of human existence
away from the individual subject each time under scrutiny-to the
temporality of Da-sein.12 6 That is not to say, however, that therefore
Da-sein is spaceless. All to the contrary, on analyzing Da-sein and its
determinations Heidegger makes immediately clear how such deter-
minations "must now be seen and understood a priori as grounded
upon that constitution of being which we call being-in-the-world" (In-
der-Welt-sein).27 To state that human being is-in-the-world, however,
is not to repeat the rather banal observation that man lives in a space-
time context. Instead, being-in-the-world means that the who of one's
own existence and the what of one's own world belong each time in
an open structure-namely, the being-there of human being.
123. On complexity, see generally Francoise Fogelman Souli6, Les Formalisations de la
Complexitg, in LES THtiORIES DE LA COMPLEXITt 48 (Francoise Fogelman Soulid ed., 1991).
124. See infra 126.
125. Though not, of course, just the concept of space.
126. Again, the being past and future, as well as present, of the "being-there" of human
being. See supra 18.
127. HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 12.53.
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Although a wholly unified phenomenon, the phenomenal fact of
being-in-the-world has several constitutive open-structural factors. 28
One is, precisely, the "being-in" of it. The others are "space" and "be-
ing."
(i) Human being is not "in" space like everything else.-So, first,
what does the "being-in" of Da-sein's being-in-the-world stand for?
One might be inclined to take that being-in as a being-in-something,
like for example water in a glass, etc., "the relation of being that two
beings extended "in" space have to each other with regard to their lo-
cation in that space."'2 9 In such a commonly-held view, those beings
which are "in" world-space "all have the same kind of being-that of
being objectively present-as things occurring 'within' the world."' 3 °
However, Heidegger warns, those are in fact ontological characteris-
tics that "belong to beings whose kind of being is unlike Da-sein. ' ' I
Human being, that is, is not present in space objectively in the same
way as the other beings are.
Indeed, being-in as a constitutive open-structural factor of Da-sein
is an existential that designates neither "the objective presence of a
material thing (the human body) 'in' a being objectively present" nor
"a spatial 'in one another' of two things objectively present."'13 2 In-
stead,
"In" stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell. "An" means I am used
to, familiar with, I take care of something. It has the meaning of colo in
the sense of habito and diligo.... The expression "bin" is connected with
"bei." "Ich bin" (I am) means I dwell, I stay near ... the world as some-
thing familiar in such and such a way. Being as the infinitive of "I
am"... means to dwell near .... to be familiar with .... Being-in is thus
the formal existential expression of the being of Da-sein which has the es-
sential constitution of being-in the-world.'33
So, to begin with, Heidegger qualifies Da-sein's being-in-the-
world as a being absorbed in the world. Thus, Da-sein "is-in" the
world in the quite specific sense of being-together-with the world or
taking care of it (Besorgen)-rather than being in it, in the normal
sense. This move, as is clear, is important for through it Heidegger is
128. The expression "open-structural," as opposed to Heidegger's "structural," is mine.
By that I mean to highlight that for Heidegger any such structure is, precisely, an open struc-
ture, not a closed or fixed one.
129. HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 12.54.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. Heidegger calls such characteristics "categorical."
132. Id.
133. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
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able to abandon space as traditionally understood by Western thinking
including legal thinking (Da-sein is not "in" space in the normal
sense)-while at the same time firmly characterizing Da-sein as be-
ing-in-the-world and so as being-in, that is, being-together-with or
taking care of the world. But one must be careful, for
[a]s an existential, "being with" the world never means anything like the
being-objectively-present-together of things that occur. There is no such
thing as the "being next to each other" of a being called "Da-sein" with
another called "world." It is true that, at times, we are accustomed to ex-
press linguistically the being together of two objectively present things in
such a manner: "The table stands 'next to' the door," 'The chair 'touches'
the wall." Strictly speaking, we can never talk about "touching," not be-
cause in the last analysis we can always find a space between the chair and
the wall by examining it more closely, but because in principle the chair
can never touch the wall, even if the space between them amounted to
nothing. The presupposition for this would be that the wall could be en-
countered "by" the chair.13 4
(ii) Insideness and spatiality.-So, Heidegger continues, chairs for
example do not usually encounter walls just as, therefore, they do not
encounter Da-sein. 135 Instead, chairs like walls are objectively present
in the world (Heidegger is clear about that)-though "[t]wo beings
which are objectively present within the world and are, moreover,
worldless in themselves, can never 'touch' each other, neither can 'be'
'together with' the other."'13 6 Da-sein however can both "touch" and
"be" "together with" another being-that is to say, Da-sein is subjec-
tivity. Does that mean though that Da-sein is pure subjectivity? No.
Rather, Da-sein's objective presence is different from the objective
presence of other, worldless beings. 37 Da-sein, that is, is present in
the world existentially-while other beings are best seen to be merely
inside it. The spatiality of Da-sein is therefore existential presence,
not mere "insideness"'' 38 (Innerweltlichkeit). That is, there is here a
veritable being-together-with the world.
134. Id. § 12.55.
135. "These other beings can only 'meet up' 'with' Da-sein because they are able to show
themselves of their own accord within a world." Id. § 12.57. Likewise, "Da-sein understands
itself-and that means also its being-in-the-world--ontologically in terms of those beings and
their being which it itself in not, but which it encounters 'within' its world." Id. § 12.58.
136. Id. § 12.55 (emphasis added).
137. Da-sein understands its ownmost being in the sense of a certain "factual objective
presence." Id. And yet the "factuality" of the fact of one's own Da-sein is ontologically to-
tally different from the factual occurrence of a kind of stone. The factuality of the fact Da-
sein, as the way in which every Da-sein actually is, we call itsfacticity. Id. § 12.56.
138. Id.
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If we define being-in in this way, we are not denying to Da-sein every
kind of "spatiality." On the contrary. Da-sein itself has its own "being-in-
space," which in its turn is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-
world in general. Thus, being-in cannot be clarified ontologically by an
ontic characteristic, by saying for example: being-in in a world is a spiri-
tual quality and the "spatiality" of human being is an attribute of its
bodiliness which is always at the same time "based on" corporeality.
Then we have again to do with a being-objectively-present-together of a
spiritual thing thus constituted with a corporeal thin4 and the being of the
beings thus compounded is more obscure than ever.
So then the existential presence or spatiality of Da-sein is as such
wholly different from, and prior to, the insideness of other inner-
worldly beings. That is of course crucial, for Heidegger's human be-
ing is after all pre-eminent over other beings by being "the only place
where the Beingness of beings comes to presence, revealing a contex-
tual world of meaning."'" On the other hand, the existential presence
or spatiality of Da-sein does of course raise a fundamental problem-
the problem of cognition. How can Da-sein hope to know the world if
it ontologically "is-together-with" that world which it seeks, legiti-
mately perhaps yet somewhat naively, to become knowledgeable
about? And, so too, how can lawyers including comparative lawyers
ever know-and can they ever know-the world "out-there" that they
so dutifully set out to represent or to compare?
(iii) Worldliness and handiness.-The contrast between the exis-
tential presence or spatiality of Da-sein and the insideness of other be-
ings raises amongst other things the question of the world toward
which Da-sein is. 4' Indeed, "which world is meant?"'142 Heidegger
tackles that question through an inquiry into "the worldliness of world
in general"-how can world be accessed ontologically without some-
how presupposing it in our search for it? 143 The point is important not
139. Id. § 12.56.
The understanding of being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Da-sein first
makes possible the insight into its existential spatiality. This insight will keep us
from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling it out, a procedure
motivated not ontologically, but 'metaphysically' in the na've opinion that human
being is initially a spiritual thing which is then subsequently placed 'in' a space.
Id.
140. LESLIE PAUL THIELE, TIMELY MEDITATIONS 45 (1995). "As for beings themselves,
their concrete existence remains unaltered by the unique role of human being in their onto-
logical discovery." Id.
141. See generally HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 14.
142. Id. § 14.64. Heidegger reviews here a series of possible meanings of the word
"world." Id. §§ 14.64-.65.
143. "Neither the ontic description of innerworldly beings nor the ontological interpreta-
tion of the being of these beings gets as such at the phenomenon of 'world.' In both kinds of
access to 'objective being,' 'world' is already 'presupposed' in various ways." Id. § 14.64.
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only philosophically or in view of our specific inquiry on space, but
also in so far as it indirectly asks the political question how is commu-
nity possible if on reflection we find that in fact we are "in" the world
existentially but not in the normal sense. To begin with, however, suf-
fice to clarify that by "worldliness"'" (Weltlichkeit) Heidegger means
an ontological concept that "designates the structure of a constitutive
factor of being-in-the-world"-so that world is ontologically "not a
determination of those beings which Da-sein essentially is not, but
rather a characteristic of Da-sein itself."' 45 That is why then, termino-
logically, "worldly" is a kind of being of Da-sein whereas, by contrast,
"innerworldly" is a kind of being objectively present "in" the world. "6
The question of the worldliness of world in general, Heidegger
suggests, is best tackled by looking first at the worldliness of the
world surrounding Da-sein ("environmentality"). 47 Such a surround-
ing world (Umwelt) is not spatial in conventional ontological terms
and so it is not first and foremost a matter of knowledge on the part of
a res cogitans. All to the contrary, Heidegger argues, in our everyday
being-in-the-world our closest kind of association with innerworldly
beings is "a handling, using and taking care of things .. 4" Thus,
pre-thematically and pre-phenomenally, we associate with mere
"things" rather than with a known world and its substantiality, materi-
ality, extendedness, side-by-sideness. The Greeks called such
"'things': pragmata, that is, that with which one has to do in taking
care of things in association. . . . .. 4 Heidegger calls them "useful
things." 50 However one might wish to call them, however, the point
is that Heidegger's analytics invites us to look at Da-sein as having a
surrounding world of "things," rather than examining those "things"
as the world that surrounds Da-sein. But we must be careful. If "[i]n
association we find things for writing, things for sewing, things for
By "innerworldly" being, Heidegger means the being of something objectively present "in"
the world.
144. Id.
145. Id.
This does not preclude the fact that the path of the investigation of the phenome-
non 'world' must be taken by way of innerworldly beings and their being. The
task of a phenomenological 'description' of the world is so far from obvious that
its adequate determination already requires essential ontological clarification.
Id.
146. See id. § 14.65.
147. See generally id. § 15.
148. Id. § 15.67.
149. Id. § 15.68.
150. Id.
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working, driving, measuring" l5-1if, in other words, what we usually
find is "usable material"152 -still "[s]trictly speaking, there 'is' no
such thing as a useful thing .... A useful thing is essentially 'some-
thing in order to.... , (Zeug).
In accordance with their character of being usable material, useful things
always are in terms of their belonging to other useful things: writing mate-
rials, pen, ink, paper, desk blotter, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors,
room. These "things" never show themselves initially by themselves, in
order then to fill out a room as a sum of real things. What we encounter as
nearest to us, although we do not grasp it thematically, is the room, not as
what is "in between the four walls" in a geometrical, spatial sense, but
rather as material for living.... A totality of useful things is always al-
ready discovered before the "individual" useful thing.
154
Beings or "things" ready at hand that are in terms of other beings
or "things"-the work they may or may not be likely to produce rather
than the beings or "things" in themselves-that is according to Hei-
degger what we typically encounter when in our everyday being-in-
the-world we encounter beings or "things" in the surrounding world. 155
That is to say, such beings and "things" present themselves to us as
"reference"' 156 (Verweisung) rather than substance. When we encoun-
ter them, we do not therefore look at them "theoretically" but with
"circumspection"' 57 (Umsicht)-without yet knowing how they really
are. Indeed, it is only by handling, using and taking care of them that
useful things reveal themselves by themselves-namely, as "'handi-
ness' (Zuhandenkeit)."'58 Or, which is the same, what we do not nor-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. §§ 15.68-.69. Here follows the celebrated example of the hammer.
Association is geared to useful things which show themselves genuinely only in
this association, that is, hammering with the hammer, neither grasps these beings
thematically as occurring things nor does it even know of using or the structure of
useful things as such. Hammering does not just have a knowledge of the useful
character of the hammer; rather, it has appropriated this useful thing in the most
adequate way possible .... The less we just stare at the thing, called hammer, the
more actively we use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more
undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful thing. The act of hammer-
ing itself discovers the specific "handiness" of the hammer.
Id. § 15.69.
155. Id. §§ 15.69-.70.
156. Id. § 15.69.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 15.71.
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mally see in our everyday being-in-the-world is what those beings or
"things" are in themselves.'59
The same, of course, must be true of lawyers including compara-
tive lawyers. They too must normally encounter law's many domains
as "useful things" (in the Heideggerian sense). And so they too must
encounter that world other than on its own terms.
21. Of Worldly Space and the Spatiality of Da-sein. But if ac-
cording to Heidegger's analysis Da-sein is in the world existentially
and, conversely, world is other than some sort of larger or total being
"in" which Da-sein is-if, in other words, world is a constitutive
open-structural factor of Da-sein's being-in-the-world-where does
that leave us in our investigation of space-both the space of human
being and, in particular, legal space?
(i) Nearness.-Let us first look at worldly space-the space char-
acteristic of Da-sein's surrounding world (or innerworldly beings).
Initially Da-sein encounters such beings as "things" at hand and that,
Heidegger now notes, means that Da-sein encounters certain beings
first-namely, those beings to which it is near(er). Thus a fundamen-
tal characteristic of the being-in-the-world of Da-sein is that human
being is near other beings. Obvious though that observation might
sound at first, the point is that such a nearness has in fact nothing to do
with a measuring of distances between human being and the surround-
ing world-it has nothing to do, in short, with traditional concepts of
space hitherto embraced by Western thinking including legal thinking.
Rather, "[tihe structured nearness of useful things means that they do
not simply have a place in space, objectively present somewhere, but
as useful things are essentially installed, put in their place, set up, and
put in order."' 6 That is interesting-for the suggestion here is that for
human beings innerworldly beings are put into place, or else they "lie
around"-but they do not simply occur in space (they do not simply
lie "in" space).
So then legal space-the physical or institutional space defined by
the many theories and practices of law (contract, murder, citizenship,
war, etc.)--can never be properly grasped and measured as being "in"
or surrounded "by" or taking hold "of' some sort of absolute space
that, by being thus secured to it and being therefore capable of secur-
ing the world to it, will then allow for both the infinite repetition and
the insuperable evidence of that same legal space that is each time in
159. Id.
160. Id. § 22.102.
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question-theory or practice that it might be. That long-standing
"metaphysical" concept of legal space would on closer inspection
simply not do. Rather, legal space would be more genuinely under-
stood as what each time may or may not have been referred to as such
upon the being near of Da-sein to other beings-what contract, mur-
der, etc. such nearness may or may not have each time made of the
surrounding world understood as "useful things." Legal space, in par-
ticular, would on this view be whatever lawyers including compara-
tive lawyers might circumspectly make of "things" each time "at
hand" and "around"-before, that is, seeing them theoretically as
"contracts," "murders," etc. Indeed that and only that would I suggest
be the matter of legal space, both the how and the heartland of it all:
that is, the being near, or nearness, of human beings to other be-
ings. '6 It is upon dealing with a specific promise-better still, with
the non-honoring of it by one party-that the "binding-ness" of that
promise as a "natural obligation" or a "gift" or a "contract," etc. will
first come out and be thematized as such.'62 It is upon dealing with
violent death that "death-ness" will be seen to amount to the suppres-
sion of life and then "murder" or, for example, an emancipatory if no
less answerable "theory" of sort (think once again of Raskol'nikov's
deed in Crime and Punishment). It is upon dealing with the aban-
donment of home that "belong-ness" and then, for example, "citizen-
ship" will become apparent. And, finally, it is upon the breaking-
down of similarity or indeed of difference that sameness and otherness
will emerge by way of what would be a veritable comparison from
without.'63 Legal space, in sum, would be better grasped as a place
that lawyers including comparative lawyers regularly constitute
(rather than merely imitate or create) on first being-near to that
which, by being usefully at hand, they later on set out to represent or
to compare. Again, this is not to say that natural obligation, gift, con-
tract, murder, citizenship, etc. are a purely subjective affair. That
could not be so-if only because one, by contrast, typically tends to
thematize them as objective. '64 Rather, what that means is that, first of
all, legal space is temporal-it is each time a possibility as well as a
particular legal theory or practice. 165 Secondly, legal space is a being-
161. On my definition of the "matter" of legal space, see supra T 3.
162. I say "binding-ness" to stress that for Heidegger what would be at stake would be the
being binding of the promise, rather than the binding character of it.
163. See supra 5.
164. There are of course other reasons-like for example the directionality of Da-sein's
spatiality. See infra 20(iii).
165. See infra 122.
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near that need not be a being physically close-though by no means
there is here a distant place. Nor need it be a solitary, atomistic
place-walled, as it were, within its own unconquerable walls. In-
stead, legal space is always a being near "in terms of a totality of the
interconnected places of the context of useful things at hand in the sur-
rounding world."'" That is, such being near has the open-structure of
reference and so can be precisely pinned-down-in that at least there
is always here "the definite 'over there' and the 'there' of a useful
thing belonging there."67 That is to say, legal space is situated.
Finally, on having a place-on being near to Da-sein-beings al-
ready always belong in a "region." 168 "Something akin to a region
must already be discovered if there is to be any possibility of referring
and finding the places of a totality of useful things available to cir-
cumspection."' 69 This regional orientation of the various places of be-
ings in the surrounding world is what constitutes their aroundness,
"the being around us of beings encountered initially in the surrounding
world. 1 70 The inconspicuous familiarity of what is around us is such
that regions are rarely accessible. Nevertheless, what is clear for Hei-
degger is that such a surrounding world does not arrange itself in a
prior space, but rather its being worldly gives meaning to the place, or
being near, of beings-it "articulates in its significance the relevant
context of an actual totality of places."' 7' That is why the legal space
that is each time instituted by a particular legal text or context would
be better analyzed, I suggest, as each time an event-or set of
events-constituting that text or context within what one might call
the horizon of the matter of legal space.172
(ii) De-distancing.-Let us now turn to the spatiality of Da-sein
itself. This too is "essentially not objective presence.., neither some-
thing like being found in a position in 'world space' nor being at hand
166. HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 22.102.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 22.103.
"In the region of' means not only "in the direction of," but also in the orbit of
something that lies in that direction. The kind of place which is constituted by di-
rection and remoteness-nearness is only a mode of the latter-is already oriented
toward a region and within that region. Something akin to a region must already
be discovered if there is to be any possibility of referring and finding the places of
a totality of useful things available to circumspection.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 22.104.
172. Seesupra 10.
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in a place." '173 Instead, the spatiality of Da-sein marks "a familiar and
heedful association" with the surrounding world that can only be pos-
sible on the basis of the being-in of Da-sein. 174 However, the point
now is that such an existential spatiality of Da-sein is characterized by
what Heidegger calls "de-distancing" (Ent-fernung) and "directional-
ity" (Ausrichtung). 175
By de-distancing as a kind of being of Da-sein with regard to its being-in-
the-world, we do not understand anything like remoteness (nearness) or
even being at a distance.... De-distancing means making distance disap-
pear, making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it
near. Da-seln is essentially de-distancing. As the being that it is, it lets
beings be encountered in nearness. De-distancing discovers remoteness.
Remoteness, like distance, is a categorial determination of beings unlike
Da-sein... . Only because beings in general are discovered by Da-sein in
their remoteness, do "distances" and intervals among innerworldly beings
become accessible in relation to other things.'
76
De-distancing is the other end, so to speak, of being near. Da-sein
is-near to beings and world upon continually de-distancing itself from
them. Thus the approaching of Da-sein, the bringing near understood
as a supplying, as a preparing, as a having at hand-all that is Da-sein
geared as it is toward nearness. But-while Da-sein is everywhere
always a de-distancing (especially in today's highly sophisticated
times)-such a de-distancing does not, once again, imply any explicit
measurement of what farness there might be with the things at hand.
Instead, de-distancing is about getting so close to distance that dis-
tance itself can then be put safely way. No doubt, "[i]n the calculative
sense these estimations may be imprecise and variable, but they have
their own thoroughly intelligible definiteness in the everydayness of
Da-sein. '" 177 That is why such a de-distancing has nothing to do with
arbitrariness or with subjective conceptions of what is around us. By
contrast, de-distancing is a discovering of things in themselves, that is,
a discovery of beings "with which Da-sein as existing is always al-
ready together."'178
173. HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 22.104.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. § 23.105. "Two points are as little remote from each other as two things in gen-
eral because neither of these things can de-distance in accordance with its kind of being.
They merely have a measurable distance between them which is encountered in de-
distancing." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 23.106 (emphasis added).
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(iii) Directionality.-Thus Heidegger's conception of the spatial-
ity of Da-sein-the existential spatiality characteristic of the being-in-
the-world of human being-comes finally and firmly into view. Hu-
man being is, first of all, near beings and world, in the sense of being
in the range of what is initially around us for us to associate with it.
Secondly, human being occupies a place-but it does so in a radically
different way from just being in a measurable, physical or institutional
space. 179 That is, "Da-sein understands its here in terms of the over
there of the surrounding world"-so much so that "Da-sein is initially
never here, but over there."'8 ° Or, one might say, the space of human
being is really a place that can only be pin-pointed by difference.
Third, human being is always a de-distancing yet it can never by-pass
the current range of its de-distancings, crossing over what farness
there is between itself and what is at hand-though, of course, it may
well be able to vary them along the way. In other words, human being
is continually de-distancing-and that won't change (for it is an exis-
tential)-though such continuous de-distancing does change as human
being moves on to ever new de-distancings. 18' Finally, however, the
spatiality of human being is also characterized by directionality.
"Every bringing near has always taken a direction in a region before-
hand from which what is de-distanced approaches so that it can be
discovered with regard to its place."'82 In that sense, useful things are
seen by Heidegger as signs which "take over the giving of directions
in a way which is explicit and easily handled"-so that in the event
one can say that "[i]f Da-sein is, it always already has directing and
de-distancing, its discovered region." '83
179. Id. § 23.107. That is, in a radically different way from just "being at hand at a place in
terms of a region. Occupying a place must be understood as de-distancing what is at hand in
the surrounding world in a region previously discovered circumspectly beforehand." Id.
180. Id.
181.
As being-in-the-world, Da-sein essentially dwells in de-distancing. This de-
distancing, the farness from itself of what is at hand, is something that Da-sein can
never cross over. It is true that Da-sein can take the remoteness of something at
hand to be distance if that remoteness is determined in relation to a thing which is
thought of as being objectively present at a place which Da-sein has already occu-
pied. Da-sein can subsequently traverse the "between" of this distance, but only in
such a way that the distance itself becomes de-distanced. So little has Da-sein
crossed over its de-distancing that it rather has taken it along and continues to do
so because it is essentially de-distancing, that is, it is spatial. Da-sein cannot
wander around in the current range of its de-distancings, it can only change them.
Id. § 23.108.
182. Id.
183. Id.
200 [Vol. 41
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22. Making Room. What the existential spatiality of being-in-the-
world clarifies-what Heidegger's notions of nearness, placeness, de-
distancing and directionality mean-is, for example, how as being-in-
the-world human being "has always already discovered a 'world." ' 84
Such spatiality, moreover, also accounts for how specifically will all
else in the surrounding world be encountered. So on the one hand the
"[s]pace that is disclosed with the worldliness of the world does not
yet have the characteristic of a pure manifold of three dimensions."185
On the other hand, however, "[1]etting innerworldly beings be encoun-
tered, which is constitutive for being-in-the-world" must be under-
stood as a "giving space" (Raum-geben).86 Thus, again, Heidegger's
decisive move from space to spatiality permits an understanding of
space as something much more capacious than our current, far too re-
ductive equation of it with mere Newtonian space. Space including
legal space can never be an absolute, fixed, neutral structure. Rather,
space is an open possibility, a continually re-organizing giving-space.
That is to say, space can only really speak of human beings (lawyers
and comparative lawyers included) as beings who always already have
a surrounding world to which they, however, give space as they con-
tinually de-distance themselves in directions that, as such, are each
time already there. So really that giving-space, which is a "making
room" (Einrdumen), "frees things at hand for their spatiality."'' 87 Or,
which is the same, beings and world can only be in space-they can
only be in place-in so far as human beings give them space, or put
them in place. Existentially, giving space is thus a way of discovering
and presenting a possible totality of places, a way of making orienta-
tion possible, and so change things around, remove them or make
room for them. But then what that space understood as a spatiality
also says is how because space is initially discovered in that spatiality
upon being-in-the-world, it is only on the basis of that discovery that
"space itself becomes accessible to cognition.""'
It is spatiality, in short, that allows for the discovery of space
within the world -not the other way around.
184. Id. § 24.110.
185. Id. Instead, "[i]n this nearest disclosedness, space is still hidden as the pure wherein
in which points are ordered by measurement and the positions of things are determined." Id.
186. Id. § 24.111.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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23. The Temporality of Da-sein's Spatiality. In Division Two of
Being and Time, Heidegger sets out to verify temporality phenome-
nologically by, as it were, temporalizing temporality (Zeitgung).189
Accordingly, in paragraph 70 he returns on the spatiality of Da-sein-
so as to review it from the perspective of temporality.
Da-sein's spatiality, Heidegger had anticipated in Division One, is
grounded in temporality-in the being past and future as well as pre-
sent of Da-sein. Does that mean that space can be deduced from, or
else be resolved in, time? No. 9 ' Does the temporality of spatiality,
then, have anything to do with say Kantian priority of time over
space? Again, no. 191 Instead, Da-sein is spatial and so temporal as
"care"-in the specific sense of a "factically entangled existing."'' 9
2
As such, "Da-sein is never objectively present in space, not even ini-
tially."193 Instead, it "takes space in." 94 Nor, for that matter, is Da-
sein spatial in that it "knows about space."' 195 All to the contrary, it is
the making room of Da-sein that allows for any particular representa-
tion-and not vice versa. Even less, finally, can the temporality of
Da-sein's spatiality have anything to do with the sorrow whereabouts
of one's own spirit bogged down by an all too encumbering physical
body.196 But if that is so, how then is the temporality of Da-sein's spa-
tiality?
To begin with, Da-sein's spatiality is grounded in temporality in
the sense that, Heidegger reminds us, making room is constituted by
directionality and de-distancing. 97 What that means is that making
room is related in some eminent way to the discovery of something
like a proximate region, 98 so that "[w]henever one comes across use-
189. Id. § 45.
190. Id. § 70.367.
191. Id.
That the empirical representations of what is objectively present "in space" occur
as physical events "in time," so that the "physical" also occurs indirectly "in time,"
is not to give an existential and ontological interpretation of space as a form of
sensibility, but rather to ascertain ontically that what is physically objectively pre-
sent runs its course "in time."
Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 70.368.
194. Id.
195. Id. Indeed, "[m]aking room is so far from identical with the 'representation' of some-
thing spatial that the latter presupposes the former." Id.
196. Instead, "because Da-sein is 'spiritual,' and only because it is spiritual, it can be spa-
tial in a way that essentially remains impossible for an extended corporeal being." Id.
197. See supra 20.
198. "[Tjhe whereto of the possible belonging somewhere of useful things at hand in the
202 [Vol. 41
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ful things, handles them, moves them around, or out of the way, a re-
gion has already been discovered."'99  Therefore, on the one hand,
"[b]eing-in-the-world that takes care of things is directed, directing it-
self. ' '200 On the other hand, there must thus always be a relation be-
tween the taking care of things and the things taken care of-a rela-
tion of relevance that, however, goes beyond the mere domain of text
or context while, at the same time, being each time intelligible only in
the "horizon of a disclosed world," that is to say, in the horizon of a
world of text or context.201 The very nature of any such relation of
relevance ("horizontal"), in fact, not only makes possible the specific
horizon each time in question, 2 2 but also allows for a de-distancing, a
continuous and continuing bringing-near of things at hand and objec-
tively present. 2 3 In other words, such relation of relevance quite liter-
ally makes any such thing present. 204
In the making present of things at hand, however, "making present
loses itself in itself, and forgets the over there"-hence, the illusion of
only a thing being initially objectively present, in space. 205  Still,
again, the central point here is that only temporality as the being past
and future as well as present of Da-sein allows Da-sein "to break into
space"-so that the world cannot be said to be objectively present in
space while, on the other hand, it is only within a world that space can
be discovered by Da-sein.206 Hence, the independence of space from
time but also, at the same time, the dependency of Da-sein upon
space. 0 7 Such a dependency, Heidegger then concludes, shows itself
in the matter of self-interpretation and of the significance of lan-
guage--dominated as they are by spatial representations. Yet, the pri-
ority of the spatial in both significations and concepts is grounded
surrounding world." HEIDEGGER, BEING, supra note 120, § 70.368.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. "The self-directive discovering of a region is grounded in an ecstatically retentive
awaiting of the possible hither and wither." Id.
203. Id. "As a directed awaiting of region, making room is equiprimordially a bringing-
near (or de-distancing) of things at hand and objectively present." Id. §§ 70.368-.369.
204. "Bringing-near and the estimating and measurement of distances within what is ob-
jectively present within the de-distanced world are grounded in a making-present that belongs
to the unity of temporality in which directionality is possible, too." Id. § 70.369.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. "The ecstatic temporality of the spatiality of Da-sein make it intelligible that
space is independent of time, but on the other hand this same temporality makes intelligible
also the 'dependency' of Da-sein upon space .... " Id.
2032004]
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"not in some specific power of space, but rather in the kind of being of
Da-sein. ' 208
24. The Paradox of Language. The initial move from subjectivity
to temporality had allowed Heidegger to highlight the question of Be-
ing and to conduct a formidable analysis of Being-in-the-world. That
was of immense importance, for Heidegger could thus finally mobilize
what essentialist or "metaphysical" views of the subject-and of
space-Western ontological, thinking, including legal thinking, had
traditionally entertained. But on using time for that purpose, Heideg-
ger had also realized that he could do just that-and go no further. 2°9
In a 1962 lecture, entitled "Time and Being" [Zeit und Sein],21° Hei-
degger described as "untenable" his own attempt in Being and Time
ultimately to ground spatiality on temporality." That being the back-
ground, the short St. Gallen conference held by Heidegger in 1964 and
entitled Raum, Mensch und Sprache2t 2 has been seen as an attempt to
reintroduce space as an element independent, as it were, from tempo-
rality.213
208. Id.
209. One of the problems with the foundational approach that characterized Being and
Time is the relationship between temporality and care. According to one view, temporality
should be understood as encompassing, but not equating to, care. See generally Graeme
Nicholson, Ekstatic Temporality in Sein und Zeit, in A COMPANION TO MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S
"BEING AND TIME" 208 (Joseph J. Kockelmans ed., 1986). According to another view, how-
ever, "[tihe structure of temporality should be treated as an abstraction from Da-sein's Being-
in-the-world, specifically from care." See Yoko Arisaka, Spatiality, Temporality, and the
Problem of Foundation in Being and Time, 40 PHIL. TODAY 36 (1996),
http://www.arisaka.org/heidegger.html. In other words, temporality should, in that second
view, be reduced to care. But then
if this is the case.., temporality does not found spatiality, except perhaps in the
trivial sense that spatiality is built into the notion of care which is identified with
temporality .... The addition of temporal dimensions does indeed complete the
discussion of spatiality, which is abstracted from time. But this completion, while
it better articulates the whole of Being-in-the-world, does not show that temporal-
ity is more fundamental.
Id.
210. M. HEIDEGGER, ON TIME AND BEING (Joan Stambaugh trans., 2002) [hereinafter
HEIDEGGER, ON TIME].
211. Id. at23.
212. See supra 18. The lecture was to be published a few years later under the title "Die
Kunst und der Raum." MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DIE KUNST UND DER RAUM, [Lecture at the St.
Gallen Conference] (1964). Today, it can be found in HEIDEGGER, GESAMTAUSGABE supra
note 41, at 203-10.
213. On this, see EUGENIO MAZZARELLA, TECNICA E METAFISICA: SAGGIO SU HEIDEGGER
pt. 1, cap. 3 (1981); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, L'ARTE E LO SPAZIO 7-13 (Carlo Angelino trans.,
II Melangolo 1979) (n.d.).
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Meanwhile, however, Heidegger had long begun to explore the
role of language in the question of Being. In a soon-to-become fa-
mous response to a letter from Jean Beaufret, a response later to be
published as Letter on Humanism (Uber den Humanismus), Heidegger
had in 1946 argued how language is best seen as the "House of Be-
ing. 214 By that time, in other words, Heidegger had turned to the in-
vestigation of the proximate relation of Being and language-rather
than Being and temporality. In the following years, Heidegger would
then build on the project initially outlined in the Letter on Human-
ism-by distinguishing "calculating thinking" and "meditating think-
ing"; by separating what language allows man to exist, from ordinary
language (a "challenging"; a "regulating"; and a "securing"); by ob-
serving that language names and naming calls; by stressing the impor-
tance of non-representational "poetry" as that "which lets us dwell";
by clarifying how dif-ference is the dimension, insofar as it measures
out, apportions, world and thing, each to its own'; and so on.
I discussed elsewhere the relevance of Heidegger's thinking on
language in relation to law and, in particular, to what I suggested to
call "meditating" or "poetic" comparisons and the "question of com-
parative law."2 5 Much more would need to be said in relation to that.
However, let us now simply recall how Heidegger's work, it seems to
me, invites us to treat law's many theories and practices as linguistic
"techniques" whereby-and that is really the point-what is at stake is
something rather more intriguing than the mere practice of language in
the normal sense, original and expansive though that might well be.
For, Heidegger points out, language belongs to man and yet, just as
importantly, man belongs to language.216
To say that man belongs to language, in particular, highlights the
foundational paradox of language-and, indeed, the very sense of its
originality. 27 The paradox of language, in particular, is that language
is a threshold-both the center and the threshold of thinking.218 That
214. The response by Heidegger had been initially published, in a shorter version, by the
journal Fontaine, with an introductory essay by Beaufret. See Jean Beaufret, Heidegger et le
Problme de la Writi, 63 FONTAINE 758 (1947). A new version by Heidegger was then pub-
lished at the end of Martin Heidegger, PLATONS LEHRE VON DER WAHRHEIT-MIT EINEM
BRIEF OBER DEN HIUMANISMUS > 53-119 (1947). See HEIDEGGER, Letter on Humanism, in
BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 35, at 213.
215. See generally Stramignoni, King's Eyes, supra note 104; Igor Stramignoni, Meditat-
ing Comparisons, or the Question of Comparative Law, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 57 (2003)
[hereinafter Stramignoni, Meditating Comparisons].
216. Stramignoni, King's Eyes, supra note 104, at 762.
217. Stramignoni, Meditating Comparisons, supra note 215, at 67-71.
218. Id. at 69.
20520041
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paradox, it seems to me, is foundational-in that language rather than
temporality is now, in Heidegger's own words, "the relation of all re-
lations. ' 2 9 But if that is so, what then can be the matter of legal
space-what can be the matter of legal experience-if not language,
some "other-language," the "house" in Heidegger's sense that lan-
guage continuously lays-out for us to inhabit and to say? And if the
matter of legal space is language, some other-language, then that par-
ticular space as each time a particular legal theory or practice will al-
ways hold in itself the possibility of some other-law, of some radically
different theory or practice-though not, in that sense, the possibility
of anything other than law.
25. Eventful Spatialities. To recap. The story of Francesco and
his devilish Venus suggests that lawyers, like painters, have compar-
ing as such as the true matter of their doing.220 Such is each time the
how of their experience-at least, in one first important sense.22' Ac-
cordingly, space-here, the space of legal representations as well as
the space of legal comparisons-is best understood as much more than
merely physical space222 or even institutional space. 223 Nor can space
be any longer seen as merely absolute, Newtonian, instrumental
space.224 Indeed, the odd story of Francesco's picture and its excess
clearly suggests how it is precisely another space that might be each
time at stake in the art of law as well as in the art of painting.225
Which space? A space that is an event or set of events through which
Francesco's story can, quite literally, take place 226-- in short, an event-
ful spatiality through which legal representations and legal compari-
sons can, they too, take place. But how precisely would that eventful
spatiality-that other-space-be? One possibility that can be sug-
gested by developing parts of the complex yet powerful, lucid think-
ing of Martin Heidegger is that, neither just text nor simply context,
the eventful spatiality that is at stake in the art of law might be each
time a comparing as such but also, in a deeper sense, a language each
219. 12 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Das Wesen der Sprache (The Nature of Language), in
GESAMTAUSGABE 25 (1985). The English version of the quoted excerpt is taken from MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE (1971).
220. See supra 5.
221. See supra 5.
222. See supra 7 .
223. See supra 8.
224. See supra fi]I 11-12.
225. See supra 10.
226. See supra 10.
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time amounting to a nearness, a placeness, a de-distancing and a di-
rectionality.27 That, I have suggested in this section, might be the
heartland of legal space-the place of law's most original imagina-
tion.228
But then, if that is what a post-Heideggerian understanding of
space would look like, what might that language be if not, in some in-
triguing sense, a threshold between what will thus be each time duly
disclosed and what will then remain, by contrast, each time utterly
concealed?
HISTORIES
Civilizations, vast or otherwise, can always be located on a map .... To
discuss civilization is to discuss space, land and its contours.
229
Non c' piti spazio per alcuna pittura.
230
26. The Paradox of Space. In the previous sections, I have ar-
gued that modern Western jurisdictions explicitly or implicitly rely on
a rather specific concept of space-which they seem to consider as
largely unproblematic (when they consider it at all). Just like Hoff-
mann's towns, monasteries or canvasses, Western legal jurisdictions
normally return a linear, ultimately calculable concept of neutral, uni-
versal space that may be real or may be fictional, yet it is always rep-
resented and representable as a physical or institutional "thing" of
sorts. As such, space is then understood as a structure, or function
thereof, that is each time marked, as it were, by some height, depth
and width, or lack thereof. Like Francesco's canvas, moreover, such a
227. See supra 19.
228. See supra 16.
229. FERNAND BRAUDEL, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS 9 (Richard Mayne trans., Penguin
Group 1995) (1963).
230. "There is no space left for any painting," GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, GtNIE DU NON-
LIEu: AIR, POuSsItRE, EMPREINTE, HANTiSE 30 (2001) (quoting C. Parmiggiani, Dialogo [avec
V. Castellani], in PARMIGGIANI 29 (C. Vattimo & V. Castellani eds., 1998)) (author's
translation).
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thing is then deemed to be empty (like a "blank" canvas or a "void"
contract), or else to be surrounded or occupied by bodies or other
structures ("figures," "persons," etc.). Yet the point is that, for all its
apparent neutrality and universality, there is on such a view a rather
confined, confining "space" all the same-a thing of the subject that is
thus in the subject's own exceptional domain.
The frailty of the common concept of space is however a rela-
tively recent discovery-one that only occurred well into modernity.
Long by and large uninterested in the space they thought they had
mastered by evacuating it (in other words, by ignoring it or abandon-
ing it as mere "absolute" space), Western legal jurisdictions now sud-
denly hope to be able to capture that space again. But then however
might one take hold of a vacant space (a space that is no longer what
we always took it to be)? That in a nutshell is I suggest one of the
most daunting paradoxes of many of today's legal theories and prac-
tices-the paradox, that is, of legal space.
(i) On inspection, Heidegger's work offers-no ready-made solu-
tions but-one radically articulated hindsight into that space that, it
seems to me, is worth debating."' If one turns (or returns) to Heideg-
ger's critical ontology as an analytical reservoir, then any relationship
between say law, history, politics and space as we may typically know
it today and as is typically evidenced by what counts today as con-
tract, murder, citizenship or war-may turn out to be quite unlike
what any such relationship is usually explained to be. In particular,
one might discover that--caught between the increasingly obvious
emptiness of law and the puzzling laws of an obvious emptiness-
Western legal jurisdictions might need to re-think in terms of "lan-
guage" the instructions that by now have come to count fundamen-
tally232 or functionally 233 as law.
23 1. A post-Heideggerian understanding of legal space, such as the one I try to sketch in
this paper, would no doubt greatly benefit from the reading of other works by Heidegger. See
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, HOLZWEGE (1950); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, VORTRAGE UND AUFSATZE
(1954).
232. A good example of this would be the institutional structuralism adopted by Geoffrey
Samuel. See generally Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative Law as a Core Subject 21 LEGAL
STUD. 444 (2001).
233. For diverse and sophisticated versions of legal functionalism, see generally NIKLAS
LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1993); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, POSTMODERNE
RECHTSTHEORIE (1992); and GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne
Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993). For a defense of Luhmann as
a "theorist[ ] of the banal," see W.T. MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE? 34 (1997). For
alternative critiques, see generally Peter Goodrich, Anti-Teubner: Autopoiesis, Paradox, and
the Theory of Law, 13 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 197 (1999); and Anton SchUtz, Thinking the Law
with and Against Luhmann, Legendre, Agamben, II L. & CRITIQUE 107 (2000). On two
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(ii) Turning to language-one might object-would hardly be a
novelty as such. In a post-Heideggerian understanding of space, how-
ever, "language" would not be simply what everyday or even profes-
sional language may be each time characteristic of our many everyday
or professional concerns. Turning to language, that is, would hardly
be turning to our supposedly superior linguistic ability to communi-
cate. Instead, there would be here at stake what logos or relation each
of us might each time originally belong to, individually or collec-
tively.2M4 And it would be precisely the role of any such language as
logos or relation that would need to be carefully uncovered in a post-
Heideggerian understanding of space.
(iii) Accordingly, the various legal instructions with which we are
typically familiar could prove to be not so much about the actual lan-
guage that they are (for example, the legal language of contract, mur-
der, citizenship or war)-but, more problematically, a threshold be-
tween typically unnoticed relations that are neither metaphysical nor
transcendent nor exclusively causal or structural nor, for that matter,
exclusively functional. Indeed, it would be the whole concept of a
"relation" that would need to be thought afresh, in a post-
Heideggerian understanding of legal space as "language." In particu-
lar, one might for example discover that what is normally seen and
then set aside as being merely "space" is each time a different eventful
spatiality-something like a heartland-rather than just space in the
normal sense. In that case, our post-Heideggerian understanding of
space would really be (as drawing from Heidegger I would suggest)
about nearness, placeness, de-distancing and directionality-rather
than about measuring or calculating in the linear-historical, linear-
functional or linear-structural sense of any such activity.
(iv) A move from space to language to logos or relation, however,
would also mean that legal space could no longer be seen (somewhat
optimistically) as a neutral, universal functional network, structure,
social system, etc. That move, instead, would invite us to regard legal
space as a rather particular, exceptional set of validated, rather than
valid, in-structions--quite literally, in-structures, or structures of sort
that are, quite literally, from within. No doubt earlier on absolute,
Newtonian space helped Western jurisdictions stabilize themselves.
somewhat opposite instances of functionalism in comparative law, compare K. ZWEIGERT &
H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998) with Gunther Teubner, Le-
gal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences,
61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (where comparisons are intrinsic to the reduction of reality oper-
ated by the legal system).
234. See supra 124.
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Now, however, that same space might be at the root of their greatest
instability. But what by contrast would that instability look like once
we think of legal space as of the "language" of those who make the
law and that the law, recursively, contributes to make? 235
(v) In a post-Heideggerian analytics of space, language would in-
deed be where we would want to start from in an attempt fruitfully to
capture and then to respond to some of the more puzzling complexi-
ties of today's Western societies-beginning, of course, with those
concerning democracy and the rule of law. For example, what else-
where I have called poetic comparisons of law would indeed start just
there: they would start by thinking afresh the complex relationships
between law, space, history and politics as mainstream comparative
law normally knows them, so that eventually the legal texts and insti-
tutional contexts of mainstream comparative law can begin to be seen
for what they truly seem to be-that is, the result of a heartland more
than the source of functional networks, structures, etc.236 Poetic com-
parisons of law, that is, would want to tackle what is, quite literally,
the matter of legal space and see what difference does it make.
(vi) To think legal space in terms of language as logos or relation
is a large task that must be undertaken imaginatively, as well as in-
crementally and with circumspection. In what follows, then, I can
only fugitively note the sort of questions that might arise from moving
from space to spatiality. Such notations are therefore preliminary, in-
complete and hardly representative of what else could be done if one
were to move from space to language-but that, I think, is good, for
the point of any such poetics would be precisely to open up or mobi-
lize legal space rather than marking down new legal frontiers.
In what follows, then, I suggest that it would be fruitful to con-
sider afresh certain written legal texts or certain specific legal institu-
tions that can be typically found in the official maps of Western legal
history and of Western comparative law. In particular, one might be-
gin by considering how legal institutions, rules, regulations, proce-
dures., etc. seem to have emerged in modernity as a multiple, open se-
ries of legal spaces that lie at the very core of, and recursively deploy,
235. That must be what Otto Kahn-Freund meant by saying that "[t]he question is in many
cases no longer how deeply it is embedded, how deep are its roots in the soil of its country,
but who has planted the roots and who cultivates the garden." 0. Kahn-Freund, supra note
117. A post-Heideggerian understanding of space, however, would focus on the more radical
consequences of Kahn-Freund's intuition.
236. I have begun to articulate the task of what I have called "poetic comparisons of law"
in Stramignoni, King's Eyes, supra note 104, and Stramignoni, Meditating Comparisons, su-
pra note 215.
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the Western citadel of law. As such, those spaces have been typically
seen to be everywhere in absolute, Newtonian space-and there is
where lawyers including comparative lawyers normally set out to find
them.
But then, the question is, how did it all happen? And what may be
the significance of it all? My suggestion would be that the discovery
in modernity of absolute, Newtonian space must have had the effect of
stabilizing the legal spaces of the West as, strictly speaking, its legal
territories or closely guarded if apparently no longer inaccessible pre-
cincts-but then, one feels, the transformation of legal spaces into the
legal territories of modernity is still to be properly traced in legal his-
tory and in comparative law alike.
27. Legal Territories. So, I would like to suggest, it is precisely
around the problem of regulating space as each time a different legal
territory of the West that modern Western law began to develop.237
And it is within those legal territories that later on in modernity a ma-
jor shift was set to occur. Thus in modernity Western law seems to
have slowly evolved from a sort of multiple "machinery" that, by that
time, had emerged from premodern spatializations of law's many do-
mains-into some sort of reflexive, increasingly sophisticated "dispo-
sitif" that had now to convert, or re-colonize, modern legal territories
into increasingly more specialized, that is abstract, inner and outer
fractions of legal space. 38
28. Premodern Spatializations. Forgotten within the interstices
of both legal history and comparative law, what is today commonly
understood by legal space may not have been there all along-
according to the history of legal space that I would like here to en-
courage. Legal historians can of course be seen as having always
concerned themselves with histories of legal places in space as well as
in time-with the histories, that is, of certain legal decisions, rules, of-
fices and procedures. Comparative lawyers, on the other hand, can be
seen to have been just as regularly concerned with the comparison of
those legal places in space and time-preferably, nowadays, with the
237. In the following pages, I shall refer to "space" meaning both physical and institu-
tional space.
238. Not everywhere the political-legal machinery of early modernity has been successful.
One, for example, can easily see how the "question Basque" is but a piece of live-flesh evi-
dence of what that early machinery was up to but did not, in that case, manage to achieve (so
far). See La Question Basque-Confins, Violence, Confinement, 56 LES TEMPS MODERNES
614 (Juin-Juillet-Aout 2001).
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general or particular functions that those places might be perceived to
be serving. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a story still to be told
would be, for example, the story (the innumerable different stories) of
the transformation of premodern legal spaces into the legal territories
of modernity-in fact a story, I suggest, with no clear beginning and
so, therefore, no linear, progressive development.
Then the problem of course would be to decide where to start trac-
ing back the inauguration of modern legal space as each time a differ-
ent legal territory of modernity. One obvious possibility would be to
start before it all became the way it did in early modernity. But where
might that time be-where might that non-linear, non-chronological
incipit lie? Or, indeed, how did it all begin?
A history of modern legal space could start, for example (but this
is only an example), with the observation that modernity-here, the
emergence in the West of the nation state and the rule of law-seems
to have brought to an end an infinite set of multiple, asymmetric proc-
esses that could be broadly described as premodern spatializations of
law's many domains. Such observation is worth for what it is-a
mere, rather arbitrary point of departure for a story still largely to be
uncovered. Moreover, that observation would need probably to be ac-
companied by several qualifications. For example, one might wish to
point out that while historically and philosophically modernity seems
to have had a linear-chronological beginning somewhere around the
sixteenth century or seventeenth centurya39-it was not until much
later that modernity came to be thematized as a new way of thinking
and, in particular, a new way of producing knowledge.24° Therefore,
one might say, modernity may have not properly "begun" until the
eighteenth century or even the nineteenth century (but this would of
course also depend on the particular field of inquiry concerned).24
239. What historically may or may not count as "modernity" is debatable and, indeed,
there seem to be no general consensus among the historians on this point. The year 1660 has
been suggested as a suitable starting point for what is here understood as (early) modernity,
for it is at that time that Europe enters a new, prolonged period of peace after half a century of
violent convulsions. See generally WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OLD EUROPEAN ORDER 1660-1800
(J.M. Roberts ed., 1978). Philosophically, by contrast, many would say that modernity begins
with the cogito ergo sum of Rend Descartes. See generally RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on
the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, in
FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS 13 (Charles W. Elliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son Co. 1910)
(1889).
240. That is course a point made by JORGEN HABERMAS, DER PHILOSOPHiSCHE DISKURS
DER MODERNE (1985).
241. Id. at 7-33. For an alternative view, locating the passage to modernity into the eight-
eenth century rise of statistic and probabilistic positivities, see MURPHY, supra note 233, at
149 n.136.
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Additionally, it should be noted that what multiple spatializations
there may have been in premodern Europe-there must have been, in
fact, a far more fragmented and slow process than any characterization
of them might ever be likely to convey (a process, again, marked by
innumerable fits and starts rather than a fixed beginning). In some
cases, moreover, that process was clearly felt to have come to comple-
tion earlier and fuller. In others, it was felt to have come to maturity
much later on, or else never accomplished in full. Nevertheless, even
as these and other qualifications may be necessary in order to avoid
misunderstandings, as well as to signal how history seems to be really
an open, intricate web of individual and collective stories-for the
purpose of these pages we can safely refer to a "modernity" of legal
space, as well as to a "premodern" period and, then, to a "late mod-
em" period of it. Additionally, we can speak, in these initial sketches
for a legal history of space, of premodern spatializations of law's
many domains, as against modem territorialized laws and then mod-
em re-spatializations. In one word, the main aspect of law's premod-
em spatializations would be that they seem to have had, as it were,
rather little to do with legal space as normally understood today.
So, then, how may those earlier, premodern spatializations of
law's many domains have actually occurred? How may premodern
legal spaces have become the legal territories of modernity? And
what sort of places would those spaces be like? Here, one could only
but hint to that quite fascinating story-not so much because that story
could never be told in full unless one digs out further historical evi-
dence (though that of course must be done), 242 but really because that
story has been literally forgotten, so that either we think and do legal
history, as well as comparative law, in some radically new way, or it
will never be possible to re-memorize what has been, quite literally,
"blotted-out." 243
Let us then begin simply by suggesting how in premodern
Europe-here, in the period between the long aftermath of the demise
of imperial Rome and the eventual emergence of the modem nation
states24--what one day would be collectively known as the West had
242. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, WHY THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW HAS NOT BEEN FINISHED
(1998).
243. For a development of this point, see generally Igor Stramignoni, At the Margins of the
History of English Law: The Institutional, the Socio-Political and the 'Blotted-Out,' 22
LEGAL STUD. 420 (2002) [hereinafter Stramignoni, Margins].
244. Officially, it is not until 476 A.D. that Odoacer puts an end to the ailing Roman Em-
pire by sending the imperial insignia off to Zenon in Byzantium. However, the giving way of
imperial Rome had begun long before then. In 212 A.D. Antoninus Caracalla had promul-
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clearly to regain some space-what space had by then fallen back into
the world "outside," a world out of which Rome had once, quite liter-
ally, called it into presence. 45 The point, though, is that precisely be-
cause by the 4 th-5th century A.D. any correspondence of that Rome
with an outside world had largely gone astray, and because that out-
side world had in turn become a bigger and more open place than had
been previously the case-the remains of what had been before had
first and foremost to take place again, and to do so as what new space
could now be claimed between that bigger, more open world (and its
multiple voices and demands) and, at the other end, the East, where by
395 A.D. a new Rome had been finally acknowledged to have been
born instead.' Such new space, though, had in my view only little to
do with what one day would be understood by legal space. In particu-
lar, what seems to me began in the period under consideration was the
multiple, uncertain at first, but more and more insistent spatialization
of bare, situated space-a space, therefore, quite unlike the physical,
natural or institutional space of modernity.247 The outside world, in
gated the Constitutio Antoniniana, whose principal effect had been to turn all the residents of
the empire into Roman citizens. By the end of the third century, however, Diocletian was to
separate the empire in two parts, and by the beginning of the following century Byzantium
had become the new capital of the Eastern part of the empire. Meanwhile, several Germanic
people had been pushing southwards, along and across the northern frontiers of the empire,
while by 376 A.D. the Visigoths had been able to defeat the Eastern Romans at Adrianople,
not too far from Byzantium. By 410 A.D., the Visigoths had also managed to turn West, sack
Rome and finally, by 442 A.D., successfully install themselves in Gaul. See generally
1 A.H.M JONES, THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 284-602 [A.D.] (Univ. Oklahoma Press 1964).
245. For example, Benveniste reminds us how "ius en tant que <«droit est inconnu de
l'ensemble des dialectes indo-europrens hors du latin"-so much so that "mame h l'intrieur
de l'italique, la notion est ddsignde par un radical different." 2 EMILE BENVENISTE, LE
VOCABULAIRE DES INSTITUTIONS INDO-EUROPEENNES: POUVOIR, DROIT, RELIGION 123 (1969).
246. 395 A.D. is the date of the death of Theodosius and the formal division of an Eastern
from a Western empire. "This severance of the mainly Greek-speaking cast from the Latin
west was to have momentous consequences in later centuries. It is still significant in marking
the areas of Latin culture in the west from those of Greek, later to be replaced by Slav culture,
in the east." PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1999) (1996).
247. Take for example the case of the forests and the way they came under the jurisdiction
of the law, As Robert Harrison points out, the Latin term itself (foresta) from which the mod-
em "forest" derives does not itself appear until the Merovingian period, in particular, in the
laws of the Longobards and the capitularies of Charlemagne, and even then the term only re-
fers to royal game preserves. The provenance of the Latin term is uncertain, but forestare
means "to keep out," "to keep off limits," "to exclude." ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS:
THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION 69 (1992).
In effect, during the Merovingian period in which the word foresta entered the
lexicon, kings had taken it upon themselves to place public bans on vast tracts of
woodlands in order to insure the survival of their wildlife, which in turn would in-
sure the survival of a fundamental royal ritual--the hunt.
A "forest," then, was originally a juridical term referring to land that had been
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that sense, was still felt in premodern times to be once more and
largely what it seemed-the organic, at times enigmatic appearance of
the visible rather than, as it were, the presence thereof-when people,
as Queen Gertrude will later on remind Hamlet, began to live in it
rather than with it.
Thou know'st 'tis common; all that lives must die,
Passing through nature to eternity.
248
So, then, what would be repeatedly at stake in the West, prior to
modernity, could only improperly be regarded to be the continuation
in space or in time, in the modern sense, of the old Roman Empire and
its particular laws. That Rome had gone for good and what future at-
tempts of resurrecting her there were going to be-for example, the
Justinian one in the 6 h century, or the Carolingian one of the 8 th-9
h
century-may have had, in fact, very little to do with that particular
Rome. 249 The remains of that Rome and of its laws were, of course,
still at hand, fragments ready to be loosely reassembled according to
particular needs (the Justinian codification of the 6th century being a
clear instance of that type of process). 20  However, what all that
seems to indicate is that it was whatever Rome as a language of sorts,
as an organizing space or a heartland-Rome as a multiple overarch-
ing set of perceptions and conceptions-might have previously meant
and, in particular, the Roman meaning of law as both lex and consue-
placed off limits by a royal decree. Once a region had been "afforested," or de-
clared a forest, it could not be cultivated, exploited, or encroached upon. It lay
outside the public domain, reserved for the king's pleasure and recreation. In Eng-
land, it also lay outside the common juridical sphere. Offenders were not punish-
able by the common law but rather by a set of very specific "forest laws." The
royal forests lay "outside" in another sense as well, for the space enclosed by the
walls of a royal garden was sometimes called silva, or wood. Forestis silva meant
the unenclosed woods "outside" the walls.
Id.
248. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE 597, 600 (W.G. Clark & W. Aldis Wright eds., n.d.).
249. Justinian, for example, "was determined to restore the former glory of the Empire by
reconquering Africa from the Vandals and Italy from the Ostrogoths, and in particular by re-
covering the city of Rome, but his work in restoring Rome's legal glories was largely inde-
pendent of these military ventures." O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 2
(3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added). During the Carolingian renaissance, on the other hand,
"[t]here was a conscious attempt to revive the civilized past; there was a school at Charle-
magne's palace, and others were founded, attached to cathedrals or monasteries." Id. at 18.
250. Another had been the Codex Theodosianus published in 438 A.D. Though, unlike the
subsequent codification by Justinian, the Codex Theodosianus was merely a collection of im-
perial enactments. The writing down of existing customary law, for example, that which was
ordered by Charlemagne at the end of the eighth century, can too be taken to be an exercise in
the same direction.
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tudo02 5 -it was Rome and that law that had, in due course, to reconsti-
tute themselves in some way or another, along partly new and inter-
locking trajectories. 2 2 No one of course-no single person, office or
event--could have possibly achieved that huge and elusive task alone.
Nevertheless that, it would seem, was what had to be done and that, I
suggest, was what eventually was done.253
Thus the role of legal space in current accounts of premodern
Europe may have to be carefully reconsidered. So, for example, in the
early Middle Ages Rome and her laws were to become mainly the
domain and the law-thejustitia--of the Judaic-Christian ecclesia.25 4
251. By the beginning of the fourth century A.D., the term lex had generally come to re-
place that of constitution, the imperial act of legislation referred to by Gaius in the second
century. See generally G. INST. 1.5. As to custom, the so-called consuetudines loci had had
great importance in those large areas of the world that the Romans had come to occupy. So
much so that by the end of the third century A.D. many had become seriously concerned
about the penetration of that custom into Roman law. However, the term consuetudo is found
selectively during the early Middle Ages, in fact almost exclusively where rents and taxes
were concerned. JEAN GAUDEMET, LES NAISSANCES DU DROIT LE TEMP: LE POUVOIR ET LA
SCIENCE AU SERVICE Du DROIT ch. 3, § 2, at 28-31 (Editions Montchrestien, E.J.A., 1997).
252. A fresh outlook on this distant and rich period of the history of Western law is offered
by Maurizio Lupoi, highlighting, amongst other things, the complex interplay in the early
Middle Ages of a written culture (the Roman culture) moving towards orality with, on the
other hand, oral cultures (what in the past has been often if loosely referred to as "Germanic
law") moving by contrast towards writing. MAURIzIo Lupoi, THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN
LEGAL ORDER ch. 2, § 6, at 41 (Adrian Belton trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (1994).
253. Thus Roscoe Pound once famously observed how, in fact, "[l]aw was not made to
order to an eternal pattern. It grew. But it grew by the inherent power of the idea to unfold or
realize itself, and so in a fixed course which could not be affected by conscious attempts at
lawmaking." Pound, Comparative, supra note 60, at 77. Foucault expressed something very
similar when he rejected (standard concepts of) originality for regularity and novelty.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, L'ARcHI9OLOGIE DU SAVOIR pt. 4, ch. 2 (1969) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
L' ARCHtOLOGIE].
254.
The Church of Rome was an indefatigable legislator throughout the early Middle
Ages: by the eight century it had produced an immense and impenetrable mass of
law. In the decrees of councils and synods, pontifical epistles, works of authority,
penitentials, the Church perpetuated the administrative style of Roman empire-
the use of the written word. As the Church came in to contact with predominantly
oral societies, it made the necessary adjustments to the way it disseminated the
Christian message, using sermons and pictures.... But it made few adjustments
to its laws.
LuPoi, supra note 252, at 270 (internal citations omitted). Indeed,
[t]he Church performed a role that subverted the previous order. Subversive, by
definition, was canonical legislation against the centuries-old customs of the n6 w
people, which were now treated as pagan practices-or against new customs, al-
though these were widely practiced and even sanctioned by law. Tolerance of the
traditions of newly converted people was extremely short-lived: silence in a priest,
wrote Alcuin, is harmful to the people. Towards the end of the early medieval pe-
riod the same sentiments were reiterated, and a central aspect of Church life was
revived.
Id. at 271 (internal citations omitted). For an interesting explanation of the meaning of iusti-
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Indeed,
[t]he fourth century was crucial in the establishment of a structured or-
ganization in the Church which enabled it not only to play a vital role in
egal history in the distant future, but also to do so in the fifth century
when the western provinces were invaded by German tribes from across
the frontiers, settled by them, and step-by-step withdrawn from imperial
control.155
However, a comparison for example between the earlier Roman
laws and the later canon law of the Church, whether based on the
available texts or on their institutional context-would be, it seems to
me, insufficient. 256  A more fruitful comparison, by contrast, would
start probably by asking: how was it that that justitia could eventually
(quite literally) take place? How did it all begin? Did it really all be-
gin with Constantine, the first emperor to become a Christian-as
many current legal histories continue to tell us? And if so, in what
sense? We will return to this in due course, but the point here is that
so far lawyers seem to have paid relatively little attention to such
questions-though they are by no means trivial. As Jean Gaudemet
notices, the New Testament, the first text of Christianity, was hardly a
legal pronouncement in the same sense of the Sinai text(s).25 7  Nor
were the early Christian texts law in the normal sense of that word.
That is to say, the first Christians had, as such, little interest in the law,
Roman or otherwise-for the simple reason that they already had one,
the law of the Jewish people. 258 By 49 A.D., moreover, the Council of
Jerusalem had of course opened up to the non-Jewish. So clearly,
[s]orties du cadre juif, comptant de plus en plus de pafens convertis, les
communautds chrdtiennes durent s'organiser. La vie municipale offrait un
exemple avec ses magistrats et l'assembl~e des citoyens .... [Mais] [i]l
fallait aller plus loin, rdgler la pratique cultuelle, guider les fidles dans
leur vie quotidienne... arbitrer les litiges. Des usages se form~rent, des
instructions furent donndes. Un droit naissait.
259
But again how precisely did that nascent law-a law that was no
longer the old Mosaic law or the Roman lex or consuetudo while, on
tia in that period, see id. at ch. 12 & ch. 13, § 5.
255. O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 249, at 4-5.
256. An early attempt was that of the Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum "in
which excerpts from the classical Roman jurists are set against the laws of Moses, presumably
with the aim of furthering Christian belief by showing that Roman and biblical law were simi-
lar." ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 233, at 49.
257. GAUDEMET, supra note 251, at 115.
258. id. at 116.
259. Id. at 116-117.
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the other hand, not being proper justitia either-how did that nascent
law manage to take place-to take the place, eventually, of the law of
imperial Rome?
The taking place of a Judaic-Christian justitia would be but one
instance of the sort of pervasive, insistent, unauthorized spatializations
that concerns us here (unauthorized for being both largely at odds with
the established. authority-sine auctoritate-and not closely linked to
any specific agent-sine auctore). Slow and uneven as any such spa-
tialization would be,2" the point here is that from around the fourth
century A.D. onwards, in the place left vacant by the final demise of
imperial Rome and of her multiple dimensions, endless fractions of
bare, situated space, people or offices, etc. must get together again,
somehow-and, then, they must be given a name, they must be called
"Europe" and then the "West. 261 Once more, that could have hardly
been a matter of legal texts or their institutional context alone-it
could not have been merely a question of origins or causation or func-
tion or structure in the ordinary, linear-chronological sense of those
terms.262 More to the point, there must have been the matter of non-
260. The uncertainty characterizing the post-imperial Rome period was, apparently, con-
siderable.
Uncertainty pervaded the legal system of the early Middle Ages. If there is an ex-
pression that typifies documents in every part of Europe throughout the period in
question, it is the two adjectives firma et stabilis, which were used either jointly
(constituting a hendiadys), or separately in every significant circumstance ...
They appear in both laws and private deeds, in both promulgatory and defining
clauses, to enjoy compliance with agreements and identify their force. The diver-
sity of the formulas in which this expression appears, and its geographical and
chronological persistence, reveal a desire that the law was unable to satisfy com-
pletely: a desire for certainty.
Lupol, supra note 252, at 42. However, "the uncertainty over the law and its practical im-
plementation was reduced by consensus." Id at 44. On consensus, see id. at chs. 7-8.
261. This seems to me the limit of it is pointed out, "[w]hat gave shape, relevance and du-
ration to the notion of Europe from the early seventh century onwards was Rome, or rather
the Roman church and its head, the papacy." Karl J. Leyser, Concepts of Europe in the Early
and High Middle Ages, 137 PAST AND PRESENT 25, 30 (1992).
262. This seems to me the limit of professor Alan Watson's otherwise generally sound po-
sition on the significance of legal transplants. As is well known, Professor Watson recognizes
that "[lhaw is inconceivable without society" and, yet, he also argues:
[A]n exceptionally good and even the best approach to understanding and knowing
law, what it does and what is demanded from it[,] is through the history of the
rules, their origin, development and transformation, above all when the same or a
historically related rule can be observed in different systems. When several sys-
tems borrow a rule from the same source, and the course of development varies
from one system to another-in one perhaps no alteration occurs at all-the factors
which produce the changes can be isolated and evaluated. The precise role of eco-
nomic and political circumstances, the influence of individuals whether lawyers or
not, the part played by tradition, the moral ideas of the society and so on can be
plotted in detail.
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linear space, non-chronological time. 63 On each occasion there must
have been, in particular, the matter of an event or series of events or of
a language-in short, the matter of legal space.
To mention a second example-by the eleventh century the early
Middle Ages come largely to an end, and that includes the laws of that
period.264 However, by the middle of the following century Justinian's
Digest suddenly reappears (or, shall we say, it makes its multiple and
mutually conflicting appearances)-after a long period of near-
oblivion. 65 In the earlier form of the littera Bononiensia, the Digest
will appear and then be studied as, first, the Digestum vetus (circa
1090), then the Digestum novum (circa 1093-1094) and finally the In-
fortiatum and the Tres Partes (after 1140).26  In the different and,
some say, truer form of the littera Pisana, it won't be in circulation
until half a century later.2 67 Nevertheless, the point is that the return of
the Digest, both wholly accidental and largely arbitrary, 268 seems to
have inaugurated new spatializations of law's many domains such as,
for example, the littera Pisana herself (which soon turned into an ob-
ject of veneration and liturgy)-some of which traveled a long way,
well into the threshold of modernity. No doubt, such multiple spati-
alizations were to be each time very different from one another. 69 Yet
Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 313, 316 (1978).
In my view, by contrast, what is at stake here is something deeper than, merely, the history of
legal rules in the linear-historical sense advocated by this author. See generally Stramignoni,
Margins, supra note 243.
263. See generally id.
264. For example, it is noted, suggestively, how "[dRs ]a fin du IX sicle, plus encore au
X', la loi du roi (les Capitulaires) ne se fait gu~re entendre. Assoupie ou lointaine, priv~e de
relais efficaces pour se faire connaitre et imposer son respect, elle laisse un vide qu'il faut
combler." GAUDEMET, supra note 251, at 32.
265.
There is . . . no doubt that there survived in Italy the memory, and some
knowledge, of Justinian's Code in an epitomized version, and of some of his
Novels; the Institutions were also known. . . . The canonists had been
searching the ancient authorities since at least the beginning of the eleventh
century, and making use of what they found; the lawyers in Pavia and else-
where were jurists reading their authorities critically and developing the law.
When men came upon the Digest they knew what it was and, far more im-
portant, they had acquired the intellectual expertise to make use of it.
O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 249, at 24-25.
266. Wolfgang P. Muller, The Recovery of the Justinian Digest in the Middle Age,
20 BULL. OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 1 passim (1990).
267. Id.
268. I say accidental in the sense that the return of the Digest was somewhat unexpected.
However, the spin given to the recovery of the Digest, once this had actually happened,
served well the ongoing confrontation between canonists and imperialists, as well as the study
and teaching of the Justianian Corpus. See O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 249, at 42-43.
269. See generally Helmut Coing, The Roman Law as Ius Commune on the Continent,
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their range and quality would be not so much the issue here27 0-- as, by
contrast, there would be their outer quality, their being from "with-
out,' 271' both sine auctoritate and sine auctore. Once again, they could
rely on bare, situated space for their being there but they would not, as
such, be understood to be rooted in space the way they would later on
be seen to be, in modernity. In that sense, legal-historical and legal-
comparative research on those spatializations is still relatively scant-
and what has been noted has been sometimes misunderstood.
Take-to mention one more example-the emergence of a
stronger and stronger royal justice that, in centuries to come, would
increasingly but steadily replace local laws and customs, Roman-
Byzantine law and, significantly, the justice of the Church of Rome.
But, again, the so far little-considered question is: how precisely did
those spatializations actually occur? What was each time their mean-
ing? What was that each time allowed them to take place? It might
be worth noting, for example, how initially many such spatializations
continued to be coached in the language of Rome and of her laws-
albeit in the various medieval and renaissance versions of the jus
commune. 72 Later on in modernity, by contrast, there will develop the
89 L.Q. REV. 505 (1973).
270. I mean "inner" quality in a broad sense, pertaining to the actual text or else the insti-
tutional context of the Digest and generally the Roman law that was being rediscovered.
R.C. van Caenegem explains what he describes as the "hi-jack of medieval European law by
Justinian's Corpus iuris" by reference to the intrinsic quality of the Corpus,
R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY
OVER Two MILLENNIA 73 (2002) (the book "contained the best the Romans, the most gifted
jurists the world had ever seen, had written down . . . the sheer quality of the Digest was
bound to dazzle people who were looking for the best law available.... To people who were
used to parochialism, the universality of Roman law must have been impressive."), id. at 74;
"the political will of those in power. . . provided intellectual ammunition to the ecclesiastical
and secular leaders who were building modern, centralized power structures," id. at 75, favor-
ing "a centralized and hierarchical state and an organized, streamlined bureaucracy," id. at 76,
the fact of the twelfth century being "indeed a great intellectual century," id. at 79;
[G]reat was the admiration for the newly discovered revelations from Antiquity...
treated as absolute authorities. ... Truth was discovered, not through observation
but through correct understanding of the Ancients.... It was no difference in ju-
risprudence. Here also one great authority from Antiquity contained the ultimate
perfection in legal science, so the best way to become a jurist was to assimilate the
timeless revelation of the Corpus iuris,
id. at 79-80; the economic setting ("The Corpus iuris was the product of a highly developed
cosmopolitan economy and was clearly more suited to the emerging West of the later Middle
Ages than the customs of the closed agricultural and manorial world of the motte-and-bailey
castle."), id. at 81; and, finally, opportunistic causes ("the fact that soon after the surfacing of
the Digest in northern Italy advocates and judges began quoting from it in order to win their
cases or to justify their judgments."), id. at 83.
271. I borrow here Roscoe Pound's fortunate expression. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAw 212 (Transaction Publishers 1999) (1963).
272. Onjus commune, O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 249, at 107-24.
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more uniform language of the nation states and of the rule of law. But
how was it that initially at least the language of Justinian (as many
times reinterpreted by glossators, post-glossators and commentators)
could emerge as the very grammar of the nation states and the rule of
law? According to one intriguing suggestion:
With Dante, Byzantine sovereignty.becomes not only an epic but a gospel.
It is Justinian himself who appears in glory to Dante and Beatrice, sings
the splendour of the Roman Empire, and admonishes those who would
seek to derogate from its unified preeminence .... As there must be one
God of the universe, one Christ of the Church, one head of the family, so
there must be one sovereign ruler, and one only, of every human society.
More-there must be one leader of the whole world; and for that task the
Roman people is destined not only by the will of God, manifested in many
ways, but by the human right of conquest. When all allowance has been
made for nationalistic bias and poetic fervour, Dante's exaltation of the
unitary sovereign was no mere figment. In its spiritual or ecclesiastical
manifestation, it still holds sway; in its temporal aspect, it embodied what
was to be for Europe, a long context between absolutism and individual
liberty.27Y
If Justinian was Dante's hero, then Roman-Byzantine law could
probably present itself to Dante and to his readers as the ideal gram-
mar for the exercise of power absolutely. But Justinian's influence on
Dante, or Dante's influence on his readers may never be properly ex-
plained-unless, that is, one goes beyond a mere textual or contextual
analysis of the written sources at hand (legal and otherwise).
In sum, the advent of a Judaic-Christianjustitia, the reappearance
of the Justinian Digest and the emergence of a royal justice throughout
much of Western Europe seem to have been, each time and to a large
extent, different focal points of certain on-going, multiple transforma-
tions of what had once counted as lex or consuetudo. One could think
of many more such points of transformation that, however, cannot be
discussed here. But perhaps one last consideration worth making here
is that such on-going, multiple transformations seem often to be prem-
ised on a break rather than on a linear-chronological sequence of
events-the break, for example, from imperial Rome, or the break
from the uncertainties of the early Middle Ages or, else, the break
from the prison house of the "second" Roman law, and its authority.
Put differently, "ex integro nascitur ordo" (order proceeds from, or
breaks out of, wholeness) seems to be a properly tragic intuition of
early antiquity that is first "baptized" by Christianity and then recur-
sively evoked by the West as a no longer tragic, yet still wholly trau-
273. SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 9 (6th ed. 1958).
2004]
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matic political and legal template-in a renewed effort of giving
space, from post-imperial Rome onwards, to what on each occasion
was out for grabs. And what also seems worthy of notice is precisely
how, in the long period of time that eventually led to the emergence of
the modem nation states, what laws there were to be dealt with
(whether godly, customary, or positive) had first to be given space-in
the very sense of both making them happen and making them "real"
again as, each time, a legal territory of the West. In short, law had,
quite literally, to take place each time, over and over again. Premod-
em West thus seems to be a time of cyclical, multiple, asymmetric
spatializations of law's many domains-think, for example, of the jus-
ticiae errantes under the Plantagenets in England,274 where "errantes"
conveys well the cyclical, multiple, asymmetric quality of their doing,
both in fact and in the appearance thereof.2 75 Irregular though they ac-
tually happened to be, such premodern spatializations of law's many
domains were, in that sense and in many cases, first and foremost
quasi-military invasions and occupations of what bare, situated space
there might be there each time to be apprehended-a veritable "lex
terrae" or ordering of the land in the most straightforward of ways.276
In the different regions of Europe those invasions and occupations oc-
curred each time in different ways, at different times and with differ-
ent fortunes-yet, there were true spatializations nonetheless, chiefly
designed to colonize bare, situated space, people and offices, etc. as
legal places for the exercise of a rather immediate, un-mediated form
of sovereignty.
274. See generally ALLEN HARDING, THE LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 53-54
(G.R. Elton ed., 1973); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW (2d
ed. 1988).
275. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL HISTORY 19 (3d ed. 1990). So, for exam-
ple, the justiciae errantes constituted what could hardly be seen as just a law court (general
eyres). Indeed,
[T]hey were a way of supervising local government.... They begat fear and awe
in the entire population. The justices did not always proceed according to modem
standards of probity or fairness: contemporaries complained that the justices were
apt to be errantes metaphorically as well as literally. Indeed, we read of com-
plaints that the eyre of 1198 reduced the whole kingdom to poverty from coast to
coast, and we learn of Cornishmen fleeing to the woods to escape the eyre of 1233.
Counties might pay fines for lenient treatment, or even buy off an eyre altogether.
Popular reaction to such heavy-handedness was to kill the general eyre before the
middle of the fourteenth century. Yet it was the strength, the severity even, of
Angevin government which incidentally gave England a body of national law
unique in Europe.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
276. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW-FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY To NOMADIC
MASKS (1990), esp 213 ff.
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29. The Birth of Modem Space: Other Mappings, Other Spatiali-
zations. With modernity and the final appearance of the nation state, a
deep if at first rather subtle shift begins to take place. The shift coin-
cides with what can be generally described as the start of a progres-
sively more intense, linear-chronological discovery of the other,
whereby the other was to be found, it now seemed, in the world "out-
there"-along the gaze, each time, of a re-nascent local or national
identity.
The outside world and the other within it had of course always
been there-a constant presence in the shared imaginary of any pre-
modern community. The point though is that in premodern Europe
such a presence would typically sit latent in the background-ready if
need be to be used as a true instrument of war (evoking either the en-
emy or the unfaithful, or both), or else as an equally useful instrument
of trade.277
By contrast, at around the time here under consideration nation
states start, one after the other one, to reach out of their many, newly
formed territories-actively to engage with the other (as opposed to,
so to speak, passively using it) and so effectively expand into newer,
both outer and inner dimensions, constituting as well as constituted by
a wealth of new, ever more rapidly circulating information about the
world "out-there." '278 The appearance, in the public imaginary and
straight out of the legal proceedings and demonology treatises of the
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of such thing as the
witches' Sabbath (a place "out-there"-a sagarum synagoga, or
strigiarum conventus, etc.-where witches and other such characters
are said to gather for all sorts feasts, orgies and similar fun)-would
be a good case in point.279 The emergence between the 18th and the
19th century of a distinctive concept of "Englishness"2 -- a curiosity
277. For a good case of this somewhat "disengaged" relationship between trade and the
"other," see, for example, the interesting study by Consuelo Varela on the Florentine entou-
rage of Christopher Columbus in Seville at the time of the "discovery" of America. See gen-
erally CONSUELO VARELA, COLON Y LOS FLORENTINOS (1988).
278. In the period of time under consideration, the actual boundaries of the nation states
were set to change quite often. However, what in this paper interests me most is the taking
roots and then the fairly rapid "dispersion" of the nation state as the privileged space of legal
modernity.
279. CARLO GINZBURG, I BENANDANTI: STREGONERIA E CULTI AGRARI TRA CINQUECENTO E
SEICENTO (Giulio Einaudi ed., 1966); CARLO GINZBURG, STOMA NOTTURNA: UNA
DECIFRAZIONE DEL SABBA xiii (Giulio Einaudi ed., 1989).
280. PAUL LANGFORD, ENGLISHNESS IDENTIFIED: MANNERS AND CHARACTER 1650-1850, 1
(2000).
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when not a true fascination by the non-English with certain suppos-
edly quintessentially English qualities, for example, order, practical-
ity, separateness, propriety and eccentricity--could be another.28" '
The very fact of stepping out of one's own territories actively to
engage with the outside world and the other within it was bound to
have innumerable long-lasting effects for the nation states concerned.
An especially eminent one was of course the truly amazing orientalist
discovery of the Orient.282 Another one, by contrast, was the discov-
ery or else the normalization of the various "official," local or national
identities. 83 Alexander Pope both anticipates and brilliantly sums this
up in an amusing description of how his character Cornelius
Scriblerus ensures that his son is dressed in a way that could fully re-
flect the received wisdom of the time:
He invented for him a geographical suit of clothes, which might give him
some hints of that science, and likewise some knowledge of the commerce
of the different nations. He had a French hat with an African feather,
Holland shirts and Flanders lace, English cloth lined with Indian silk; his
gloves were Italian, and his shoes were Spanish. He was made to observe
this, and daily catechised thereupon, which his father was wont to call
"travelling at home."284
As to the legal jurisdictions of the time, one interesting effect of
the discovery of an outside world and of the other within it was pre-
cisely what could be generally described as the brief appearance and
then the progressive disappearance of "natural" or physical space-
progressive because firmly premised on the linear-chronological gaze
of the jurisdiction each time concerned. 28  Like in general with the
outside world and the other within it, so too bare, situated space had
281. See generally id.
282. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Penguin Group 2003) (1978).
Under the general heading ... of the Orient, and within the umbrella of Western
hegemony over the Orient during the period from the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display
into the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustra-
tion in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about
mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of
development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character.
Id. at 7-8.
283. For example, it has been argued how the discovery of the "other" helped the British
stabilize their own national identity. See generally LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE
NATION 1707-1837 (1992).
284. ALEXANDER POPE & JOHN ARBUTHNOT, MEMOIRS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE,
WORKS AND DISCOVERIES OF MARTINUS SCRIBLERUs 23 (Hesperus Press, Ltd. 2002) (1741).
285. See generally CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE (Harper San Francisco
1989).
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been there all along, in and of the normal legal practice. As it has
been recently noted, in the Middle Ages law's many domains had
been in fact a truly radical, rooted reality; that is to say, a reality with
"the deepest thinkable roots. 286 However, what begins by the early
modernity is a slow turning of legal places-so far so very immedi-
ately related to bare, situated space as to be largely indistinguishable
from it-into increasingly more abstract legal spaces, or territories, of
a now much more engaged and thus no longer indistinguishable legal
control. But of course the constitution of modern legal space could
only take place upon a prior discovery of some other space-namely,
natural or physical space-and then the abandonment of that space
into the background as absolute, universal space. The process had
been, once again, slow and uneven. Nevertheless, the insistent separa-
tion of natural or physical space did allow early modernity to visualize
what, from now on, should count as pure legal space (the space of le-
gal rules, sanctions, people and institutions)-while at the same time
appearing to eliminate "impure" or "factual" natural space from its
multiple, ever more probing, ever more abstract gaze.
(i) The gradual constitution of legal space beginning with early
modernity had a twofold aspect.
So, on the one hand, there now begins a series of outer mappings
of what, this time, is thought to be lying beyond or outside the nation
state-a discovery, one might say, of one's own "without," in space as
well as in law. But what might be each time the character of such dis-
covery? No doubt, that discovery was a territorialization in that, on
closer examination, it clearly belonged to the gaze of the nation state
each time involved. Indeed, other legal spaces-other legal jurisdic-
tions-could only be really envisioned as such in so far as they would
each time have already made their way into the gazer's particular
cosmology. And that, in turn, meant that the original space of the
gazer would itself expand (as it were) into a progressively more capa-
cious territory in each case defined by its ever more searching, ever
more optimistic gaze. On the other hand, however, such outer map-
ping would be of a very different nature from premodern spatializa-
286. PAOLO GROSSI, MITOLOGIE GiURIDICHE DELLA MODERNITA 23 (2001) (author's
translation).
DI diritto ... 6 qui realtA radicale, cio di radici, cio di radici le piti profonde
pensabili; realtA di fondazioni di tutto un edificio di civiltA, e come tale
intimamente collegato con i grandi fatti primordiali fondanti quell'edificio; fatti
fisici e sociali a un tempo, appartenenti alla natura cosmica ma assunti a
fondamento ultimo e primo di tutta la costruzione sociale.
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tions-in that, unlike what had been the case before, there now begins
a representation, a mise-en-scne, of legal space more than an attempt
however successful to capture it-a replacement rather than an occu-
pation. Legal space, that is, suddenly more available to experience
than it had ever been before when all space was merely bare, situated
space-is now increasingly represented as having certain specific
characteristics rather than simply if naively assumed to be just there,
in the largely disengaged fashion of premodern times-think for ex-
ample of William Camden's Britannia subtitled, significantly, Choro-
graphica Descriptio.287 In the sense suggested in the previous sec-
tions, such a modern discovery, or passage from occupation to
replacement, each time emerges from a heartland as an increasingly
complex "language" or "dispositif'-as what multiplicity of "vectors"
each time there happen to appear, producing visibility, language,
power and, ultimately, subjectivization.288
It is important to note, however, that such a language or dispositif
required the other to appear to be standing alone-it required the sub-
ject to appear to be free from the original gaze. Thus, for example, at
around this time Vitoria, Suarez, Gentili and Grotius put their minds
to the world "out-there"-the world that at that time was being dis-
covered to be lying beyond the correspondently smaller and smaller
dimensions of the nation state-so contributing, eventually, to the set-
ting out of the future discipline of international law. But how was,
each time, that foundational gesture possible? Take Grotius' De jure
praedae-published anonymously in 1609 as Mare Liberum. An at-
tempt made on commission and so, it is worth noting, somewhat acci-
dental289 to justify and protect Dutch trade in the East Indies against
the traditional but often ineffective monopoly by the Portuguese, the
book argued that nobody should be permitted to acquire dominium
over the sea.290 The argument, albeit not new, was interesting on sev-
eral counts. One important effect of it, however-besides that of en-
suring that the sea could not be successfully claimed to fall within the
lawful domain of any particular nation state-was that, somewhat
287. 1 am grateful to Peter Goodrich for pointing this out to me.
288. See FOUCAULT, L'ARCI-OLOGIE, supra note 253. See also Gilles Deleuze, Qu'est-ce
qu'un dispositif?, in MICHEL FOUCAULT PMiLOSOPHE 185 (Paris 1989).
289. See C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and International Law: An Introduction to Some Themes
in the Field of the Grotian Studies, in GRorrIUS READER 5 (L.E. van Holk & C.G. Roelofsen
eds., 1983) ("It is an uncomfortable thought that Grotius' connection with the Law of the Sea
should have been the result of an accident, rather than a matter of his deliberate choice. Yet it
is a conclusion from which is hard to escape.").
290. See HUGO GROTIus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans.,
James Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1633).
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paradoxically, it contributed to separate or identify the sea as a legal
space. 29' As a consequence, not only does the sea emerge for modern
subjects and rulers alike as an object that can now be even more easily
visualized, managed and discussed than ever before, but also the sea is
contextually freed as a hitherto unseen, now self-standing space-
susceptible of future, thus far unthought-of, still-to-be-conceived
forms of regulation. Later on-from Kant to the League of Nations-
the language of peace and commerce and civility and rights will in-
creasingly appear to have finally triumphed over traditional acts of di-
rect political and legal imposition normally associated with the nation
state and the rule of law.292 Yet, here, the point is that in the passage
from a largely disengaged pre-modernity to a generally engaged and
engaging modernity so many legal domains continued to be possible
(in most cases and with many exceptions) precisely upon veritable,
sustained outer mappings and replacements from within. And it was
mainly on the basis of such earlier, multiple outer mappings and re-
placements from within that future territorializations would be in due
course firmly based. For what is, say, international law if not-
originally-a highly sophisticated if no doubt often accidental set of
pre-occupations by the West over what is thought to lie in the world
"out-there"?2 93
(ii) As mentioned, the constitution of legal space that began in the
early modern period was a slow, twofold process. Parallel to the in-
numerable outer mappings and replacements from within that have
been just described, there also starts in the period under consideration
a progressive but inner series of spatializations of each nation's own
"within." That is, inside the nation state's legal rules, people and loca-
tions slowly begin to turn reflexively inwards. The humanists' insis-
tence on "pure" rights in the place of the previous reliance by Roman
lawyers, glossators and commentators alike on factual phenomena
291. "The most striking characteristic of Mare liberum is its boldness. In a small compass
very far-reaching theses are developed. It is not only the Portuguese title to the Indian Ocean,
but all pretensions to sovereignty over the sea, which have to be rejected according to
Grotius." Roelofsen, supra note 289, at 11.
292. Take, for example, the many difficult problems surrounding the implementation of
the fundamental rights of man. See generally CoSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2000); Umberto Igor A. Stramignoni, Soggetto di Diritto e Diritti (Fondamentali) del
Soggetto: Autonomia, Linguaggio e Diritto Comparato, XX-2 RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO
PRIVATO 223 (2002).
293. This theme-what one could describe as the "imagination" of international law-
might be worthy of a more robust discussion than it seems to be currently the case in some
international law circles. For an instructive review of the more recent debates in international
law, see generally Deborah Z. Cass, Navigating the Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship
in International Law, 65 NoRDIC J. INT'L L. 341 (1996).
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seen to have, each time, certain legal consequences-provides one
early example of this new, inward-looking awareness. 294 The enact-
ment of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries in order to support the
emergence of assumpsit-would be another example.295 What must
be stressed, however, is that such a new awareness required a more
specific concept of space than, simply, natural or physical space-
while, at the same time, inviting a rapid distancing from natural or
physical space as, apparently, objective, universal space. Put differ-
ently, discipline (e.g., the discipline of rights; the discipline of the en-
forceable oral promise; etc.) begins gradually to replace direct coer-
cion -96-while the emerging importance of the various disciplinary
fields of knowledge slowly if largely inadvertently sets the premises
for future transformations of existing legal procedures (and, in Eng-
land, the traditional forms of action) from an outward element of the
legal world (an element meant to symbolize, warn or regulate in an
immediate, un-mediated form) into an inward, internal requirement of
a much more complex legal language or dispositif (where legal proce-
dure is only one aspect of the functioning of that language or disposi-
tij). In this largely reflexive move from procedure to proceduraliza-
tion, no longer can law's many domains stand proudly in isolation,
like they used to do before-either confronting one another or else
294. "Already in Donellus ... the emphasis of the institutional system has changed from
what it was even in Justinian's compilation. There it was still based on factual phenomena
whose differences had legal consequences. Now the subject matter is exclusively legal phe-
nomena-different kinds of rights." PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE
ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 76 (1988).
295. I have argued this in one specific case study concerned with the history of the equita-
ble doctrine of part performance. Igor Stramignoni, When Law Stands Still: Land Contracts
in English Law and Law's "Abandonment" of Everyday Life, 12 L. & CRITIQUE 105, 114-16
(2001).
296. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON pt. I, at 135
(Editions Gallimard, 1975) (contains a prime instance of this argument). Note that the inner if
problematic relationship existing between sovereignty, law and what can be can be called bare
force seems to be inscribed from the start in the legal culture of the West. Compare, for ex-
ample, the very language with which Justinian's Institutiones begin: "Imperatoriam maies-
tatem non solum armis decoratam, sed etiam legibus oportet esse arnatam, ut utrumque tem-
pus et bellorum et pacis recte possit gubernari et princeps Romanus victor existat non solum
in hostilibus proeliis, sed etiam per legitimos tramites calumniantium iniquitates expellens, et
fiat tam iuris religiosissimus quam victis hostibus triumphator." IMPERATOR CAESAR FLAVIUS
IUSTINIANUS, Institutiones, in JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 32 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.,
Paul Krueger Latin text ed., 1987) (emphasis added).
Imperial Majesty should not only be graced with arms but also armed with laws, so
that good government may prevail in time of war and peace alike. The head of the
Roman state can then stand victorious not only over enemies in war but also over
trouble-makers, driving out their wickedness through the paths of law, and can tri-
umph as much for his devotion to the law as for hits conquests in battle.
EMPEROR CAESAR FLAVIUS JUSTINIAN, Institutes, in JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES, supra, at 33.
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oblivious of one another. Instead, the effort must now be that of sim-
ply but more effectively marking-out one another's field of operation
from within-as well as of searching, in earnest at first, for one's own
specific, different origins in "time" and "space."
(iii) Thus at the beginning of modernity law's recently formed,
many domains-the new legal places of a unifying and increasingly
unified Western legal machinery-had come to be, inside the national
boundaries, the ever more organized central courts, tribunals, prisons,
schools and professional associations, etc.297 Again, the past of such
places where they had existed had often been one of obstinate indif-
ference or, alternatively, of keen but ultimately undifferentiated con-
frontation. In England, for example, many future lawyers and judges
would gather from all over the country to the Inns of Courts in Lon-
don, as that was the place where they could be taught the common
law.298 If, however, they wanted to learn the Roman civil law or (until
1535) the canon law, they had to go elsewhere-to Oxford or to Cam-
bridge. The result, in most cases, had been to breed and then to feed
into society two very different sorts of lawyers-neither of which was
very much interested in one another's existence, other than at times of
clash. With the outbreak of modernity, however, and with the discov-
ery of the outside world and of the other within it, such state of affairs
was set to change considerably-as the encounter with the other was
to trigger the need of a sharper if not necessarily more accurate de-
scription of both one's own without and one's own within, as well
as-inevitably-the ensuing, inner schism between the two. Simi-
larly, in Italy what has been called the medieval "Respublica iuriscon-
sultorum" of glossators and commentators begins slowly to give way
to the Supreme Courts of the various states of the peninsula.2 99 Such
297. This extended well beyond the physical precincts of legal institutions.
From early on in its history, the court was not geographically limited to the court-
room. It was a "place" and it was to be protected as such: that is to say, in its other
offices, in its chambers, in the Inns of Court, in the chancelleries, the libraries and
all the other sacred hiding places (sacramentorum latibula) and treasure chests in
which the records and the writs of the law were either forged or kept.
GOODRICH, supra note 276, at 229. See also P. Raffield, Reformation, Regulation and the Im-
age: Sumptuary Legislation and the Subject of Law, 13 L. & CRITIQUE 127-50 (2002).
298. A.W.B. Simpson, The Early Constitution of the Inns of Court, 28 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
241, 242 (C.J. Hamson ed., 1970); See generally WILFRID R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT
UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE EARLY STUARTS 1590-1640 (1972); W.C. RICHARDSON, A
HISTORY OF THE INNS OF COURT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF THE
RENAISSANCE (n.d.).
299. See GINO GORLA, DIRITTO COMPARATO E DiRiTTo COMUNE EUROPEO cap. 20, at 543-
619 (1981) (citing DE GENNARO, RESPUBLICA JURISCONSULTORUM (1 St ediz., Napoli, 1731)),
id. at 555 n.20.
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an eventful proceduralization of existing protocols-while no doubt
serving well the external purpose of centralization and state-
formation-was bound to create in due course both inner and outer
complexities leading, as it would later on appear, to a constant, insu-
perable asymmetry or short-circuit between actual operations and offi-
cial pronouncements as to what and how might the law really, that is
legally, be or function.
What is worth noting here is that initially each legal space-for
example, the law school, the court, the legal profession, etc.-is de-
ployed and designed to look, as it were, proudly onwards-a powerful
symbol and a signal of a newly established, and long fought-for, po-
litical and legal legitimacy (in England, that of the courts of common
law over competing jurisdictions).3°0 It will later become apparent
how, conceived for the white, Christian, middle class, male heterosex-
ual, the new legal machinery of a young proud politics had constituted
itself into a rather particular, private, indeed exceptional set of places
within Western law's ever expanding yet no less particular, private,
exceptional domains. The reflexive turn of the various legal places of
the legal machinery of the West remains, to this day, largely uncharted
in legal history and comparative law. And just as uncharted remains
the contextual emergence of the various outer trajectories-of the
various languages or "dispositifs"-that in each case were both consti-
tutive and a result of that reflexive turn. Yet, clearly, the brief appear-
ance of natural or physical space within the horizon of law's many
domains must have played a crucial, stabilizing role in such outer and
inner movement from within. For instance, in the British isles, where
physical space had been visible from time immemorial, such outer
mappings and inner spatializations came to maturity earlier than else-
where and, in particular, before the later and final establishment of a
truly modern national state-at least, in so far as the hegemony thus
300. Consider the sumptuary legislation of sixteenth century England:
The representational power of clothes and their capacity to embody institu-
tional authority, while simultaneously delineating societal status, was of par-
ticular concern to sixteenth century English legislators, as the nation-state
supplanted the feudal model of society. The legitimacy of the medieval legal
system had been predicated upon the lawful authority of immutable hierarchy;
the image of which was the visible elucidation of rank, provided by cos-
tume... Sumptuary legislation effects the manipulation of the image so as to
enforce a particular vision of order and reason .... The injunction is that the
common lawyer should "frame" himself; he must create an image of himself,
or reconstitute himself as a semblance so that the subject, looking at the im-
age, recognizes the self as other.
Raffield, supra note 297, at 129-36.
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established by ever more central over ever more peripheral legal do-
mains was concerned.3°' It seems to me that the reasons for this have
never been fully explored-yet it would be interesting to do so in a
history of legal space. Likewise in continental Europe where, by con-
trast, natural or physical space had always appeared as much more
fragmented than in the British isles, those outer and inner movements
from within were slower to develop and slower to replace the modern
machinery of law-making Metternich, for example, (in)famously if
significantly refer to Italy as of little more than a mere "geographical
expression" of Europe. 0 2
30. Comparing Law in Space. The inner spatializations of early
modernity making space within established legal places would-once
we think space in terms of the spatiality of an eventful language rather
than as some sort of absolute, Newtonian space-be in some impor-
tant sense similar to what outer mappings and replacements from
within were to develop, as it turned out, via the fragile language of
peace, commerce, civility or rights.
To begin with, neither of those two aspects of the modem turn
were, unlike what might seem at first, any longer a matter wholly or
even principally concerned, in Europe, with the exercise of some im-
mediate, un-mediated form of legal sovereignty-that is, a problem
like in the past of making bare, situated space happen as yet another
legal territory of this or that particular community and, collectively, of
Europe and the West. By contrast, the constitution of legal space in
modernity allowed traditional legal territories both to grow more in-
dependent of space, and to mobilize that space for their own specific
and often shifting ends. In particular, legal territories could grow in-
dependent of space in so far as that space could now be easily set
aside as a merely factual, natural element belonging to the background
of legal representations. At the same time, legal territories could now
mobilize space as never before, in so far as the withdrawal of law
from that space meant that, from now on, what space there remained
nevertheless still available-factual, natural space-could be, as it
were, replaced almost at will. That is to say, on law's many and ever
multiplying modern maps natural frontiers and natural alliances could
be more easily shifted (so to speak)-initially, through the contempla-
301. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 113-26 (1987).
302. On the impact of geography on the political history of Italy, see DENIS MACK SMITH,
MODERN ITALY: A POLITICAL HISTORY ch. I (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (1959).
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tion of contract, for example, or of marriage or of citizenship, etc.-
having less and less consideration for traditional concerns such as
some clear geographical proximity, the existence of common, situated
roots or for example a common, situated faith.
In that sense, the difference between pre-modernity and modernity
could hardly be overstated. Surely, immediate, un-mediated legal
sovereignty would continue to be the case in a number of specific in-
stances and, then, all the more so the further one looks away from the
heart of Western Europe. Yet within Europe that old form of sover-
eignty becomes rapidly unsustainable-for a number of reasons but
not least because to engage with the other involved, in itself, an often
reluctant but always necessary, prior awareness of that other as being,
in some fundamental way, related to the gazer, as much spatially (by
virtue of one's closeness or distance) as otherwise. The constitution
of space, in other words, gives previously unnoticed space to both the
gazed and the gazer-but, then, space itself becomes progressively
elusive (it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish it from any
Other space) until it later on begins, quite literally, to disappear. That
is, suddenly there is more and more space that gazed and gazer have in
common, can exclude and even forget but neither can really any
longer appropriate--except, that is, indirectly through provisional ex-
changes treating one's own association with that space as a sort of cur-
rency for the exercise in some new form of "non-territorial" national
sovereignty or "non-territorial" private property vis-A-vis the other (or
both). So, for example, it has been doubted that the English common
law was ever in danger-as Maitland once suggested-of being over-
come by the Roman Civil law.3"3 Yet, that hypothesis becomes much
more understandable if one reframes it in terms of the initial discom-
fort and following negotiations that the somewhat sudden awareness
of the existence of a powerful, legally other so close in space as well
303. See generally FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, English Law and the Renaissance, in
SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F.W. MAITLAND 135 (Helen M. Cam ed., 1957) (1907). For
a institutional re-assessment of Maitland's theory, see William Searle Holdsworth, The Re-
ception of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century, 28 L.Q. REv. 131 (1912), thus
[w]e cannot think ... that the defects in the substantive and adjective rules of the
common law, great thought they were, rendered the Reception of Roman Law, as
actually administered on the continent, probable, even if it had been possible. But
it is quite true that it was these defects which made the jurisdiction of the new
courts and councils of this period absolutely necessary in the interests both of good
government and of legal development.
Id. at 139. For a re-assessment of Maitland's theory highlighting changes in the intellectual
history of English law, see J.H. Baker, English law and the Renaissance, 1985 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 44, 46-61.
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as otherwise must have determined amongst the common lawyers and
their age-old yet not untroubled institutions.
Secondly, and just as importantly, both those outer mappings and
replacements from within and those inner spatializations of law's
many domains, ultimately led to a veritable obsession with identity
and origins--cumulatively, an obsession with the identity and origins
of the West as a whole. Or, to put it differently, there started in early
modernity a rather momentous shift from the earlier taking place of
the nation state and of the rule of law through bare, situated space
immediately at hand, to a now somewhat more abstract thinking and
then representing of it either from within or from without-yet, still
largely as a space lying "out-there" and so, reflexively, from the
viewpoint of the subject.3" The spatial metaphors of which Des-
cartes' famous Discourse on Method was replete seem a good exam-
ple of the change, heightened role of space at the threshold of moder-
nity-as well as of its elusiveness and promise.
It is true that we have no example of people demolishing all the houses in
town for the sole purpose of rebuilding them in a different way to make
the streets more beautiful; but one does see many people knock down their
own in order to rebuild them, and that even in some cases they have to do
this because the houses are in danger of falling down and the foundations
are insecure. With this example in mind, I felt convinced that it would be
unreasonable for an individual to conceive the plan of reforming a State by
changing everything from the foundations up and by overthrowing it in
order to set it up again, or even to reform the body of sciences or the order
established in our schools for teaching it, but that, on the other hand ... I
could not do better than undertake once and for all to be rid of them in or-
der to replace them afterwards either by better ones, or even by the same,
once I had adjusted them by the plumb-line of reason. And I firmly be-
lieved that, by this means, I would succeed in ordering my life much better
than if I built only on old foundations and leaned on principles inculcated
in me in youth without having ever examined them to see if they were
true. 305
304. See generally Barbara J. Shapiro, Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England,
21 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1968).
305. RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, in FRENCH AND ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS 13, Discourse 2
(Charles W. Elliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son Co. 1910) (1889).
For, although I could see several difficulties in this course, they were not all totally
irremediable, nor are they comparable to those which arise in the reformation of
the least things affecting the State. These great bodies are too difficult to raise up
again, once knocked down, or even to hold up, once shaken, and their fall can only
be heavy. Then, as for their imperfections, if they have any, and the mere diversity
among them suffices to assure us that many of them have imperfections, usage had
doubtless softened many of them considerably, and had even insensibly averted or
corrected many which one could not have so well remedied by prudence. Finally,
these imperfections are almost always more bearable than changing them would
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Now, to the extent that representations of legal places evoked
space largely to replace it with its particular reflections,3°6 in the long
run that shift was bound to destroy space while reifying its many re-
flections as the true if interchangeable matter of those representations.
Within national boundaries, for example, premodern spatializations
are now replaced by progressively open, multiple and ever-
multiplying disciplinary territorializations that, as increasingly ab-
stract legal representations, at first seemed rather harmless, yet later
on would help implode the collective body of the modem. We must
leave to another occasion an examination of that third stage in this
proposed history of legal space. Here, suffice only to stress that, at
first, legal modernity seems to be progressively made up, in Europe,
by continually re-defined yet clearly marked-out networks or bodies-
legal territories--each of which would be regarded, at first at least, as
being superiorem non recognoscens. However-born of repeated if
largely asymmetric and often entirely accidental struggles leading to
the making of the nation state and of the rule of law-such legal net-
works or bodies now claimed a name and a place of birth-an iden-
tity---capable of providing them with a sharper sense of what they
might be, and where they might have come originally from. But how
might an identity ever be found-whether within or without the nation
state and the rule of law-if its name and place turn out to be, as later
in modernity they did in fact turn out to be, a silent name and an
empty place?
Unsurprisingly, the emergence of the nation state and of the rule
of law-their taking place, their taking roots-and the subsequent
outer mappings, replacements from within and inner spatializations of
the new legal machinery leading to more and more abstract legal dis-
positifs-were to have a considerable impact on the art of comparison,
and its use of space.3 7 A move, in particular, is now set to occur from
be, in the same way that the high roads which wind round between mountains be-
come gradually so smooth and convenient by dint of being much used, that it is
much better to follow them than to undertake to go more directly by scrambling up
rocks and going down to the very foot of precipices.
Id.
306. This is still the case today when, for example, the police will have been on the scene
of an accident, but the court will have simply heard of it; or a contract made in London will be
held to be valid in Paris without, however, having to be made a second time; etc.
307. It has been suggested how "[tihe complete recognition of the new branch of legal sci-
ence may best be dated from the year 1869. In that same year the Society of Comparative
Legislation was founded in Paris, and Sir Henry Maine was appointed the first Professor of
Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence at Oxford." Sir Frederick Pollock, The History of
Comparative Jurisprudence, 5 J. Soc'y COMP. LEGIS. 74, 86 (1903).
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earlier, more parochial legal concerns, whereby the art of comparison
was mainly employed to supplement or to clarify the local law com-
pared3 08 -to newer, more cosmopolitan preoccupations whereby, ap-
parently, comparisons can now be fruitfully employed to discover-
elsewhere-the legally other, what they looked like and what they
were up to and-from there-what, in turn, the gazers themselves
might look like, and might be up to. Comparisons, that is, could sud-
denly be of great use-but on closer inspection their use was more in
the return of the Same (whether after or at the end of it) than in the
advent of the truly Other. And, of course, the take-off of industrializa-
tion and of colonization was bound to intensify the need for such spe-
cific, professional knowledge. But, again, how may that move have
become possible, in the first place?
To begin with, the art of legal comparison was bound to reflect,
and then to radicalize, what rather specific concept of natural-physical
space had been gaining visibility within.3" That is, if inside the nation
state and the rule of law physical, natural space becomes rapidly mar-
ginal in what process there occurred of self-reflexive inner spatializa-
tions of the legal territories of modernity, in the outside world physi-
cal, natural space remains crucial for it is capable of inaugurating and
maintaining difference. Thus Montesquieu famously argued that it is
only after engaging with the physical, natural environment that one
can properly capture the precise workings of the institutions under
scrutiny-yet the sense of that argument may be different from what it
has been normally understood to be. 10 Outside one's own nation state
and one's own rule of law, physical, natural space becomes crucial in
308. In England, for an example of these premodern comparisons, see, e.g., Sir John
Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie, in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE
MODERN ERA ix (S.B. Chrimes ed. & trans., Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1979) (1942); SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999); CHRISTOPHER
ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., Seldon Society
1975) (1531).
309. See supra 5.
310. So, for example, it is
[l]a bontd des terres d'un pays y dtablit naturellement la d6pendance. Les
gens de la campagne, qui y font la principale partie du peuple, ne sont pas si
jaloux de leur libert6; ils sont trop occup6s et trop pleins de leurs affaires par-
ticuli~res. Une campagne qui regorge de biens craint le pillage, elle craint
une arm6e....
Ainsi, le gouvernement d'un seul se trouve plus souvent dans les pays fer-
tiles, et le gouvernement de plusieurs dans les pays qui ne le sont pas: ce qui
est quelquefois un d6dommagement
MONTESQUIEU, L'Esprit des Lois: et la Querelle de L'esprit des Lois 1748-1750, in (EuvRES
COMPLtTES 527, 632 (1964).
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that it helps naturalizing what is effectively internal legal space as
"foreign" legal space-thus making it naturally foreign. Radicalizing
physical, natural space-giving physical, natural space roots on which
legal space can hang-also makes it legitimate to keep that foreign le-
gal space separate and so available for comparison (in the fashion of
much natural school thinking) or, in a mirror-like gesture, separate but
unavailable for comparison (like by contrast historicism would be in-
clined to object). Thus, Montesquieu for example argued, laws are
strictly related to the particular environment where people live and
sustain themselves. 3'1
The representation of comparisons' many spaces based on a spa-
tial matrix available within-developed around several different tra-
jectories. Internally, for example, the very emergence, for example, of
a law of contract and then a law of tort out of an all-encompassing
property law (this is, for example, what happened in England)--could
not but encourage the newly born discipline of comparative law to
adopt for the outside what virtually identical, spatially structured, con-
ceptual legal tools and practices could be found to lie at the very core
of each particular new legal discipline available within. Take-to
mention another example-the case of continental comparative law-
yers, whereby by the time the modern discipline of comparative law is
finally born, the complex debates generated around the nineteenth
century movements for codification had succeeded to produce or to re-
produce a large reservoir of theoretical and practical experiences to
which comparative lawyers in search of the legally other would be
easily drawn. On the other hand, however, it is interesting to note that
the newly born discipline of comparative law never managed, it has
been argued, to create its own, specific conceptual grids.312
311.
Les lois ont un tr~s grand rapport avec la faqon dont les divers peuples se
procurent la subsistance. In faut un code de lois plus dtendu pour un peuple
qui s'attache au commerce et A la mer, que pour un peuple qui se contente de
cultiver ses terres. 11 en faut un plus grand pour celui-ci que pour un peuple
qui vit de ses troupeaux. I1 en faut un plus grand pour ce dernier que pour un
peuple qui vit de la chasse.
Id. at 634.
312. See generally David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Compara-
tive Law?, 46 Am. J. CoMP. L. 719 (1998). Thus, in noting how "a developmental disjuncture
has occurred in the relationship between [comparative law's] objectives and methods," so that
[c]ertain 'traditional' objectives of those thinking about and using comparative law
have shaped its current methods, but new objectives have emerged and others have
become more pressing, and current methods often have limited value for achieving
them.... Comparative law [it is argued] has no language! It can point to a small
set of specialized nouns as its own, but nouns do not make a language. A language
236 [Vol. 41
90
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss1/4
NOTATIONS ON THE MATTER OF LEGAL SPACE
One other consequence of that move was that what more inward-
looking concerns there continue to be, will now become the almost
exclusive hunting grounds of "national" lawyers-who will then be-
come increasingly keen to keep the more cosmopolitan lawyers at bay.
Accordingly, any newer, outer preoccupation correspondently if
somewhat briefly becomes the more and more specialized preserve of
public international law and of private comparative law proper.
Again, the separation between public international law and private
comparative law is best seen as a separation "from within"-from
within the privateness of Western law in general.313 However, the in-
ternal specificity of those two fields of knowledge would be thema-
tized as lying in that, while public international law directs its gaze to
the public other-that is, the foreign nation state seen as an official-
comparative law, by contrast, looks at the private other-that is, to
each nation's particular legal past (from which the legal present can
now be clearly and proudly distinguished), legal future (the legal ends
that, by comparison, can be found to belong to the various national
laws compared) or legal self (the logical, analytical core of each na-
tion's own legal universe). It is now, for example, that in England
what one may call the "Civil law hypothesis" begins to gain lasting if
often somewhat undeserved credit amongst English common lawyers.
The point however is that in so doing legal comparisons become cru-
cial in quietly setting out, quietly maintaining and then quietly dis-
missing the different legal domains under scrutiny, in their own "es-
sential," "innermost" or even "functional" or "structural" being. No
surprise then that comparative law's new legal places-the past, the
future and the self seen from without-will one day prove to have
been, right from the start, the latest, most subtle and, on occasion,
even pernicious set of, in fact, inward-looking, reflexive spatializa-
tions of some newly acquired territorial, even imperial, geographical,
religious, political and symbolic general identity.
31. Space(s) of Exception. Things will change yet again later in
modernity. As tribunals, prisons, schools, etc. begin slowly to turn
outwards and inwards at the same time-it becomes increasingly ap-
develops where members of a community seek to explain aspects of the data or re-
ality with which they deal. Physics has a language; sociology has perhaps more
than one. I suggest that the comparative law community has no language because
its members seldom pursue objectives that could generate such a language, and
that there is much to be gained by pursuing objectives that are likely to do so.
Id. at 7-8.
313. See supra 4.
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parent how they had been, all along, at once places of prior spaces
(individually and collectively, the territories of the nation state and the
rule of law) and spaces of future places. But, then, how is the legal
space of late modernity? Might it be the case perhaps that in law, like
it has been said of Francesco's art, "there is no space left for any
painting"?31 4 Should that be so, then a problem I suggest would be
perhaps not so much, or not immediately, that of identifying which
those late modem spaces might be, or what they might have become,
or what they might be there for. That would be to insist on mere cal-
culating, instrumental thinking-one that in the present circumstances
would probably, recursively lead to further, increasingly imponderable
complexities." 5 Meditating thinking, by contrast, would be seeking to
capture how those spaces might be in today's increasingly unconven-
tional world.3 16 What for example may the "exceptional" legislation
following events such as the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, the
war in Afghanistan, the second war in Iraq and the marches that have
sought to oppose those events-what may that legislation tell us of the
matter of legal space? We can of course choose merely to condemn
that legislation, or analyze it in its particular text or even as part and
parcel of an institutional context that is available for (legal) reading,
measuring and calculating-but it is doubtful that any of those strate-
gies would lead us very far.317 Much more productively, by contrast,
one could try to capture that legislation in some of its deeper, more re-
vealing implications-might we be, for example, before one of
Deleuze's symptoms, or one of Lyotard's figures, or even one of Der-
rida's archives-thus hopefully re-enabling ourselves to resist, endure
or perhaps even exit those events as we think it best?3"8 Baudrillard,
for example, has suggested that in today's world of generalized ex-
change such events show how "[o]nly symbolic violence is generative
of singularity. '"3 19 Is that really so? What then would that tell us of
the how and of the heartland of late modem legal space? Like in the
314. DIDI-HUBERMAN, supra note 230 ("Non c' piii spazio per alcuna pittura.") (author's
translation).
315. On calculating, instrumental thinking, see supra$ 3.
316. On meditating thinking, see Stramignoni, Meditating Comparisons, supra note 215.
317. One central problem would be the increasing emptiness of the language being em-
ployed in and around such legislation. See generally COLLATERAL LANGUAGE (John Collins &
Ross Glover eds., 2002), showing the ambiguity with which terms such as "evil," "freedom,"
"justice," or "terrorism" are being employed in recent years.
318. For a recent, imaginative attempt at "exodus" from modernity, see generally HARDT
& NEGRI, supra note 42. For a critique, see generally DEBATING EMPIRE (Gopal Balakrishnan
ed., 2003).
319. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE SPIRIT OF TERRORISM 29 (Chris Turner trans., Verso 2003).
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case of pre-modern and then modem legal space, the answer might be
far from obvious-nor could it be properly tackled at once. So here
the point has been simply yet resolutely to invite meditating, non-
instrumental thinking-that is to say, to suspend judgment-and high-
light how the complex and largely hidden interplay in law between
what is normally understood by legal space and "other-spaces" (events
that are, quite literally, the heartland of legal space) is generally ig-
nored by lawyers. Could that interplay be brought out in sight? And
what might that help one see? Neither a solution for any of the very
specific problems that absorb everyday legal practice, nor a theory
that could never alone account for the very historicity of it all 20-
Francesco's story, it seems to me, could nevertheless be one good
starting point to think about that crucial interplay, as and when that
story speaks of struggle, separation, resolution, reform and then the re-
emergence of one's own history as the matter of artistic space. In par-
ticular, I argued, many modern theories and practices of law would be
most fruitfully seen in their deeper, eventful relation with the histories
of those who think them, discuss them or put them in practice-
histories that should not, however, be seen merely by reference to
their legal texts or institutional contexts but should be investigated on
their own terms, by trying to bring out the heartland that is always,
though always in different ways, the incipit of them all. We might
thus make sense of them and of the matter they represent in ways that
have gone so far unnoticed. Heidegger's analytics, in particular-the
radical ontology of the Da-sein of law-provide, so my argument
goes, a series of powerful insights into those histories-especially
when such analytics invite us to reconsider absolute, universal space
as a spatiality or "language" of sorts. Understood in the spatiality of
their eventful language, legal theories and practices (the legal space
they institute and rule) suddenly materialize as the evidence of their
politics, the evidence of their histories, inseparable from their heart-
land. Like for Francesco's unsuccessful attempts to paint the face of a
pious St Rosalia that appears on the canvas but is so very foreign to
his own personal history-so too the heartland of legal space is al-
ways there though it may be impossible to measure it, compare it or
trace it in the normal way. Each time.the excess of one's own indi-
vidual or collective theories, the excess of one's own individual or
collective practices-that heartland is, in brief, the excess of the art of
law and, as such, is and remains beyond control, comparison or his-
320. Indeed, Heidegger asks, how could mere theory care for the "light in which a seeing,
as a theoria, can first live and move?" HEIDEGGER, BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 35, ch. 5.
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tory as these are normally understood. And it is that heartland-it is
that incontrollable, incomparable, untimely excess-that, it seems to
me, may be truly at stake in many of today's most difficult questions
about the future of Western democracy and the rule of law.
Several after Heidegger have taken up that groundbreaking move,
at least implicitly-the move, that is, from space to spatiality to lan-
guage-and they have then developed analytics of their own that
could further help us understand the matter of legal space as this pre-
sents itself to us nowadays. Yet not enough lawyers have yet given
those post-Heideggerian analytics some serious consideration. While
there is hardly any doubt that absolute, universal legal space helped
modernity stabilize itself-might it not be the case that, at this point,
that same absolute, universal space has become one eminent reason
why today we feel so overwhelmed by events that appear to be bigger
than our institutions, legal or otherwise, can possibly handle? Is there
really no way out-if not necessarily forward-of modernity's widen-
ing discontents? And on the other hand can anyone in their right state
of mind afford to disregard such discontents? To the extent that legal
representations are, as I have suggested, a comparing as such that
lawyers make from a heartland rather than being universal truths or
universal conventions about the world we inhabit-we might have to
consider carefully whether, whatever the legal theory or practice each
time in question, the legal space that such theory or practice institutes
and rules may not be little more than just an exceptional place, in the
precise sense of being a true place of exception-the exception, that
is, of Western law.
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